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With all their graphs, models and puzzles that sometimes fill first-year students with 
awe and wonder, economics textbooks are relatively simple in their content. They 
sketch what seems to be a logical, if abstract, picture of the economic world, but 
they do not engage with any of the serious difficulties that in modern economic 
theory passes for economic practice and policy. You will not learn from them that 
economics does not have an ontologically objective subject, that economic life is 
the product of human (collective) intentionality or that there are more demanding 
elements in economic decision making than finding means to a given end.
The book before you, on the other hand, examines a long list of mysteries hidden 
from those elementary advances in economics that are reproduced more or less 
consciously by theorists, practitioners and students of economics who in their stud-
ies have not been daring enough to challenge or qualify received economic wisdom. 
Insofar, it is argued here, as these ‘hidden’ aspects of economic reality are important 
for its explanation and description, they should not be overlooked either by aca-
demic economists or by policy architects.
The papers collected in this volume address a wide spectrum of the apparent 
shortcomings of economic theory, generally falling into two related categories. One 
deals with the naturalistic pretence of economics that assumes the capacity to study 
economic realities in the same way as other disciplines study nature. This mistaken 
assumption results in other misleading postulates, the most harmful of which is 
probably that the subject-matter of economics can be treated as ontologically inde-
pendent both of human intentions and from human purposes. The other category of 
shortcomings deals with the consequences of the attempt to render economics a 
value-free and predictive science. This allows paradoxes to emerge, for example, 
the inability of economic theory to account for the central concepts of economics, 
such as well-being, in meaningful and normative terms. The values of daily life 
associated with well-being, such as bona fide dealings and natural justice (e.g. the 
prejudice in favour of promise-keeping), are excluded because they cannot be quan-
tified and thereby measured or mathematically expressed.
xiv
The trouble, however, is that the language employed to describe the economic 
world – as well as judgements of relevance necessary for its analysis – are value 
laden. When we think of welfare, it is impossible to strip it of all its normative con-
tent without seriously altering its meaning. Assuming that a person’s welfare is self- 
centred, for example, it depends only on her consumption bundle, and that the only 
goal of a person is to maximise her welfare (as well excluding the possibility that a 
person’s welfare can depend other people’s well-being) is to make strong normative 
statements which often fly in the face of facts about people’s motivations and 
desires. This is just one example of a much broader problem of the entanglement of 
descriptive and normative elements in the language and content of economics.
This challenge is often overcome, or at least concealed, either by the formalisa-
tion of economic concepts in mathematical terms or the rendering of the subject 
matter in the form of mathematical theorems. The ubiquitous use of mathematical 
formalism in economic analysis is a consequence of its assumed naturalistic orien-
tation and of the attendant modelling of its methodologies on those of various natu-
ral sciences. Methodological borrowing is justified by the apparent resemblance of 
economic and natural phenomena: both are said to be subject to laws and regulari-
ties that are ontologically independent from human will. But this putative resem-
blance rests on the restatement of the subject matter in terms that exclude any and 
all human-centred values. The neoclassical school of economics, which, despite its 
commonly recognised flaws, remains the core of the economics curriculum, teaches 
that it is possible to explain economic phenomena using theoretical models that 
isolate the economic motives of actors from other factors conditioning the socio- 
economic world. These models treat the latter as unnecessary, ‘disturbing causes’. 
The truth-value of these constructed (read: ‘non-existent’) objects of economic 
inquiry becomes a matter of their consistency with hypothetical assumptions rather 
than empirical verification.
In opposition to that approach, one of the major themes of this book is the onto-
logical subjectivity of economics whose reality is constituted by institutions. 
Institutions in turn are collectively, that is to say, socially, created by means of lan-
guage, in shared or intersubjective meanings and interpretations. Economic objects 
are here shown to be innate in human intentionality and judgement; they emerge 
from human activity with moral purposes embodied in them. Economic phenomena 
are traditionally interpreted as the instantiations of laws. However, they turn out 
merely to be statements describing the behaviour of theoretical economic models. 
The use of models to explain the workings of economic systems is shown inherently 
to be flawed.
The four preceding volumes of this series have covered the limitations of eco-
nomic models and consequences thereof. Several essays in this collection focus on 
one particularly important weakness of economic models: their limiting assump-
tions regarding the identity and reasoning powers of economic agents, particularly 
the human agent, has come to be defined as no more than a collection of prefer-
ences. As the subject of economic science and analysis, human beings have lost 
their distinctiveness as persons, as autonomous moral agents, having been replaced 
by impersonal economic agents, without a will other than the one supplied by 
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economic theory, and therefore necessarily amoral. This too is a result of the natu-
ralistic orientation that denies economic agents the capacity of practical reason. In 
consequence, it also denies them the need and ability to learn what is good for them 
and to those around them, and to make value choices in accordance with the sort of 
person they consider themselves to be.
Typical dismissals of the problems posed in the forthcoming essays are rhetorical 
questions like: Why should economists bother? Why not leave the unending criti-
cism to philosophers, sociologists, and perhaps theologians? They like to busy 
themselves with theoretical quandaries without seeming to understand the practi-
calities of the economic world. A familiar answer is the well-known fact that where 
theory meets the real world, economic models turn out to be unsuitable or the insuf-
ficient source of knowledge about the causes, nature and consequences of the 
observed economic phenomena. It becomes evident, for example, that economic 
actors facing situations of choice cannot be sure what the consequences of alterna-
tive lines of action will be. With imperfect information or incomplete markets, ratio-
nal economic calculations might be impossible to perform, and instrumental 
rationality, such as means-ends schema, could not be relied on. Since unquantifiable 
uncertainty is one of the most enduring features of our contemporary economic life, 
persons do not routinely act rationally, they rather base their decisions on their 
beliefs about what they trust to be right. To further complicate things, much of their 
decision making is streamlined by institutions which form a specific embodiment of 
collective intentionality and collective rationality. Theories and models that do not 
account for these complexities are bound to be contradicted by empirical data. If 
used as basis for policy prescriptions, they might and indeed do become sources of 
harmful practices – think of recent debates about austerity measures.
In recent years, however, an even more serious objection to modern economic 
theory has come to the forefront. The paradigm theory contrived for authorised 
economic behaviour, namely the utility-maximising economic agent, is now seen 
not only as mistaken but as downright destructive. This problem was recognized 
already by the initiators of what came to be known as Corporate Social Responsibility. 
The utility-maximising agent has, understandably, acquired a bad reputation, but 
there is also a growing perception that we need to reject the myth of universal pros-
perity being arrived at chiefly by individuals pursuing self-chosen good.
The upshot of the reflections undertaken in this volume is that accurate under-
standing of the claims made by economics and of the methods employed by it 
requires a deep engagement with its underlying theoretical and philosophical pre-
suppositions. Otherwise, economics is bound to stray further not only from practical 
applicability to real-world phenomena but also from our essential humanity.
As a start, it might help to conceive of economics as a discipline based on capaci-
ties, tendencies and undetermined potentialities rather than strict laws of nature. 
Economic explanation would also gain from a broader and therefore better under-
standing of the nature of human choice, its dispositions to virtue and vice, and its 
motivational complexity. What follows from this is the need to approach economic 
modelling in ways that do not abstract from essential aspects of human nature, par-
ticularly because they do not lose the ability to identify the economic agents under 
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investigation as a human person. If it is claimed that a model has a realistic connec-
tion with the world it describes, then we must be able to establish ‘to what’ and ‘to 
whom’ the description applies.
Lastly, it is rarely realised but should always be emphasised that economics as a 
scientific discipline joins other social and human sciences in their search, or rather 
their specification, of what forms the ultimate end of social endeavours and policy 
prescriptions. In economics, the ultimate end falls under the rubric of the concept of 
well-being, whose content is undecidable on any simple, abstract or deterministic 
model. Its specification requires an understanding of the culturally distinct and 
socially constructed character of human needs, desires and preferences as well as 
enlisting the values and moral perspectives of economic subjects themselves. Such 
an approach surpasses the limits of scientific logic and blends into the logic of nor-
mative – that is, ethical and moral – justification. It employs an axiologically richer 
account of human motivation, which goes beyond the calculation of individual, 
future-oriented gains; it exceeds the limits of utility maximisation, allowing space 
for people’s need and desire to do the right thing. It is important to realise that most 
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Abstract The natural sciences study objects; the social sciences are concerned 
with events. Objects have properties, events are the products of human intentional-
ity. Modern economics is built on the assumption that events can be transformed by 
a process of abstraction into things with properties of the sort that permits the for-
mulation of law-like generalities. These assumptions have resulted in the paradigm 
of the value-free economic agent. This paper rejects this paradigm and defends the 
claim that the domestication of the methodology of the natural sciences in econom-
ics is a category mistake. Instead, economics should develop a methodology that is 
proper to its subject.
1.1  Introduction
The ambition of modern economics to resemble to the maximum possible extent the 
natural sciences involves the reconstruction of economic processes into objects that 
resemble the objects of the natural sciences. This move permits the use of causation 
theories that are analogous to causation in the natural sciences where causation 
depends on the properties of the objects participating in the phenomenon under 
study. But economic events, unlike the objects of nature, come about through human 
effort and intention. Their characteristics are given not by nature but by the human 
agent. Natural objects have no meaning; human intentions are inherently value 
P. Róna (*) 
Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
e-mail: peter.rona@bfriars.ox.ac.uk
“And wonder if Man’s consciousness
Was a mistake of God’s.”
(Thomas Hardy, I Travel as a Phantom Now)
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laden, the product of human will and intellect. Modern economics excises the 
human will and intellect from the domain it studies and treats the remainder as if it 
were the sort of object one finds in nature, such as molecules, compounds, trees or 
the electrical current. With the indispensable help of this excision, modern econom-
ics formulates law-like generalisations that portray economic events as phenomena 
without moral content. But this outcome is fundamentally at odds with human expe-
rience, and it is certainly not supported by either its predictive or explanatory record. 
The result is that the actual processes of economic life, resting as they do on human 
will and intellect regularly defeat the predictive and explanatory power of modern 
economics, constructed to be innocent of that will and intellect. The tension is obvi-
ous. Either there are economic laws of universal applicability or economic life is, at 
least in part, the life of the human mind and will. The third alternative, namely that 
all humanity is of the same mind and will, does not command the assent anyone 
who is not a professional economist.
The title of this paper, “Made with Words” comes from Thomas Hobbes and 
from an era very much alive to the ontological difference between the natural and 
the moral sciences where the former is concerned with the properties of corporeal 
objects as opposed to the behaviour of incorporeal, or moral entities.1 The XVIIth 
and the first two thirds of the XVIIIth century, still under the influence of Cartesian 
dualism, firmly believed in the existence of both a physical and a non-physical 
world, but by the end of the XVIIIth century the unity of nature had become axiom-
atic, and the idea that the scientific method of the natural sciences could be extended 
to social reality was already propounded by Newton and heartily endorsed by, 
among others, Diderot and D’Alembert. As Newton put it, “if natural philosophy in 
all its parts, by pursuing this Method, shall at length be perfected, the bounds of 
moral philosophy will be also enlarged.” Throughout the XIXth and the XXth cen-
tury, economics, born with Adam Smith and the dawn of Rationalism, turned to the 
notion of the unity of nature and the applicability of the methods of natural science 
to all of reality with increasingly ungovernable fervour. Einstein claimed that eco-
nomics could be reduced to microphysics, and some Logical Positivists thought that 
sociology was no more than a particular instantiation of molecular genetics. The 
unity of nature axiom spelled for much of the XIXth and the XXth centuries the 
eclipse of ontology and, correspondingly, introduced a long period during which the 
nature of the subject matter under study, the examination of its properties was 
largely ignored. The eminent Harvard philosopher, Hilary Putnam went so far as to 
write as recently as 2004 that ontology was “a stinking corpse” in need of urgent 
interment.
But surely, if Galileo Galilei was right in claiming, as he did, in his The Assayer, 
that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics there are other 
books about other realities and about human experience that are not written in that 
language. (That he was not right was shown brilliantly by Eugene Wigner in 1959, 
1 Hobbes’ phrase was extensively explored in the context of political theory by Pettit (2008).
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but that is another story.)2 So, what is the nature of economic reality and how does 
it differ from natural objects?
1.2  The Objects of Nature and the Objects of Thought
The objects of nature exist independently of any theory or hypothesis about them. 
Their properties are unaffected by any human thought or action. It is this character-
istic of natural objects  - their independence from and indifference to any theory 
about them  - that makes it possible to formulate verifiable theories about them. 
Substances exist regardless of what we make of them, and their transformation 
under various circumstances is the consequence of their properties interacting with 
the properties of other natural objects rather than the human attribution of such 
properties. Their nature cannot be changed by regulation or persuasion. They are 
impervious to incentives. It is a fundamental requirement for the validity of any 
scientific theory that the object of the theory be separate from the theory about it. 
Scientific experiments are repeatable precisely because the properties of the subject 
matter of the experiment are constant, and, moreover, they are universal. The 
valences of the elements in Mendeleev’s table are the same in Denmark, Argentina 
or the Philippines.
In sharp contrast, the objects of economic activity are objects of thought. They 
are mind-, or as Russell has it, representation dependent,3 brought into being through 
collective intentionality. Although the objects of thought may result in the produc-
tion, distribution and consumption of tangible, corporeal objects, the object of eco-
nomic thought itself is incorporeal. A ‘market’ may be a physical space, but the 
economically significant aspect of a market is not its physical configuration, not its 
physical properties, but, rather, the properties of the activities carried on therein. 
The economically significant properties of physical objects are not their physical 
properties, but the terms and conditions for their ownership, exchange and the con-
ditions for the determination of their value. These intangibles are not properties of 
the objects themselves, but, rather, they are the generally accepted social conditions 
for their creation, ownership, use and consumption. Economic objects come into 
being as the fruit of human thought relating to both their conception as objects as 
well as the social organisation that permits their creation and sustenance. These 
objects are social facts, the embodiments of collective intentionality, emerging from 
a collective ethos and they come into being through language, reflecting the thought 
that gives rise to them. Because they are the product of human intention, they are 
inherently subjective, reflecting the intent of those who create them. Thus, ‘money’, 
a piece of paper with specific size, colour design and printing is endowed with 
specific properties and functions by the collective intentionality with which it is 




constituted and with which it is continuously redefined. The piece of paper is an 
objective or corporeal object, but its significance and role are not a function of its 
physical being. Indeed, money no longer needs to have any physical form at all.
1.3  What Is Intentionality?
Intention, including intentional action, is one of the most complex aggregate of 
issues in philosophy, involving the mind/body problem, causation, knowledge, 
truth, practical reasoning, ethics and ontology. Economic events, the complex 
aggregate product of intentionality  – including opposing or contradictory inten-
tions – are the products of intentional human action.
Philosophical interest in intentionality, developed first by Aristotle’s medieval 
followers, most notably St. Thomas Aquinas, was largely forgotten until revived by 
Brentano, Husserl and Meinong. The publication of G. E. M. Anscombe’s Intention4 
combined the Aristotelian – Thomist tradition with analytic philosophy in place of 
Brentano’s empiricism. Since then the philosophy of intentionality has been greatly 
expanded by, among others, Peter Geach,5 John Searle,6 Graham Priest7 and 
Tim Crane.8
A review of the many theories and subtleties of intentionality is beyond the scope 
of this paper, and for our purposes the simplest definition of the notion will suffice. 
It is the capacity of the mind to direct itself onto any object, be it existing or not 
existing and be it a concept or a thing. For the narrower purposes of this paper inten-
tionality is the name of the mental constitution and representation of the habits, 
beliefs and rules with which objects are endowed with exchangeable value, how that 
value is created, preserved, diminished and exchanged, in short Adam Smith’s 
famous human „propensity to truck, barter and exchange”.
Whereas modern economists, such as the Nobel Laureate N. Gregory Mankiw 
believes that economists “approach the subject of the economy in much the same 
way as a physicist approaches the study of matter and a biologist approaches the 
study of life... (economists) devise theories, collect data, and analyse these data in 
an attempt to verify their theories”,9 Smith sees the heart of the matter in the „offer-
ing of an argument to persuade one to do so and so.”10 These two conceptions of 
economics could not be further apart. According to Mankiw, the subject matter is 
much like matter, harbouring data which is there to be collected for the verification 
4 Anscombe (1957)








of some causal generalisation. For Adam Smith it is about the argument to persuade, 
given our propensity to truck, barter and exchange. Mankiw believes that economic 
objects have an objective, independent existence. Smith, in contrast, believes that 
they exist only by virtue of human propensities, that the economy is not a collection 
of objects but an array of human propensities.
A further specification is that the intentionality at play in the economy is collec-
tive. The intentions of the individual agent operate in the context of a collective, 
socially constructed and socially legitimated intentionality. There are no economic 
events within the domain of a single person. Whereas the protagonist of modern 
economics is the utility maximising homo oeconomicus with a single motive for his 
actions and the exclusive prerogative to determine his utilities, in fact, utilities are 
social constructs and so are the rules with which choice among available utilities 
may be made.
The intentional objects of human economic activity, Smith’s propensities, are 
incorporeal, rendering the usual techniques of abstraction and idealisation regularly 
employed in the natural sciences problematic. The elimination of „disturbing 
causes” – to use Mill’s famous phrase, − leaves after the elimination some corpore-
ally identifiable object with verifiable properties. But in the case of incorporeal 
objects this is not possible. The conceptualisation of experience may produce a use-
ful metaphor or icon for the sum of that experience, but it is not its distillation 
through the elimination of eliminable components because such components are 
themselves abstractions. A demand curve is an effective visual representation of the 
abstraction called demand, but it is not the sum and cannot be the sum of empirical 
data. As Nicholas Kaldor noted, the enemy that defeats the successful summary is 
time. Demand for a good takes shape over time, but during the same period other 
relevant factors, such as the availability of substitute goods, a change in interest 
rates or the level of confidence, the operation of monetary policy, etc. alters the 
context in which the demand takes place, and the demand curve cannot account for 
such changes. Economists deal with this problem with the help of the ceteris pari-
bus assumption, but the conceit that everything else remains constant is just that, an 
arbitrary conceit. The intuition that there is a relationship of some sort between 
prices and quantities is undoubtedly a useful generalisation, but it does not have the 
sort of truth value that a typical law in physics or any branch of the natural sciences 
carries.
1.4  Is This Just a Question of Complexity?
It is frequently claimed that the difference between the facts of nature and social 
facts is one of quantity rather than quality. The facts leading to price formation, 
according to this view, are qualitatively the same as those that produce nuclear fis-
sion. The difference is only that there are more of them. Social facts involve greater 
complexities because they are the composites of a much larger number of compo-
nents than the facts of nature. But this claim is mistaken for two rather fundamental 
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reasons. First, social facts are intentional facts, depending on human intentionality, 
whereas natural facts do not contain any intentionality. Second, social facts operate 
in an open world where new facts come and old facts go without there being any 
principle regulating the coming and going, in contrast with natural facts where the 
context, as in a laboratory experiment, can be determined. The difference between 
facts that come into being through human agreement and custom and facts that are 
totally independent of us is quite basic to science. It is the precondition of the sepa-
ration of the experimentally verifiable theory from its object. If monetary theory 
were about the properties of the piece of paper serving as a ten pound note, it would 
have no difficulty in resembling the natural sciences. But it is not about that piece of 
paper. Monetary theory aims to be about the functions, purposes, effects and 
responses in individual and collective behaviour we collectively ascribe to the ten 
pound note together with the rules, the terms and conditions we explicitly and 
implicitly posit that renders that note operational. That ceaseless variation in the 
value of that ten pound note is the consequence of the ontological subjectivity of the 
collective intentional object we call money. As Adam Smith had it, the value of that 
ten pound note is a matter of persuasion, a matter of how, through that dialogue 
between buyer and seller and the ceaseless interaction within society at large value 
is arrived at, how they reach agreement that the note is worth more or less or just 
about the same as the object for which it is exchanged.
1.5  Do Economic Objects Exist?
One of the most intensely debated issues in the philosophy of intentionality is 
whether the object of thought must, in fact exist in order to be the object of inten-
tionality. The materialist view answers the question in the affirmative, claiming that 
the existence of imagined objects is an altogether different sort of existence from 
real existence. Others, like Tim Crane, hold that, inasmuch as nonexistent objects 
can have specific properties, they can be the objects of intentionality. If it is reality 
that grounds the truth of a claim and if reality does not contain more than what 
exists, the question what objects exist becomes quite important. If economic objects 
exist in the same sense as molecules, the determinism of modern economics is well 
founded. Economists can then claim to be making discoveries about the world much 
like any natural scientist. Buti if economic objects do not exist, there is nothing that 
can be discovered about them and the claim to science collapses. Non-existent 
objects have no laws of nature and cannot have causal powers because causal pow-
ers require spacio-temporal locations, something non-existent objects do not have.
The non-existence of economic objects – their lack of ontological objectivity – 
does not, however, preclude the possibility of constructing objects with a subjective 
ontology. Sherlock Holmes, Pegasus and the planet Vulcan are all non-existent 
objects, and yet, it is possible to make true as well as false statements about them. It 
is, for example, true that Sherlock Holmes was a detective, and it is not true that he 
was an aerobics instructor. It is true that Pegasus has two wings but not true that it 
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won the Kentucky Derby, etc. In the same way, demand curves, ‘markets’ or ‘mar-
ginal propensities are no easier to locate in the real world than Sherlock Holmes, but 
it is quite possible to make true as well as false statements about them. The demand 
curve is a line in a textbook the shape of which is not the property of any object, but, 
rather, the visual rendering of a collection of generalised characteristics of the rela-
tionship between prices and quantities. A market may be a place – and therefore a 
real object – but need not be in order to possess characteristics of the processes tak-
ing place in real markets. The problem facing economics is compounded by the fact 
that, whereas the three non-existent objects mentioned above are corporeal, this 
form of fictional corporeality in typically unavailable to economic objects. That 
corporeality becomes important when the truth claims about Sherlock Holmes may 
have truth value if they are consistent with the postulated axioms about him. A claim 
that he can fly will not satisfy this condition. Pegasus on the other hand may well be 
able to fly but it cannot smoke a pipe, converse with Watson or solve a crime. The 
question for economics therefore, is how to determine the truth value of claims 
about non-existent intentional objects where the object would be ontologically 
objective if it existed, but where the object not only does not exist, but does not have 
even fictional corporeality. The short answer is that it cannot be done in compliance 
with the requirements for truth value in the natural sciences because truth value in 
the natural sciences is a function of experimental confirmation while the truth value 
of non-existent objects is a matter of consistency with assumptions and postulates. 
(A concrete illustration will be given below in the discussion of Walras.)
Uncertainty about the ontological objectivity of the entity under study leads to a 
failure in demarcating the distinction between theory and its subject matter. This 
failure deprives the theory of its scientific status and leads to the sort of circularity 
noted by Joan Robinson: „Utility is a metaphysical concept of impregnable circu-
larity; utility is the quality in commodities that makes individuals want to buy them, 
but the fact that individuals want to buy them shows that they have utility.”11 A 
comparison of the definition of chemistry set out by Robert Findlay Henry with the 
two on offer from Adam Smith and Mankiw quoted above will reinforce this point. 
According to Henry, „Chemistry attempts to understand transformations between 
substances.”12 If we follow Adam Smith in attempting to formulate a similar defini-
tion of economics, and claim that „economics attempts to understand the nature and 
causes of the wealth of nations”, the question arises whether ‘substances’ are the 
same as ‘wealth’, and whether ‘transformations’ pose an analogous challenge to 
Smith’s ‘nature and causes’ and whether the sort of understanding posited by 
Hendry is the sort of understanding that can be had of wealth.
Substances exist regardless of what we make of them, what utility we apprehend 
in them, and their transformation under various circumstances takes place quite 





are socially constructed – they are ‘social facts’13 – subject to significant and more 
or less continuous reconstitution. Social facts cannot be separated from the theory 
or rules under which they are formulated.
The difficulty of separating subject from theory where the subject has no inde-
pendent ontology is also apparent in Lionel Robbins’ famous definition: „Economics 
is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and 
scarce means which have alternative uses.”14 But ‘ends’ and ‘scarce means’ are 
socially constructed non-existent objects and the ‘human behaviour’ under study is 
an integral part of that social construction. It is human behaviour that constructs 
both the end and the scarcity, and it is the ends and the scarcity that constructs 
human behaviour. We are back to Joan Robinson’s „impregnable circularity”.
Physical objects, such as the chemist’s elements do not have a purpose, an end, a 
telos. The purpose with which they may be endowed, the use to which they are put 
is not a property of these elements. Aristotle’s famous unsolved problem of the 
incommensurability of use value and exchange value – as indeed the constant prob-
lem of incommensurability in economics – cannot be solved if we are searching for 
a ‘value’ that is common to both.15 His beds and shoes do not have either use or 
exchange values. Such values are attributed to these objects by the intentionality of 
the exchanger or user. Whereas the valence of a chemical element is a property of 
that element, exchange and use values are attributions depending upon the intention 
of the agent. The value is in the intentionality as opposed to the valence which is in 
the object. Keynes was acutely aware of the problem but did not quite know what to 
do about it. In a letter to Roy Harrod he wrote:
In chemistry and physics and other natural sciences the object of experiment is to fill in the 
actual values of the various quantities and factors appearing in an equation or a formula; 
and the work when done is once and for all. In economics that is not the case, and to convert 
a model into a quantitative formula is to destroy its usefulness as an instrument of thought … 
I also want to emphasise strongly the point about economics being a moral science. I men-
tioned before that it deals with introspection and with values. I might have added that it 
deals with motives, expectations, psychological uncertainties. One has to be constantly on 
guard against treating the material as constant and homogeneous, even as the material of the 
other sciences, despite its complexity, is constant and homogeneous. It is as though the fall 
of the apple to the ground depended on the apple’s motives, on whether it is worth its while 
falling to the ground, and whether the ground wanted the apple to fall.16
Although Keynes comes very close to recognising intentionality as the ontologi-
cally decisive difference between the moral and the natural sciences, he does not 
solve the dilemma implicit in modern economics17: are economic objects like 
13 Gilbert (1989)
14 Robbins (1932). In a later version the puzzling phrase „behaviour as a relationship” was replaced 
with the notion of „allocation”.
15 Meikle (1955)
16 Letter to Roy Harrod, of 10 July 1938 (misdated 16 July) in Collected Letters of John Maynard 
Keynes Vol XlX, 299–301.
17 In fairness to Keynes, he wrote this letter during the glory days of logical positivism when ontology 
was seen as the thoroughly disreputable branch of philosophy. It is a mark of his genius that he was 
swimming against this tide.
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Newton’s apple that yield data with which the actual values of the various quantities 
and factors in an equation or a formula can be filled, or is the idea of a non-existent 
object burdened with values, introspection, motives and expectations altogether 
absurd? If apples cannot be combined with motives, expectations and psychological 
uncertainties, but economics must nonetheless deal with them, must the apples be 
jettisoned, or is there a way of both having your apples and not having them by 
pretending that what you have is not an apple, but just like one? This, of course, is 
the route proposed by Adam Smith and the classical economists, including Marx, 
when they attribute an abstract character to labour in order to come up with an 
explanation of how different and incommensurable types of labour can nevertheless 
have the kind of homogeneity with which a theory of exchange can be stitched 
together. Smith writes:
The greater part of people, too, understand better what is meant by a quantity of a particular 
commodity than by a quantity of labour. The one is a plain palpable object; the other an 
abstract notion, which, though it can be made sufficiently intelligible, is not altogether so 
natural and obvious.
In seeing the difference between the quantity of commodities and a (non- existent) 
quantity of labour as a matter of degree of naturalness or obviousness, Smith misses 
the fundamental ontological difference.
Mill’s notion that there are apple-like objects that can be understood if separated 
from „disturbing causes” haunts Keynes reasoning. On the one hand, in this same 
letter he deems it „most important... to investigate statistically the order of magni-
tude of the Multiplier” as if the Multiplier were an apple-like object, but on the 
other, he sees that the „material” of economics, unlike that of the natural sciences, 
is „neither constant nor homogeneous”. Is the Multiplier then an apple, or is it one 
of those materials that, due to being infected with motives, is neither constant nor 
homogeneous? Or is it neither? What should one do? Achieve homogeneity with 
Mill’s device of eliminating as a „disturbing cause” anything obstructing homoge-
neity and constancy or admit that the inconstancy and heterogeneity of the „mate-
rial” renders it unsuitable to scientific treatment. Keynes blinks.
Having posited as its singular objective the achievement of scientific status, 
much of modern economics has been about possible ways of overcoming this 
dilemma. The path was first set out in a systematic manner by Léon Walras, and, for 
the most part, remains the basic paradigm of economics. Walras offers his basic 
definition of „pure economics” in the Preface to the fourth and definitive edition of 
his Elements of Pure Economics18 with deceptive clarity: „Pure Economics is, in 
essence, the theory of the determination of prices under a hypothetical regime of 
perfectly free competition.” Note that, unlike Hendry, who is interested in under-
standing the actual transformation of substances, Walras wants to construct a theory 
about price determination under hypothetical circumstances. With this simple state-
ment Walras makes it clear that the subject matter of economic theory, so to speak 




non-existent hypothetical regime. And yet, he and his successors believe that one 
can do science without the apple.
In a passage of enormous significance for the development of modern economic 
theory, anticipating both Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson, he sets out his claim 
with great clarity.
… the physico-mathematical sciences, like the mathematical sciences in the narrow sense, 
do go beyond experience as soon as they have drawn their type concepts from it. From real- 
type concepts, these sciences abstract ideal-type concepts which they define, and on the 
basis of these definitions they construct a priori the whole framework of their theorems and 
proofs... the pure theory of economics ought to take over from experience certain type con-
cepts, like those of exchange, supply, demand, market, capital, income, productive services 
and products. From these real-type concepts the pure science of economics should abstract 
and define ideal-type concepts in terms of which it carries on its reasoning. The return to 
reality should not take place until the science is completed and then only with a view to 
practical applications. Thus, in an ideal market we have ideal prices which stand in exact 
relation to an ideal demand and supply.
Remarkably, he adds a few lines later: „after that they (the scientists) go back to 
experience not to confirm but to apply their conclusions.” (Emphasis added.) He 
concludes his triumphant declaration with the dethroning of Ricardo and Mill and 
the crowning of mathematics:
As to mathematical language, why should we persist in using everyday language to explain 
things in the most cumbrous and incorrect way, as Ricardo has often done and as John 
Stuart Mill does repeatedly in his Principles of Political Economy, when these same things 
can be stated far more succinctly, precisely and clearly in the language of mathematics?
The a priori framework of economic theory is, on this view, the product of two 
abstractions. The first abstraction produces „real-type” concepts from experience, to 
be followed by a second abstraction, which yields „ideal-type” concepts. Although 
Walras does not specify what each of these steps may involve, it seems reasonable 
to surmise from the text that the first of these steps involves some sort of isolation 
and/or reduction, something comparable to Mill’s removal of disturbing causes, 
while the second one is ordinarily called idealisation. Both operations encounter 
serious difficulties when performed on objects of thought. In addition, Walras, as 
indeed all his successors leave us without an explanation as to how the representa-
tion of the ideal-type concept by numbers or symbols might be validated. When we 
substitute a number for that C, standing for capital in an equation, what exactly is 
that capital, and in what sense does that number comprise that C? The principal – 
often the only – known property of the ideal-type concept is that it bears a mathe-
matically expressed relationship to something else. Unless we take as an axiom the 
view urged by Russell or Ryle that only quantifiable things exist, we must somehow 
account for intentionality. Are the numbers or symbols with which the ideal type is 
represented already embedded in experience, or do they materialise out of thin air 
in the course of the abstraction as the real-type and thereafter the ideal-type con-
cepts emerge?
One could continue with an explication of the other great figures of the social 
sciences, such as Max Weber, John Stuart Mill or Carl Menger, but the common 
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denominator is obvious: the methodology of the social sciences purports to create 
an ontologically objective object, but the object with which it ends up is not a suit-
able object for scientific treatment. At the same time, notwithstanding their unsuit-
ability to science these surrogate objects, like allegories, metaphors and similes can 
reveal with great power some truth about a complex and confusing reality. There is 
relationship between supply and demand, between prices and quantities, and Alfred 
Marshall’s two curves do reveal something important about that relationship. But 
price formation in the real world is far more complex and elusive, and, most impor-
tantly, far more a matter contingent on the interplay of an indeterminate number of 
factors than Marshall’s curves allow. It is perfectly reasonable to build idealised 
models in the hopes of gaining some insight, but it is a great mistake to pretend that 
the subject matter of economics can be analogised to that of the natural sciences. 
Unlike the latter, in the famous words of Thomas Hobbes, it is „made with words”.
Perhaps the most important consequence of this view of economics is that moral 
judgment is an inextricable part of its subject matter, that the construction of models 
and hypotheses without regard to that moral judgment leads not to the understand-
ing of some sort of natural reality operating according to the laws of nature, but, 
rather, to an ideology parading as a science in order to be all the more convincing.
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Chapter 2
An Essay on Humble Economics
Łukasz Hardt
Abstract The purpose of this essay is to show that the departure from the Walrasian 
branch of neoclassical economics could lead to conceptualization of economics as 
a humble science, i.e. a science that is aware of its explanatory capabilities, but also 
convinced that discovering unambiguous regularities is not possible. Humble eco-
nomics does not claim the power of formulating explanations which will not need 
further justification. It is based on an ontology of potentialities where one does not 
find laws, but capacities, tendencies, natures, and Aristotelian dynameis. It is based 
on the recognition that there is an irremovable mystery inherent in the functioning 
of the economy.
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2.1  Introductory Remarks
Economics refers to laws, causes, regularities, mechanisms, or dependencies of a 
purely probabilistic nature. These issues are, however, the subject of hot disputes 
among economists themselves. Many of them believe that the explication of eco-
nomic phenomena through their subsumption under laws does not make sense, 
while others would like laws in economics to resemble the status of almost universal 
laws of nature.1 L. Walras was the first to claim that “[…] pure theory of economics 
is a science which resembles the physico-mathematical sciences in every respect” 
(Walras 1874/1984, 71), and then, almost 80 years after the publication of Walras’ 
Éléments d’Économie Politique Pure, K. Arrow and R. Debreu offered a mathemati-
cally expressed proof of the existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. 
Their paper was published when the deductive-nomological model of explanation 
was at its peak of popularity. Therefore, it was only a step away from projecting 
economics as the physics of the social sciences. However, in the late 1960s econom-
ics started to become more and more diverse, and in the philosophy of science itself, 
the Hempel-Oppenheim model began to falter at its foundations. A discussion has 
begun on whether explaining empirical phenomena by subsuming them under gen-
eral laws is appropriate at all.
Many important changes in economics took place in the 1970s. In this excep-
tional period a cognitive turn impacted economic science, key architects of the gen-
eral equilibrium framework proved that macrophenomena are not easily reducible 
to micro ones, and thus the dominant mechanistic perspective has slowly begun to 
be questioned.2 Economists such as H.  Simon, D.  Kahneman, A.  Tversky, and 
V. Smith, in a sense, accomplished the unfulfilled dream of A. Marshall who wanted 
to make economics more rooted in the biological sciences.3 K. Arrow himself said 
many years later:
[…] the very notion of what constitutes an economic theory will have to change. For a 
century, some economists have maintained that the biological is a more appropriate para-
digm for economics than equilibrium models analogous to mechanics. […] economic the-
ory may well take an analogous course (1995, 1617–1618).
The changes in neoclassical economics at the end of the twentieth century gained 
such a momentum that D.  Colander in his insightful 2000 paper wrote that 
1 For the sake of simplicity, I equalize such laws to universal regularities (of the kind: if X, then Y) 
that are omnitemporally and omnispatially true, being at the same time characterized by a high 
level of necessity (Hardt 2017). Also, such laws are not equal to moral natural laws.
2 Here I refer, among other factors, to the implications of the Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu theo-
rem which states that aggregate demand functions that are built on individual preferences and other 
neoclassical postulates do not meet the weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP). And since 
WARP is violated, then on the aggregate level it is impossible to prove the existence of an unique 
and stable equilibrium. Hahn (1995) saw the SMD theorem as the most devastating attack on 
micro-founded neoclassical economics.
3 Here I refer to well-known words by Marshall: “The Mecca of the economist is economic biology 
rather than economic dynamics” (1898, 43).
Ł. Hardt
15
neoclassical economics is dead.4 The message of his text was that economics is so 
diverse and pluralistic that it makes no sense to use the term ‘neoclassical econom-
ics’ which is associated with the general equilibrium framework, and it is better to 
just talk about mainstream economics. The years that followed witnessed a further 
 expansion of economic explanandum and explanans and, as a result, disputes 
erupted over whether the limits of economics are to be defined by its methods or a 
set of problems to which economics can be applied. Heated discussions about the 
status of neuroeconomics are a case in point.5
The above provokes the following question  – was the Walrasian neoclassical 
economics only a short-term interlude in the development of economics which oth-
erwise has a humble view of its research capabilities and communicates to the pub-
lic that it can only acquire knowledge about contingent tendencies, causes, or 
natures of things, but not about universal and constant laws of nature? Classical 
economics was to a large extent such a humble science as it is illustrated by the 
well-known statement of N. Senior that “[The economist’s] conclusions, whatever 
be their generality and their truth, do not authorize him in adding a single syllable 
of advice” (1836/1951, 2–3), or J.S. Mill’s claim that economic laws are statements 
of tendencies only. Classical economists were much more careful in giving their 
opinions binding force than their neoclassical successors (Colander 2011).
The widespread use of formal models by neoclassical economists meant that the 
positivist understanding of science became less and less aligned with their research 
practice. Since modelling has become a signum specificum of economics, its meth-
odological appraisal should include references to different ways of studying sci-
ence, namely the ones subscribing to a model-based ideal of science, rather than to 
the well-established ideas of science built on laws of nature. This also makes it 
necessary to move away from Newton’s deterministic mechanics and implies the 
need to face a multi-layered world in which unobservable factors play a key role.6
The purpose of this essay is to show that the departure from the Walrasian branch 
of neoclassical economics leads to the conceptualization of economics as a humble 
science, one that is aware of its explanatory capabilities, but also convinced that 
discovering unambiguous regularities is not possible. This humble economics does 
not claim the power of formulating explanations which will not need further justifi-
cation. In other words, it is simply not possible to remove the mystery which is 
inherent in the functioning of the economy.
4 It was even P. Samuelson, the so-called Mr. Neoclassical Economics, who claimed in 1976 that 
“To talk about neoclassical theories has certain implications. It is more appropriate to talk about 
mainstream economics” (in: Pizano 2009, 117). So, even he was somehow influenced by a chang-
ing spirit of economics in the 70’s.
5 See, e.g., a special issue of Journal of Economic Methodology (2010, no 2) dealing exclusively 
with the methodological status of neuroeconomics and its explanatory potential.
6 We can even treat the unobservable as an anathema to many empiricist conceptions of science. 
Also, allowing the entry of unobservables into science makes metaphysics necessary in philo-
sophical accounts of science (Chakravartty 2007, 16).
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The essay is organized as follows. First, some preliminary insights concerning 
the way I understand a humble science are offered. Next, some reflections on the 
classical roots of modern economics are presented. It is shown that economists such 
as A. Smith, R. Ricardo, J.S. Mill, and A. Marshall were against dogmatism in eco-
nomics. What follows is an analysis of metaphysics making its way back into philo-
sophical reflection on economics. Next, I comment on D. Colander’s essay on 
Creating Humble Economists (2016) and I propose that the lack of humility in eco-
nomics cannot be helped by trying to persuade economists to behave like engineers 
(as it is suggested in Colander’s paper) but rather by sticking with N. Cartwright’s 
metaphysically rich statement that “Our most wide-ranging scientific knowledge [in 
this case knowledge about the economy] is not knowledge of laws but knowledge of 
the natures of things” (1999, 4). Conclusions follow.
2.2  Disentangling the Idea of a Humble Science
Science is about knowing the world. It is important, however, to realise that it is not 
an unlimited knowledge. Sticking to a position that science alone can explain every 
aspect of existence leads one inevitably to scientism which is a form of scientific 
dogmatism. Its proponents often believe that such a position can be made from 
within science. They are wrong. Statements about science are not scientific state-
ments but rather meta-scientific ones and thus when reflecting on the scope of sci-
ence one should benefit from insights from the philosophy of science.7 And here, for 
instance, we can refer to K. Popper’s claim that “It is important to realize that sci-
ence does not make assertions about ultimate questions — about the riddles of exis-
tence, or about man’s task in this world” (1978, 342). So, first of all, a humble 
science does not claim monopoly in providing us with knowledge on how the world 
works: “there is more to the physical world than has met the scientific eye” 
(Polkinghorne 1990, 88). Also, as L. Kołakowski wisely claims, “But although we 
cannot pierce the mystery and convert it into knowledge, our awareness that there is 
mystery is in itself important; although we cannot tear the veil from ultimate reality, 
we should know that such a veil exists” (2001, 10). Therefore, I disagree with peo-
ple like P. Atkins (1994) who states that “There is nothing that cannot be under-
stood” (1). But I shall not focus too much on studying the nature of general 
statements about science. My aim is rather to discuss the character of knowledge 
about the world that science (here economics) as such gives us.
7 J. Lenox puts emphasis also on the fact that scientism contradicts itself: “The statement that only 
science can lead to truth is not itself deduced from science. It is not a scientific statement but rather 
a statement about science, that is, it is a meta-scientific statement. Therefore, if scientism’s basic 
principle is true, the statement expressing scientism must be false. Scientism refutes itself. Hence 
it is incoherent” (2009, 43).
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If our aim is to analyse the nature of scientific knowledge, then we should move 
towards epistemology.8 Here questions of how we know things and how we can 
know that we know them emerge and they can be studied from various perspectives 
offered by numerous theories of knowledge. The traditional dilemma of knowing 
also applies: are we able to know the world for certain (absolutism) or can we just 
know it from a mere perspective (relativism) and, therefore, nothing is known with 
absoluteness or certainty (scepticism)? Simply speaking there is a long tradition in 
Western thought to see this very dilemma as a matter of all or nothing, as a choice 
between dogmatism and scepticism. However, there is also a short history of thought 
that searches for some middle ground in this debate. My take on a humble science 
subscribes to this latter tradition.
Since the subject of this paper is economics, there is a particular justification to 
refer to Hume while studying the issue of epistemological humility: apart from 
being one of the most important philosophers studying the nature of human under-
standing, he was also a crucial source of inspiration for Adam Smith. At the very 
end of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding we can find the following 
description of human beings as inherently epistemologically humble: “[People] 
must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, be their most diligent 
enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations” 
(Hume 1748/2004, 104). In Hume’s case his epistemological humility is strongly 
intertwined with his ontological humility: “Nothing in the world is perpetual. 
Everything, however, seemingly firm, is in continual flux and change. The world 
itself gives symptoms of frailty and dissolution” (1777/2006, 603). As Holland 
(2013, 31) writes, “[…] no one in the European philosophical tradition has a keener 
sense of the limits of human knowledge than David Hume”. Therefore, knowing 
something for certain is simply impossible for him and the only thing one can 
achieve is to have “a degree of belief, which is sufficient for our purpose” (1740/2000, 
122). However, a belief which would be free from any doubts is hardly possible: 
“Belief, being a lively conception, can never be entire, where it is not founded on 
something natural and easy” (ibid.). Interestingly, Hume claims that beliefs are 
somewhere in-between knowing something for certain and knowing something with 
a given degree of probability only. However, Hume’s beliefs are subjective, and they 
are based on impressions about the causal structure of the world. Therefore, they are 
always subject to error, since we only feel a certain necessity in the causal connec-
tion between empirical states.
Hume’s introduction of beliefs into epistemology was followed by various think-
ers offering this category a legitimate place in modern philosophy of science. 
Importantly, for instance, Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason offers three catego-
ries of human understanding, namely opinion, knowledge, and belief, and 
thus writes:
8 It does not, however, mean that we are to commit a kind of ‘epistemic fallacy’, namely a reduction 
of ontology to epistemology.
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Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgment in relation to conviction (which is, 
at the same time, objectively valid), has the three following degrees: opinion, belief, and 
knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgment, subjectively as well as objec-
tively. Belief is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient. 
Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient (1781/1996, 749).
Here, as in Hume, belief is subjective. Nevertheless, Kant is a little less pessimis-
tic than Hume since what we know about a given thing is a result of an interaction 
between our experience of this very object and its “thing-in-itself”. Instead of delv-
ing further into Kant, I shall move to Charles Peirce who (together with W. James) 
founded pragmatism - a philosophical movement claiming that “the rational justifi-
cation of scientific beliefs ultimately depends on whether the method generating the 
beliefs is the best available for advancing our cognitive goals of explanation and 
precise prediction” (Almeder 2014, 103). Here is Peirce’s famous passage about the 
role of beliefs:
Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass 
into the state of belief; while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish 
to avoid, or to change to a belief in anything else. […] the irritation of doubt causes a 
struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle inquiry (1877, 66–67).
Such world view is often criticized for rejecting the very notion of truth and 
focusing solely on the utility of beliefs (see, e.g., Rorty 1995). I think that we may 
let pragmatists defend so strongly the utility of beliefs but at the same time claim 
that at least some of these beliefs are true. Also, true beliefs do not have the status 
of Humean regularities, e.g., believing that lower interest rates should lead to 
higher investments can still be true even if in a given situation (say in Poland in 
2019) this is not the case.9 What is very important in pragmatists’ stance on the 
character of knowledge is that the way beliefs are formed matters for their 
justification.
I hope that it is now clear that insights given by Hume, Kant, and Peirce can be 
seen as supporting the ideal of a humble science, one that accepts fallibility of some 
of its claims. Or, to be more precise, a humble science does not reject the possibility 
that some of its statements may just be wrong. The character of humble science can 
also be illustrated by contrasting it with its opposite, namely a science characterized 
by vices, including arrogance, vanity, conceit, egotism, grandiosity, pretentious-
ness, snobbishness, impertinence (presumption), haughtiness, self-righteousness, 
domination, selfish ambition, and self-complacency (Roberts and Wood 2003, 258). 
If the way we practice science matters for its success (as pragmatists claim), one 
may ask whether humble scientists are always to opt for a humble science. Here we 
are approaching virtue epistemology where many authors claim that intellectual 
humility serves as a prerequisite for a humble science. Hazlett (2012, 220) states 
that intellectual humility is “the disposition not to adopt epistemically improper 
higher order epistemic attitudes”. Also, but in a slightly different context, Whitcomb 




et al. (2015) claim that being a humble scientist means to know one’s self- limitations 
and thus being open to criticism. Roberts and Wood (2003, 272) nicely describe a 
humble researcher by portraying her antithesis:
The intellectually vain person is overly concerned with how he ‘looks’ to the people who 
count: he wants to impress, and is very concerned not to look silly at conferences and in 
front of his bright students. This concern may incline him not to admit, and maybe not even 
to notice, when someone has raised a good objection to his views. It may also incline him 
to fudge arguments when he thinks he can make them look good enough to get away with. 
The intellectually vain person may be genuinely concerned to accomplish intrinsic epis-
temic ends: to figure out what’s what and to give his students a good education. But he also 
has the extrinsic concern to look good intellectually, and we are saying that this is in general 
an epistemic liability. By contrast, the lack of concern to look good frees the intellectually 
humble person to pursue intellectual goods simply and undistractedly (think of G. E. Moore).
Saying that „everyone nowadays is, I take it, a fallibilist about scientific theories” 
(Worrall 1989, 268) does not mean that we cannot approach the truth about the 
world and that there are no places where Humean regularities can always be true. 
They can hold, for instance, in theoretical models. What I claim is that vices like 
pride, haughtiness, and conceit can block any scientific progress since one can just 
conclude that he knows everything about the world and no further scientific inquiry 
is necessary. In other words, pride leads to intellectual laziness. But humility, on the 
contrary, makes people curious about the way the world works and therefore “it is 
humility that makes men as angels” (St. Augustine), and hence as McCloskey 
(2006) stresses when citing T.  Merton: “Humility is a virtue, not a neurosis. A 
humility that freezes our being and frustrates all healthy activity is not humility at 
all, but a disguised form of pride” (1956, 55). One can also refer to Saint John Paul 
II’s lecture at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow in 1997: “Reason should act 
and be active in the spiritual climate of moral virtues, like honesty, courage, hum-
bleness, and genuine concern for human beings” (St. John Paul II 1997/2006, 988). 
And in Fides et Ratio he adds: “Human wisdom refuses to see in its own weakness 
the possibility of its strength; yet Saint Paul is quick to affirm: ‘When I am weak, 
then I am strong’ (2 Cor 12:10)” (no 23).
At the very beginning of this section I wrote that a humble science is a kind of a 
middle ground between dogmatism and scepticism. Now, I can add to the above that 
intellectual humility can be treated as an Aristotelian mean state between absolut-
ism of certitude and timidity of incertitude. Therefore, humility is not only a moral 
virtue but also an epistemic one. In any case, they are intertwined since being a 
humble person makes it easier to be a humble scientist who can practice a humble 
science. In the following section I will look at classical economists and show that 
economics they practiced can be treated as an example of a humble science.
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2.3  Classical Economics as a Humble Science
When focusing on classical economics, one usually starts from the analysis of Adam 
Smith’s works. However, in order to understand Smith, we should take note of 
D. Hume and his reflection on the character of knowledge economics offers us.10 We 
did it partially in the previous section, but now we would like to be more precise and 
focus solely on his economics.11 Hume used a lot of thought experiments in his 
economic research. As Massey (1991) comments “[…] perhaps no other philoso-
pher has conducted his thought experiments with the degree of care and sophistica-
tion that Hume bestowed on his” (293). Also, Schabas concludes her paper on 
models in Hume’s thought by writing that “I have not yet found such a concentra-
tion of examples [of thought experiments] since the ones devised by Hume” (2008, 
168). What then do Hume’s thought experiments look like? Here I would like to 
refer to one of his most important experiments, namely the analysis he presented in 
the Essay of Interest (1758/1993, 181):
For suppose, that, by miracle, every man in Britain should have five pounds slip into his 
pocket in one night; this would much more than double the whole money that is at present 
in the kingdom; and yet there would not next day, nor for some time, be any more lenders, 
not any variation on the interest (emphasis added).
Referring to the “miracle” means that we are dealing here with an imaginary situa-
tion, a kind of thought experiment, and not a precisely defined and isolated model.12 
Moreover, this magical appearance of additional money in the pockets of British 
subjects indicates that Hume analyses solely the influence of monetary variables on 
the economy – only they have meaning, and other factors are either fixed or absent 
(ceteris paribus). This is important because it served him to show the neutrality of 
money. Explaining empirical facts through thought experiments presupposes that 
the mechanisms described in them have their counterparts in the economy. It is dif-
ficult to find in Hume’s thought anything that better supports this thesis than the 
following words:
10 There is a huge amount of literature on Hume-Smith connection and presenting it in details is not 
necessary here, however, I would like just to cite Smith from his letter written to W. Strahan shortly 
after Hume’s death: “I have always considered him, both in his lifetime and since his death, as 
approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature 
human frailty will permit” (Smith 1776, cited in: Rasmussen 2018, 51).
11 Writing about Hume’s economics does not mean that he can be undoubtedly called an economist. 
He was definitely a moral philosopher and only later started to be described as an economist 
(Schumpeter 1954/2006, 120).
12 Although models and thought experiments are similar in many respects, one should notice also 
important differences. First, models are more decoupled from their targets than thought experi-
ments. Second, such experiments (at least in Hume’s interpretation) should refer to empirical tar-
gets that are at least potentially possible; models, on the other hand, can describe fairy-tale worlds. 
Third, thought experiments’ insights are often illustrated by some references to empirical domains, 




Now it is evident that the same causes which would correct these exorbitant inequalities, 
were they to happen miraculously, must prevent their happening in the common course of 
nature, and must forever in all neighboring nations, preserve money nearly proportional to 
the art and industry of each nation (Hume 1758/1993, 191).
The first fragment of the above paragraph from Hume’s work refers to the situa-
tion of the thought experiment, whereas the second part points out to empirical 
reality, hence the use of the phrase “nearly proportional”, not simply “proportional”. 
The above shows that Hume willingly went from analysis in terms of a thought 
experiment to the study of the surrounding empirical phenomena. In his text On 
Public Credit (1758/1993) we can find an interesting reference to the then Great 
Britain: “[the situation] to which Great Britain is visibly tending” (211).13 What is 
always true in the thought experiment, because it happens “miraculously”, namely 
in isolation from other potentially disturbing causes, in reality takes place in a ten-
dency only. To be more precise, a given cause produces a tendency to a particular 
result and not necessarily the very result itself. Certainty can only be in place in 
thought constructs, strictly axiomatized and defined. It is in these model worlds that 
there are universally true relationships and laws. In his Treatise, while accounting 
for the nature of human knowledge, he writes:
Here remain, therefore, algebra and arithmetic as the only sciences, in which we can carry 
on a chain of reasoning to any degree of intricacy, and yet preserve a perfect exactness and 
certainty. It is impossible for the eye to determine the angles of a chiliagon to be equal to 
1996 right angles, or make any conjecture, that approaches this proportion (Hume 
1740/2000, 51).
Before commenting on this passage, I would like to quote below the following state-
ment from Mill’s 1836 essay On the Definition of Political Economy:
The conclusions of geometry are not strictly true of such lines, angles, and figures, as 
human hands can construct. But no one, therefore, contends that the conclusions of geom-
etry are of no utility, or that it would be better to shut up Euclid’s Elements, and content 
ourselves with ‘practice’ and ‘experience’ (Mill 1836/2008, 46).
Both Hume and Mill state that in isolation, i.e., in a given model (Mill) or in a 
particular thought experiment (Hume), certainty is possible and that true statements 
in these theoretical worlds become approximations of truth if they are related to 
empirical facts – a triangle drawn by the author of this essay is to have only approxi-
mately 180°, and this is even more striking in a hypothetical case of a chiliagon. So, 
we will never have universally binding and precise laws that are also context 
independent.
Now, and before moving to Smith, it is quite noteworthy that some interesting 
reflections on humility and pride can be found in Hume’s Treatise. For instance, in 
the section titled Of Greatness of Mind Hume starts his analysis by clearly stating 
that “An excessive pride or overweening conceit of ourselves is always esteemed 
vicious, and is universally hated; as modesty, or a just sense of our weakness, is 
esteemed virtuous, and procures the good-will of every-one” (Hume 1740/2000, 
13 This sentence did not appear in the first edition of Hume’s essay.
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378). Earlier in the text he claims that “Humility exalts; but pride mortifies us” 
(ibid., 193). Although these words are put forward in the sections of his work which 
deal with morals and not human understanding as such, one can apply them to the 
issue of the nature of human knowledge in view of Hume’s analysis presented in his 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In Hume’s Enquiry we can find a clear 
statement denying the possibility of reaching ultimate knowledge, while at the same 
claiming that it is modesty which eases researchers to be humble in assessing the 
character of knowledge they possess about the world: “Hence we may discover the 
reason why no philosopher, who is rational and modest, has ever pretended to assign 
the ultimate cause of any natural operation, or to show distinctly the action of that 
power, which produces any single effect in the universe” (Hume 1748/2004, 17). 
Here reference is made to philosophers but nowadays we can also apply it to econo-
mists. Hume’s vision of human knowledge then is very close to the one we described 
earlier as a humble science.
As far as Adam Smith’s ideas concerning the nature of laws in economics are 
concerned, one may say that they are somehow contradictory. However, they are 
such only on the surface and do not give ground to another Das Adam Smith 
Problem. Since Smith was hugely influenced by Newton, he shared with him a 
mechanistic world view in which one has structures, mechanisms, and never chang-
ing relationships. In other words, both conceived of a reality in which omnispatially 
and omnitemporally constant conjunctions are possible. Take, for instance, the fol-
lowing insight from The Theory of Moral Sentiments: “Human society, when we 
contemplate it in a certain abstract and philosophical light, appears like a great, an 
immense machine, whose regular and harmonious movements produce a thousand 
agreeable effects. (1759/2013, 280). In Smith’s Essays on Philosophical Subjects 
there is another, clearly stated observation: “The universe was regarded as a com-
plete machine, as a coherent system, governed by general laws, and directed to 
general ends” (1795/1980, 113). On the other hand, we can also find Smith’s state-
ments that seem to be totally antinomous to the above ones. In The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, he writes: “In the great chess-board of human society, every single 
piece has a principle of motion of its own” (1759/2013, 204). It seems therefore 
that, we do not have universal rules of human behaviour but each human subject has 
its own principles of conduct. How then can we reconcile the two seemingly contra-
dictory views on the nature of knowledge about the economy? Here Smith himself 
can help us with the following statement:
Systems in many respects resemble machines. A machine is a little system, created to per-
form, as well as to connect together, in reality, those different movements and effects which 
the artist has occasion for. A system is an imaginary machine invented to connect together 
in the fancy those different movements and effects which are already in reality performed. 
The machines that are first invented to perform any particular movement are always the 
most complex, and succeeding artists generally discover that, with fewer wheels, with 
fewer principles of motion, than had originally been employed, the same effect may be 
more easily produced. The first systems, in the same manner, are always the most complex, 
and a particular connecting chain, or principle, is generally thought necessary to unite every 
two seemingly disjoined appearances: but it often happens, that one great connecting prin-
ciple is afterwards found to be sufficient to bind together all the discordant phenomena that 
occur in a whole species of things (Smith 1795/1980, 66).
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Is not Smith just writing about modelling economic phenomena? His “imaginary 
machines” are models that are used to “discover principles”, including those gov-
erning economic systems. In his interpretation of the above cited excerpt Condorcet 
concluded that “in all the arts, the truths of the theory are necessarily modified in 
practice” (Condorcet 1804, 292).14 So, in models or thought experiments one can 
have perfect and unchangeable regularities, but once we refer them to empirical 
domains we only have some beliefs or “some degrees of certainty to which we may 
hope to attain” (ibid., 138). Referring to a more recent example, one can say that in 
the model of perfect competition price is always equal to the marginal cost of pro-
duction, but outside the model, when we appeal to the real economy, p = MC does 
not, in fact, obtain. Economic models do not give us certain knowledge about the 
world. Thus, the most we can do is to humbly make inferences from models to their 
targets.
J. S. Mill was another nineteenth-century economist who questioned the possi-
bility of formulating precise and universally binding laws of economics. Instead, he 
proposed the following definition of economic laws: “All laws of causation, in con-
sequence of their liability to be counteracted, require to be stated in words affirma-
tive of tendencies only, and not of actual results” (Mill 1843, 523). Mill also wrote 
about the idea of “abstract truth”, namely the truth of theoretical claims insofar as 
they are placed in abstract places (models). However, “the conclusions correctly 
deduced from these assumptions [models], would be as true in the abstract as those 
of mathematics; and would be as near an approximation as abstract truth can ever 
be, to truth in the concrete” (Mill 1836/2008, 49). Interestingly, Mill’s tendencies 
are acting powers that make things happen (ibid., 56). I shall elaborate on this point 
in the following section.
Now, before closing our study on classical economists, I shall recall A. Marshall 
who is rightly treated as one of the founding fathers of neoclassical economics but 
whose economics did not lose its classical roots (Colander 2011). One can even 
argue that the Marshallian branch of neoclassical economics is closer to the ideas of 
Smith, Ricardo, and Mill than to the Walrasian branch of neoclassicism. This is 
particularly true of Marshall’s insights concerning the nature of economic laws. 
Suffice is to quote some select views of his here: “If the subject matter of a science 
passes through different phases of development, the laws of the science must have a 
development corresponding to the things of which they treat” (Marshall 1890, 65); 
“Every cause has a tendency to produce some definite result if nothing occurs to 
hinder it. Thus gravitation tends to make things fall to the ground: but when a bal-
loon is full of gas lighter than air, the pressure of the air will make it rise in spite of 
the tendency of gravitation to make it fall” (Marshall 1920/2013, 26); “there are no 
economic tendencies which act as steadily and can be measured as exactly as gravi-
tation can: and consequently there are no laws of economics which can be compared 
14 M. de Condorcet was one of the most important interpreters of Smith’s ideas (Rothschild 2001). 
Although he did a lot of research in theory of probability, he was conscious that economic systems 
are so complex that interplays between various events are not of a probabilistic nature, and thus he 
often referred to beliefs as being somehow in-between knowledge and probability.
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for precision with the law of gravitation” (ibid.). So, simplifying a bit, not only does 
each economy have its own set of laws but these laws are statements about tenden-
cies only. Therefore, not being humble in assessing our abilities of understanding 
economic systems would be just wrong.
In what follows, I will come back to Mill’s tendencies but in a metaphysically 
richer way. In doing so I will claim that while assessing the nature of our knowledge 
about the economy we cannot abstract from the very character of the economic 
realm. In other words, ontological fundamentals of economic systems matter for the 
scope and certitude of our knowledge about them. Or, as Lawson 2015 claims “[…] 
method must fit with the nature of its object” (13), and thus, for instance, Róna 
states that “clarity on the ontology of the subject matter of the social sciences seems 
urgently needed” (2018a, 5).
2.4  Metaphysics of Economic Systems
If we would like to describe an economic reality, we should ask how its organizing 
parts come to be. More fundamentally, a study into the nature of specific elements 
of this reality is necessary. It is claimed here that “all features of reality can be 
viewed under the aspect of their being” (Lawson 2014, 19). And scientific ontology 
can be understood as primarily interested in investigating the natures of particular 
economic objects. It differs from philosophical ontology which deals with general 
aspects of being.15 As I show in my recent book on Economics without Laws (2017), 
and what I have just indicated with respect to classical economics, the economic 
world is not governed by universal laws such as whenever A, then (always) B, but 
rather by such entities as powers, mechanisms, tendencies, and structures. Such a 
world is a world of potentialities only. Also, speaking metaphorically, such a world 
is a world where its constituting parts interact “chemically” and not 
“mechanistically”.16 In such a realm, macro phenomena emerge from their micro 
15 M. Bunge, for instance, describes this difference as follows: “Ontology can be classed into gen-
eral and special (or regional). General ontology studies all existents, whereas each special ontology 
studies one genus of thing or process physical, chemical, biological, social, etc. Thus, whereas 
general ontology studies the concepts of space, time, and event, the ontology of the social investi-
gates such general sociological concepts as those of social system, social structure, and social 
change” (Bunge 1999, 200). Our scientific ontology, and economic ontology in particular, is an 
example of Bunge’s special ontology.
16 Here I refer to Mill’s analysis presented in his chapter On the Composition of Causes in A System 
of Logic. According to Mill, when causes interact chemically then we cannot use the method of 
isolation and thus the very ontological foundations of classical (and neoclassical) economics need 
to be questioned. In Mäki’s words, “This is the question of whether the causes of economic phe-
nomena combined ‘mechanically’ or ‘chemically’, to use Mill’s phrases. When causes combine 
‘mechanically’, their effects can be ‘added up’ like vectors […]. On the other hand, when causes 
are combined ‘chemically’, some qualitative novel, emergent outcomes ensue” (1992, 349).
Ł. Hardt
25
foundations rather than being reducible to their constituting parts. So, as Lawson 
puts it:
[…] these or related notions [law-like statements in economics] must be conceived in terms 
of potentials; as potentials that may or may not be expressed, and if expressed that may or 
may not be actualized because of countervailing tendencies […] (Lawson 1997, 106).
And before he also writes that:
[…] science aims at uncovering causal factors, that is, it is concerned with identifying 
structures, mechanisms and the tendencies they ground, which produce, govern or facilitate 
phenomena at a different level. And if the aim of science is to illuminate structures that 
govern surface phenomena then laws or law-statements are neither empirical statements 
(statements about experiences) nor statements about events or their regularities (whether 
unqualified or subject to ceteris paribus restrictions), but precisely statements elucidating 
structures and their characteristic modes of activity (ibid., 24; italics in original).
Three ideas from the above statements by Lawson are important for our purpose, 
namely those that treat about tendencies, characteristic modes of activities, and 
ceteris paribus clause. So, let me begin with tendencies. They can be defined by 
referring to N. Cartwright’s philosophy of potentialities, i.e.: “Substituting the word 
‘capacity’ for Mill’s word ‘tendency’, his claim is exactly what I aim to establish in 
this book […]. I suggest that the reader take my ‘capacity’ and Mill’s ‘tendency’ to 
be synonymous” (Cartwright 1989, 170). The following may serve as an example: 
Mill would claim that lower interest rates produce a tendency of investments to rise. 
Cartwright would rather say that lower interest rates carry the capacity to cause 
higher investments. Or, to use Cartwright’s favourite example, saying that aspirin 
relieves headaches should be read as claiming that aspirin has the capacity to relieve 
headaches.17 Now, we come closer to the second idea underlined above by Lawson, 
namely things’ characteristic modes of activity. In Cartwright’s terms one should 
just say that the very nature of A is to produce B. For instance, the nature of lower 
interest rates is to make investments higher. But, as in the case of aspirin, a particu-
lar capacity may be dormant, or its functioning may be offset by some disturbing 
factors. So, one may have low interest rates without a corresponding shift in invest-
ment. No universal laws please, but only natures are real, and they make economic 
events happen: “Aristotle’s notion of nature is far more suitable than the concept of 
law, regularity and occurrent property to describe the kind of knowledge we have” 
(Cartwright 1999, 78; original italics). Claiming the contrary would lead one to 
fundamentalism which we should oppose.
What now about ceteris paribus clause? Would it not suffice as a basis for a 
humble economics? It would not as long as it is understood merely as ‘other things 
being constant’ restriction. Also, such laws are either empirically false (because 
disturbing factors occur) or they are trivially true (if they are understood as purely 
analytical statements). Countless papers have been written on how such laws can be 
17 As the author of Metaphysics put it: “Something is said to be a capacity [potentiality, power] 
when it is a starting-point of movement or change either in another thing or in a thing insofar as it 
other” (Aristotle 2016, 83).
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defended. Here I would refer to just two such defences that interpret ceteris paribus 
laws as humble statements about the world. First, just before studying ceteris pari-
bus clause in the third chapter of his Principles A. Marshall wrote the following: 
“And following our definition of an economic law, we may say that the course of 
action which may be expected under certain conditions from the members of an 
industrial group is the normal action of the members of that group relatively to those 
conditions” (Marshall 1920/2013, 28). Marshall talks here about a ceteris normali-
bus clause which says that a particular statement is only true when conditions are 
normal. For instance, a rise in unemployment ceteris normalibus lowers inflation. 
Such a statement is only true in a particular New Keynesian model where one can 
have a non-flat Philips curve. Outside such a model we can only believe that such a 
relation can hold imperfectly. And here we are somehow coming back to Cartwright’s 
understanding of economic realm mentioned above where ceteris normalibus laws 
simply become statements of the following kind: ceteris normalibus A leads to B, 
and it means that the nature of A is to produce B. So, and again, we have a humble 
way of interpreting laws of economics. As Cartwright nicely describes it:
There is a tendency to think that all facts must belong to one grand scheme, and, moreover, 
that this is a scheme in which the facts in the first category have a special and privileged 
status. They are exemplary of the way nature is supposed to work. The others must be made 
to conform to them. This is the kind of fundamentalist doctrine that I think we must resist 
(1994, 316).
We live in a dappled world where we do not have all encompassing theories that 
give us a sense of certitude. Here I agree with Rodrik (2015, 17), who humbly says, 
“The correct answer to almost any question in economics is: it depends”. But even 
if we have an appropriate set of theoretical statements crafted for a given empirical 
domain, we will then be able to describe merely capacities, natures, and powers of 
the objects under investigation. The above reflection is of key importance for my 
thesis about the necessity for humility in building economic explanations. Since 
models produce beliefs that economists have about the world and if they are credi-
ble when the structure of a given model is close to its empirical target, it turns out 
that, for instance, economic laws (even if understood as statements about tendencies 
only) which give an accurate description of highly developed countries do not have 
to be adequate in explaining phenomena in less developed countries. Thus, it is not 
only the case that context is everything but even in a given context we are unable to 
guarantee that if A, then (always) B rules, and hence capacities are (nearly) every-
thing, too.
2.5  D. Colander’s Plea for Creating Humble Economists
In an important paper on the current state of economic profession D.  Colander 
(2016) claims that the crucial problem economics is facing is “lack of humility” 
(737). Therefore, he writes that “we economists have a tendency to convey more 
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scientific certainty in our policy positions than the theory and evidence objectively 
would allow” (ibid.). Later he proposes the way for having more humble econo-
mists. His solution is to treat economists not as applied scientists but rather as engi-
neers. Colander’s argument for such a solution rests on the assumption that the goal 
of science “is finding the truth” (738) while that of engineering is “by nature 
applied” (739). And he cites Koen’s statement that the engineering method is “The 
strategy for causing the best change in a poorly understood or uncertain situation 
within the available resources” (ibid.). What matters is also the fact that Colander’s 
understanding of truth is rather straightforward: “a scientific truth is timeless” 
(ibid.). Next, he claims that most economists are actually engineers and that they are 
by nature more humble than pure scientists.
Colander’s arguments are roughly similar to the ones of B. Bernanke, who, while 
heading the FED, in his Princeton 2010 speech claims that in fact we have three 
areas we should focus on, namely economic science, economic engineering, and 
economic management. In his opinion we have more problems with the two latter 
concepts than with the former one. I do not entirely agree with either Colander or 
Bernanke, but I find the former FED’s chair arguments a little more appealing since 
I also think that we do not have problems with economics as such but rather we have 
some problems with the correct understanding of the claims it makes. However, the 
very act of correct understanding of economics’ insights does not belong to eco-
nomic engineering either in Bernanke’s or Colander’s sense. In other words, 
Bernanke is wrong in claiming that economic science offers theoretical and empiri-
cal generalizations, and Colander is similarly wrong in stating that economics 
should just move more towards engineering and not science. What I would like to 
stress, and what should hopefully be clear from the insights suggested in previous 
sections, is that there can be a science, also economic science, which does not offer 
us eternal and unchangeable strict generalizations but rather informs us about 
capacities of potentially causative factors. It can inform us about some strictly 
defined behaviours only insofar as they appear in closed theoretical models. Such 
rules of behaviour usually do not perfectly hold once we move from models towards 
their targets, instead of generalizations we rather have some beliefs about real econ-
omies. Moreover, these beliefs can be treated more like ceteris normalibus laws or, 
to be even more precise, as mixed cn-cp laws, e.g., ceteris normalibus (for ideal 
markets, i.e., in some model conditions) and ceteris paribus (having other variables 
unchanged), a decrease in interest rate leads to an increase in investments. Also, a 
particular ceteris normalibus clause can be understood not only as being synony-
mous to a given model condition but rather as a metaphysically rich conditioner, 
namely the nature of A is to produce B. Here we are close to new Aristotelianism. It 
is, therefore, not only the case that science without laws is possible. Science which 
does not offer timeless truths is possible as well. And so, paraphrasing Giere (2000, 
523), what has traditionally been interpreted as laws of nature describing various 
economies, turn out to be merely statements describing the behaviour of theoretical 
economic models. One who realizes this, is very close to a humble economics.
Colander’s insistence on the fact that the most important problem economics is 
facing is lack of humility in economists’ behaviour is definitely true. Also, my claim 
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that we need a humble economics, namely economics conscious of the kind of 
knowledge it produces (as it was discussed earlier) necessarily implies that we need 
economists who understand economics in such a way. My disagreement with 
Colander’s proposal is that we do not have to transform economists into engineers 
to achieve such a change. We should not abandon science in general, and economics 
in particular, and the way forward is towards a humble science, and in our case a 
humble economics.
2.6  Conclusions
There is an ongoing debate concerning the state of modern economics. Some accuse 
economics of “mistaking beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth” 
(Krugman 2009); others point to the fact that we do not have any problems with the 
science of economics but rather with economic engineering and management (e.g., 
Bernanke 2010); some emphasise the fact that we have problems not with econom-
ics as such but with economists and their lack of humility (Colander 2016). In the 
reflections presented in this paper I also focused on the lack of humility but in a 
somewhat different sense. The focus here was on the problem that flies in the face 
of a great number of economists in many areas of economics, namely their dream of 
finding universal laws governing economic systems. However, these laws do not 
exist. As Róna (2018b, 189) claims, for instance: “The proper subject of economics, 
therefore, cannot be the search for nature based law-like generalities with reliable 
predictive and explanatory power, because there are no such generalities”. Although 
many economists would agree that laws they discover do not have the status of laws 
of nature, they still have many problems in rejecting the worldview which sees the 
world as being governed by such laws. However, and again, laws of nature do not 
rule the world and thus searching for scientific laws that do is futile. What we can 
aim for is to identify capacities, causes, mechanisms, tendencies, and some imper-
fect empirical regularities. Unchangeable and omni-spatio- temporally binding laws 
can only apply inside theoretical models. Claiming that they are to hold in the same 
way beyond models is mistaken. In other words, taking the model mistakenly for its 
empirical target may easily lead one to a form of scientific dogmatism. As Rodrik 
nicely puts it: “there is no such thing as the model, but always it is a model” (2015, 
43). So, explaining the workings of economic systems by using models is inherently 
imperfect. Said differently, inferences from models to their targets should be made 
with due humility.
Although we still face the problem of economics’ failure to adequately under-
stand the status of its claims and of assigning too much certitude to them (as dis-
cussed above), there are many signs which indicate that the economic profession is 
now turning (though slowly) in the right direction. One example is what is often 
called an empirical turn in economics which means that more and more papers are 
applied and focused on data rather than on theory only. Therefore, one can claim 
that there is a diminishing risk of taking models’ claims outside their proper 
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domains. But still, such a turn in economics does not make economic science less 
prone to criticism but rather changes what is criticized and how. Studies based on 
randomized control trials can serve as an example. And there we have a problem of 
external validity. If you want RCTs results to apply elsewhere in any simple way, 
you commit the very same error as authors of theoretical models in economics: they 
want their insights to work beyond their proper domains. Since experiments (includ-
ing RCTs) are models, their results must be interpreted with due humility. Writing 
about RCTs Deaton and Cartwright (2017) claim the following: “We often learn 
much from coming to understand why replication failed and can use that knowl-
edge, in looking for how the factors that caused the original result might operate 
differently in different settings”. In other words, causes of various economic phe-
nomena identified in empirical work should be given careful (humble) interpreta-
tion, e.g., they are only INUS conditions for particular results.18 Let me explain. 
Imagine that a lower interest rate causes investment to rise. What should be 
accounted for with regard to this statement is the presence of firms that would like 
to invest but need cheap capital, and some regulatory rules that allow for firms’ 
investments. Together these factors are unnecessary but sufficient to the increase of 
investment rate (since many other events certainly could lead to higher investment, 
e.g., a given firm may receive a subsidy from the government, etc.). Within this very 
set of three events, the lowering of interest rate is an insufficient (since lowering of 
the interest rate only, without firms willing to invest, for instance, would not cause 
higher investment) but non-redundant (because higher investment would not occur 
without it, ceteris paribus) part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but suffi-
cient for the occurrence of the result. Therefore, a lower interest rate is an INUS 
condition for higher investment. So, we are again facing the issue of proper interpre-
tation of knowledge about the world the empirical experiment gives us. Here again 
a correct way to tackle it is to treat it humbly. With regard to the above example the 
most one can claim is that the nature of lower interest rate is to stimulate investment. 
This is the way Cartwright in her writings seems to interpret INUS causality, includ-
ing the one identified via RCTs.
As we have just seen, although empirical turn is a step in the right direction for 
economics, it does not alone guarantee a move towards a humbler economics. One 
may say that it can be treated only as an INUS condition for making economics 
humbler. Other developments such as making economics more pluralistic and hence 
context sensitive may also (potentially) make it humbler. Yet, even in thus modified 
economics some researchers may still give too much certitude to the insights they 
produce. Therefore, for a genuine movement towards a humble economics one 
needs economics based on an ontology of potentialities where one finds not laws, 
but capacities, tendencies, natures, and Aristotelian dynameis. In the very least I 
hope that philosophy of economics will contribute a bit to the occurrence of such a 
change by making economics more self-critical.
18 INUS causality is due to Mackie (1974), and INUS clause stands for Insufficient but Non-
redundant parts of a condition that is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for a contribution to the 
outcome.
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Chapter 3
What Is Economics for?
Brendan Hogan
Abstract The methodological foundations of any scientific discipline are shaped by 
the goals towards which that discipline is aiming. While it is almost universally 
accepted that the goals of explanation and prediction of natural and non-human phe-
nomena have been met with great success since the scientific revolution, it is almost 
just as universally accepted that the social sciences have not even come close to 
achieving these goals. This raises the question addressed in this paper, namely, what 
is economics, and social science more broadly speaking, for? What is their aim, and 
how is it similar and dissimilar to that of the natural sciences as we have come to 
classify them? I take up this question from a pragmatic perspective in this paper, set-
ting economics within the wider context of social inquiry. Specifically, I turn to 
Hilary Putnam and John Dewey as exemplars of the pragmatic critique of any eco-
nomics that sees its goals in line with those of the natural sciences, that is, as aiming 
for explanation and prediction according to governing laws of human behaviour.
The methodological principles that have come to be enumerated as the fundamental 
starting points of neoclassical economics have been subjected to critique since their 
beginnings in the Marginal Revolution. The rational agent, the utility maximizing 
character of their choices, and the methodological individualism that dovetailed so 
nicely with advancing methods of quantification have all been called into question 
if not completely refuted from a variety of quarters.1 These critics come from such 
areas of intellectual specialization as the philosophy of the social sciences (espe-
cially its subbranch the philosophy of economics), disciplines in the humanities 
outside of the sciences, and even within economics itself. The latter group of critics 
suffered increasing marginalization as the ascendancy of neoclassical economics 
married a positivist philosophical underpinning to the scientific pretensions and 
mathematizing tendencies of economics as a discipline. It is not without some 
1 See, e.g., Anderson (2000).
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unintended irony, then, that the practitioners of this science borrowed a distinction 
from theological discourse and termed mainstream methods ‘orthodox’ and those 
outside of the dominant discourse, ‘heterodox’.
However, as a now well-told story in philosophical accounts of economics has it, 
while positivism and specifically the philosophy of science embodied in logical 
empiricism fell upon hard times in the mid-twentieth century and was bypassed, the 
mainstream practitioners of economics of at least two schools seemed to ignore 
entirely the failure of positivism to account for a variety of its own aims. These 
failures reproduced themselves in neoclassical economics in terms of explanation, 
the irrational choices agents make, and a consistent failure to generate models which 
would predict aggregate market behaviour.2 Behavioural economists took these fail-
ures as their starting point in reintroducing irrationality into their understanding of 
human decisions and now stands as a major contender for explanatory adequacy in 
providing economics with better scientific grounds for its intellectual project. It also 
has gained greater political traction in terms of policy. But the question of the rela-
tion between values intrinsic to the practice of science and the descriptions gener-
ated by that scientific activity itself still remains outside the organon of these two 
major schools of economic thought. This exclusion shows up in two ways. First, 
both schools basically accept that the end of human activity is the realization of 
individual preferences. On the neoclassical model, this involves the cost-benefit 
analysis of an internal algorithm that calculates action based upon given preferences 
and available information regarding means to satisfy those preferences. Behavioural 
economics introduces paternalistic interventions at the level of policy prescriptions 
to overcome the irrationality of individuals in the erroneous choices they make to 
satisfy their given preferences. Agents exhibit irrationality stemming from a variety 
of sources including cognitive biases and framing effects that lead to choices which 
do not maximize utility. Thus, both see action and economically informed policy as 
a means for preference satisfaction. That is, whether you model practical reason as 
neoclassical economists do, on what might be characterized as a Humean desire- 
belief model, or you follow behavioural economists in eliciting the inherent cogni-
tive biases which interfere with our preference satisfaction, you isolate the question 
of morality from the discipline of economic inquiry. This first shows up in both 
schools’ attempt to provide a value-free and predictive account of economic science.
In this chapter I offer an alternative path for characterizing the practice of eco-
nomics that is informed by a pragmatic account of social science. On this under-
standing, as pragmatic philosophers from Charles Sanders Peirce to Hilary Putnam 
have argued, facts and values are inextricably intertwined in the practice of all 
2 The 2008 financial crisis is an example of this failure, a failure so striking as to sponsor a royal 
commission of leading economists to explain why economists had failed to predict it in the UK. In 
the US, the testimony of Alan Greenspan before a committee in the House of Representatives has 




science.3 Additionally, according to the pragmatic view on offer here, sciences on a 
pragmatic understanding take their cue from the Aristotelian dictum that we should 
order our method and the goal of our inquiries to the object we are trying to under-
stand. However, somewhat counter-intuitively pragmatism offers a general theory 
of inquiry as problem solving. It follows from this hybrid of object-specific methods 
and a fundamental problem-solving aim that if what we are trying to solve are not 
just problems of physics, for instance, but also the frustration of values and interests 
of human beings, the inquiry itself will take on a moral character both in terms of 
vocabulary used to engage the problem, and in terms of the character of the inquiry 
itself. Thus, according to the pragmatic view in this paper, economics cannot help 
but be a moral science as it involves issues of labour, distribution, inequality and 
scarce resources that affect the flourishing of the human species, and now much 
more broadly, the flourishing of species on the planet. Once economics is redrawn 
in this way, and the pretensions of economics to be a ‘science’ modelled on the 
natural scientific goals of explanation and prediction are reconstructed, the question 
‘What is economics for? ‘might be given a morally and epistemologically 
robust answer.
In turning to pragmatism, I would like to focus on several features that bring into 
relief the general orientation pragmatism provides at the epistemological and scien-
tific level. In particular, and what stands in stark contrast to what might be seen as 
the two main contenders for supremacy in economics mentioned above, pragmatism 
embeds values in the process of inquiry itself to the point of denying a rigid fact/
value dichotomy even with respect to such paradigms of value-neutrality as physics 
and the rest of the natural sciences. Hilary Putnam was perhaps the most vocal prag-
matist in destroying the idea that facts and values are judgments, when expressed as 
propositions, that can be completely disentangled from each other. It is not only 
present in his perhaps most famous work, Reason, Truth, and History, but it is the 
topic of an entirely separate book, more than two decades later, The Collapse of the 
Fact/Value dichotomy.4 These works serve as the foundation for his later work in the 
philosophy of economics. In The End of Value Free Economics with Vivian Walsh. 
Putnam writes:
There are facts (using the term as we ordinarily do—not as a term in metaphysical theory, 
which… is what the logical positivists did) which come into view only through the lenses 
of an evaluative outlook. ‘Virtue terms—terms such as ‘brave’, ‘wise’, compassionate’, 
‘resourceful’, and their opposites, have indeed figured in philosophical discussions for mil-
lennia precisely for this reason.5
3 Putnam has most recently clarified his position on facts and values with respect to ontology, logic, 
and mathematics as a special case of employing, borrowing a term from Jennifer Case, “optional 
languages”. That these alternative conceptual approaches, what he dubs his ‘conceptual pluralism’, 
is a result of not having one true mode of describing the world, and that the choice is based on 
interests which have an evaluative and rational basis. This pluralism, however, does not have the 
consequence of relativism or anti-realism. For his late articulation of this thesis, see Putnam (2016).
4 See Putnam (1980) and Putnam (2004)
5 Putnam (2003, 396). Repr. in Putnam and Walsh (2012,112)
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The consequence of this view is that the attempt in economics to achieve a value-
free model of the scientific explanation of human behaviour is fundamentally 
flawed. Thus, even if economics could imitate the natural sciences as they would 
like to do, the language involved in describing what is observed or judgments of 
relevance, to take two elements of scientific inquiry, are value laden. The issue is 
doubly fraught for the sciences of human behaviour as inquirers employ assump-
tions with respect to values besides using language that necessarily entangles 
descriptive and normative elements. Again Putnam:
The world we inhabit when we describe the world for purposes other than the purposes of 
physics or molecular biology or some other exact science—certainly the world we inhabit 
when we describe the world for the purposes the economist is interested in—is not describ-
able in ‘value-neutral’ terms. Not without throwing away the most significant facts along 
with the ‘value judgments’ (Putnam and Walsh 2012, 112).
Besides the issues with thick terms or descriptions that don’t allow for disentan-
gling the normative from the factual elements of propositions, another common 
feature of a variety of pragmatic thinkers with respect to social inquiry is the inter-
ests and values made explicit by the fact that something is a problem in the first 
place. That is to say, it is not just an ‘injection’ of values via the conceptual and 
linguistic arguments regarding thick concepts, the entangled character of fact and 
value in certain terms, but it is also central that problematic situations themselves 
become available for social scientific inquiry by being constituted in their fabric as 
situations by values.6 The account that pragmatism, beginning with Peirce, has of 
inquiry is as a practical activity of moving from the state of doubt to the state of 
belief. Dewey transformed the doubt-belief matrix while maintaining its general 
character, into a novel understanding of logic as a theory of inquiry.7 This extension 
6 The classic statement of this position in the pragmatist literature occurs in John Dewey’s 
Experience and Nature. There he writes:
Or is there an ingredient of truth in ancient metaphysics which may be extracted and re-
affirmed? Empirically, the existence of objects of direct grasp, possession, use and enjoy-
ment cannot be denied. Empirically, things are poignant, tragic, beautiful, humorous, 
settled, disturbed, comfortable, annoying, barren, harsh, consoling, splendid, fearful; are 
such immediately and in their own right and behalf. If we take advantage of the word 
esthetic in a wider sense than that of application to the beautiful and ugly, esthetic quality, 
immediate, final or self-enclosed, indubitably characterizes natural situations as they 
empirically occur. These traits stand in themselves on precisely the same level as colors, 
sounds, qualities of contact, taste and smell. Any criterion that finds the latter to be ultimate 
and “hard” data will, impartially applied, come to the same conclusion about the former. 
Any quality as such is final; it is at once initial and terminal; just what it is as it exists.
It is beyond the scope of this article to engage the pragmatic resources for this position. It is 
instructive that after decades of exploring such issues as the role of sense-data in our scientific and 
metaphysical theories, Putnam increasingly moves towards this position in his writing. See espe-
cially his debates with Bernard Williams as evidence of this move. In this shift he relies on Dewey, 
yes, but in his latest work turns to theories and empirical research in perception to extend his 
stance. See Dewey (1925, 82) and Putnam (2016).
7 For the classic statement of this matrix, see “The Fixation of Belief” in Peirce and Buchler (1955).
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of Peirce’s original formulation is key for both understanding the practical character 
of scientific activity, but also, crucially, the results of that activity: inquiry is contex-
tually situated and draws on the conceptual resources available for addressing fail-
ures of habits at the individual, institutional, and social level. A key element of the 
contextual character of problematic situations is what Dewey called their qualitative 
uniqueness. While they share many elements and continuities with respect to previ-
ous problem contexts, they are novel. As novel, our patterns of inference, whether 
deductive or inductive, are not enough to respond in a way that can identify, let 
alone solve, the problem at hand. Rather, it requires hypothetical inference, or 
abduction, and experiment.
In addition, on the pragmatic understanding of social science, the practical char-
acter of this activity extends beyond the supposed value-neutrality of methodologi-
cal frameworks to the end towards which economists are aiming. Practices are 
famously rule-governed activities that have embedded within them goals towards 
which they are ordered. But what is the goal of economics? Indeed, what is econom-
ics for? The model of economics that pragmatism offers takes this question to be 
one of the primary orienting features of this or any practice that would qualify as 
scientific inquiry. Briefly, before addressing this goal, it is helpful to highlight two 
aspects of pragmatism that have deep consequences for how we deal with social 
problems more broadly: the general character of the pattern of inquiry and the 
experimental nature of inquiry.
In the pragmatic understanding of inquiry, or science, or how we achieve knowl-
edge about the world (epistemology), pragmatism shares at least one methodologi-
cal similarity with positivism in at least some of its guises: scientific inquiry has one 
general pattern. Positivists, in one of its most famous versions, exiled from all 
meaningful language value propositions as senseless as they had no verification 
procedure by which they might be tested and secured in the physical sciences.8 This 
of course is the opposite of the pragmatic position as values and interests saturate 
the choices made within problem-solving contexts of all inquiry. The criteria of 
coherence, for instance, involves evaluation of fit introducing normative judgments 
into scientific procedures. While pragmatism does share with positivism the theory 
of a general pattern of inquiry, the practice of doing science and its language is 
value-laden according to pragmatism. This clashes with positivism, and following 
upon it, mainstream economics’ self-understanding. When it turns to social sciences 
(especially in the pragmatism of Dewey and Putnam, to point to the main examples 
in the background of this paper but by no means limited to just these two) this pat-
tern adapts and orders itself to the objects or subjects constituting the problematic 
context and in addition becomes historically self-conscious with respect to prior 
methods of inquiry in a cumulative way. Dewey in particular is not sanguine about 
the difficulties of fulfilling the norms of scientific inquiry with respect to social sci-
ence, but nonetheless uses it as a normative criterion for parsing what counts as 
actual social inquiry and what are merely intellectual abstractions based upon a 
priori theoretical commitments.
8 The two main targets in pragmatist literature taking up this argument are emotivism in ethics and 
physicalist eliminativism in metaphysics and ontology.
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This methodological self-reflection is itself shaped by the social and historical con-
texts in which it emerges. Put more directly,  the very concepts and ideas which guide 
scientific inquiry as well as what ends up being aritculated as ‘fact’ are both generated 
and activated within a context. Beyond the character, then, of our language, concepts, 
and judgments that betray the infusion of facts and values, the intellectual means at 
our disposal are operant within a ‘background’ that is specific to our historical and 
cultural location. This is a familiar thesis in the philosophy of science that is captured 
in a different register as the theory-dependence of our data. Putnam’s way of putting 
this within the practical circumscription of our scientific activities is by stating that 
“science institutes data”.9 That is to say, the facts that are articulated in the language 
of scientists of course rely on observation, but perception for pragmatists is an inter-
ested affair, mediated through the conceptual resources available for making the mate-
rial of our percepts explicit.10
Besides these conceptual features of the pragmatic understanding of inquiry, the 
general pattern as articulated by Dewey also emphasizes the existential or objective 
impact inquiry effects. That is, the activity of inquiry reconstitutes problematic situ-
ations through the intelligent intervention of humans seeking to solve their prob-
lems. Because inquiry is generated out of the doubt of the inquirer in Peirce, or the 
shattering of our projective habits and anticipations in Dewey, its resolution consists 
in the reordering of the practical context in which the problem or doubt found its 
genesis. That is to say, and here we rely on Dewey for its most explicit statement, 
inquiry involves resolving problems that emerge from breakdowns of our practices 
in such a way as to reconstruct and restore the environment:
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one 
that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements 
of the original situation into a unified whole.11
I enlist this oft-quoted definition for two reasons. The first is that it raises a whole 
host of issues as to how to understand the purposes of the sciences themselves, and 
these issues only become more complicated when dealing with human subjects. Far 
from limiting the purpose of science as creating a verified system of propositions that 
describe the natural world in a value-neutral way, pragmatic inquiry is involved in 
actively constituting the problematic situation with respect to the conceptual resources 
at hand and then engaging in experimental activity that attempts to solve the problem. 
In fact, it is in discussing social inquiry as a special instance of inquiry that Dewey 
takes pains to reiterate the world-changing or interventionist character of natural sci-
entific inquiry.
9 Rorty et al. (2004). This conversation between James Conant, Hilary Putnam, and Richard Rorty 
provides an accessible and illuminating exploration of these issues, along with Putnam’s disagree-
ments with Rorty.
10 I state the matter this way for sake of expediency. There is a much longer pragmatic story to tell 
regarding the relation of concepts, percepts, and stimuli.
11 See Dewey (1938, 109).
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3.1  The Philosophy of Social Science and Pragmatism
Here I would like to retreat to a higher level of abstraction, but one that allows for 
an understanding of how crucial the question of this reflection is to the practice of 
economics itself from a pragmatic perspective. When we place economics as a dis-
cipline grouping it under the social sciences, we can help illuminate an answer as to 
what it is for by unearthing some of the general features of inquiry in the social 
sciences, tout court. The debate over what the social sciences are for can be captured 
very generally by referring to the three ends of explanation, understanding, and 
emancipation.12 That is, what social scientists generally consider the goal of a social 
scientific activity have tended to sort out along three lines:
 1) The social sciences aim at results akin to the explanations based on cause -effect 
covering law models as in the natural sciences, or some lesser version of induc-
tive correlation.
 2) The social sciences are geared towards mutual understanding of the meaningful 
and expressive character of an animal that is essentially self-defining and self- 
articulating through actions not reducible to a framework available to an inde-
pendent observer.
 3) The social sciences are part of an overall praxis whose ultimate goal is emanci-
pation from the irreducible dimensions of power that have thus far stratified 
societies in ways that arbitrarily oppress, dominate, and diminish human creativ-
ity through the systematic distortion of the intentions of actors.
The naturalist, interpretive and critical schools of social science then, are part of 
the conceptual inheritance of social science when it comes to the intellectual and 
practical task of addressing economic problems. Here we turn to the pluralism of 
pragmatism, and in particular to John Dewey’s philosophy of social science, to 
address the purpose of economics, vis-a-vis the philosophy of social science.
In the face of such different and at first face incompatible ends for economics as a 
special example of social inquiry, the pragmatic approach famously employs what 
might be termed a Hegelian strategy in a metaphysically naturalist vein. That is, 
rather than select one of the methodological platforms for the purpose of social sci-
ence, pragmatism absorbs each in a pattern of inquiry that draws out the lessons for 
practical coping with problems that each method was historically inspired to address. 
Each of these schools helps as a stage in articulating and addressing the problem at 
hand. In addition, because problematic situations are unique and composed of varie-
gated elements in differing intensities of influence, no one methodological platform 
has priority of others in an a priori fashion. In some instances what we observe using 
utility maximization models of human choice is correct. In others, it would be mis-
leading to impose these as explanations of action.13 This makes the employment of 
12 See the classic statement of these options see Fay and Moon (1977).
13 Clifford Geertz’s (1973) “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight” remains an instructive 
touchstone for the dangers of imposing rational choice models on social phenomena.
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method a practical affair requiring an experimental and fallibilistic attitude: Are there 
causal elements to human behaviour that need be elicited to help explain the prob-
lematic situation? Am I really understanding what is going on in this action context 
without engaging the participants in ways such that I empathetically reconstruct their 
intentions so as to give meaningful sense to their actions? Are there forces at work 
psychologically distorting practices and intentional frameworks for the purposes of 
ideological manipulation? These are all questions that will help illuminate human 
action in general, and what has come to be defined as economic action over time. 
This translation or, if you prefer, sublation of different paradigms of social science 
and, by extension, economic schools is not limited to pragmatic philosophy broadly 
to the social questions of this sort. Rather, pragmatism’s overall strategy is to see 
each of the alternatives developed in the past with regard to ethics, epistemology and 
metaphysics as methodological frames by which to assist in reconstructing a prob-
lematic situation in the present into a resolved whole.14
The particularly pragmatic contribution in social science, as a potential fourth 
element to social inquiry, is its experimental character. Because Dewey’s philoso-
phy of social science remains the most detailed working out of the pragmatic turn in 
philosophy with respect social inquiry, I will rely on his discussion of it in his 1938 
Logic: the theory of inquiry. There Dewey marks out in definite terms what the 
consequences for the pragmatic reconstruction of the history of philosophical 
inquiry are for the social sciences in the penultimate chapter of that work. He states 
that social inquiry is especially vulnerable to the positivist doctrine of the strict 
separation of facts and values and thus the independence of social science from 
social practice:
…the idea commonly prevails that such inquiry is genuinely scientific only as it deliber-
ately and systematically abstains from all concern with matters of social practice. The spe-
cial lesson which the logic of the methods of physical inquiry has to teach to social inquiry 
is, accordingly, that social inquiry, as inquiry, involves the necessity of operations which 
existentially modify actual conditions that, as they exist, are the occasions of genuine 
inquiry and that provide its subject-matter. For, as we have seen, this lesson is the logical 
import of the experimental method.15
That is, for pragmatic social science, social action for the sake of addressing a 
problem articulated in the different methodological processes of social inquiry is 
endogenous to social inquiry itself.
14 I have referred to these questions as informing different methodological moments of social 
inquiry in Hogan and Marcelle (2017). This pluralist strategy has some current practitioners in 
contemporary economics. Ha-Joon Chang, for instance, has famously been arguing both in publi-
cations and making popular videos that at once reorient the abstractions and expert level of eco-
nomics and also challenges the orthodoxy that, while on its back heels intellectually speaking, still 
maintains sociological and political dominance. Chang in fact lists 11 different schools of econom-
ics. Also resonant with pragmatism is Chang’s insistence that the experience of an individual is a 
sufficient starting point for making informed judgments about economic systems and their out-
comes. See Ha Joon Chang (2011) and RSA- Animate: Economics for Everyone- a cognitive 
whiteboard animation. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E9EzXHVYClI
15 Dewey (1938, 486)
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Social inquiry is about solving problems, as is all inquiry, and solving the prob-
lems of human beings requires social cooperative action. A problem is not solved by 
a journal article or a monograph, no matter how brilliant. It is here that the larger 
goals of community life are inscribed within each of the social sciences. That is, 
each social science as it has developed is actually not even scientific, according to 
pragmatism, unless it involves cooperative, coordinated action on the part of the 
individuals who live within the problematic context to solve the problem:
That which is observed, no matter how carefully and no matter how accurate the record, is 
capable of being understood only in terms of projected consequences of activities. In fine, 
problems with which inquiry into social subject-matter is concerned must, if they satisfy the 
conditions of scientific method, (1) grow out of actual social tensions, needs, “troubles”; (2) 
have their subject-matter determined by the conditions that are material means of bringing 
about a unified situation, and (3) be related to some hypothesis, which is a plan and policy 
for existential resolution of the conflicting social situation.16
Our only path for confirming our social scientific hypotheses, however, is through 
coordinated action. The epistemological requirement of getting the problem right in 
the first place includes the public or practical verification of the problem through 
channels of communication that take up into the problem formation process the 
perspectives of the subjects themselves.17
This aspect of social inquiry widens the practical requirements of the social sci-
ences into forming a public that becomes a constitutive feature of problem forma-
tion. In contradistinction to appeals to technocratic management of political policies 
and legislation, the problems of political, economic, and social life are here under-
stood as products of the articulation and communication of those individuals who 
are experiencing the problem themselves. Because problematic situations do not 
exhibit their constitutive features in ways that are easily legible to an observer, the 
demand to figure out what the problem in the first instance is paramount. But rather 
than these problems being of the nature of different chemical compounds and their 
reaction to each other, or the motion of planetary bodies, social problems involve 
agents who disagree, come into conflict, resort to violence, and have widely varying 
interpretations of the cause and effect processes and powers governing their life-
chances. If social scientists are going to have a chance at getting the problem right, 
they themselves must suspend their a priori predilections to define social problems 
according to a vocabulary and methodology that worked in a prior historical 
instance. This is not to elide what I earlier referred to as the contextual and histori-
cally specific character of our conceptual employments. It is to recognize the falli-
ble and situated character of our conceptual projections in light of a novel situation. 
The qualitative uniqueness, however, that is the mark of problematic situations pre-
vents inquirers from apprehending in a cognitively thorough manner environments 
that exhibit these various unique characteristics, spontaneous energies, and novel 
constellations of forces at work. In short, how we come to a robust description of the 
16 Dewey (1938, 493)
17 On the concept of practical verification, see Bohman (2003).
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actual problem at hand is through accessing those problems such that any type of 
possible hypothetical solution addresses the problems as experienced by the sub-
jects who suffer them:
The connection of social inquiry, as to social data and as to conceptual generalizations, with 
practice is intrinsic not external. Any problem of scientific inquiry that does not grow out of 
actual (or “practical”) social conditions is factitious; it is arbitrarily set by the inquirer 
instead of being objectively produced and controlled. All the techniques of observation 
employed in the advanced sciences may be conformed to, including the use of the best 
statistical methods to calculate probable errors, etc., and yet the material ascertained be 
scientifically “dead,” i.e., irrelevant to a genuine issue, so that concern with it is hardly more 
than a form of intellectual busy work. That which is observed, no matter how carefully and 
no matter how accurate the record, is capable of being understood only in terms of pro-
jected consequences of activities.18
One of the constraints, then, on this understanding of social science is that prob-
lem formation itself relies upon the articulation of the frustration of interests and 
harms experienced by individuals such that our understanding of the problem can be 
as epistemologically robust as possible. It is of course possible, that subjects them-
selves articulate their perspectives saturated in misinformation, or prejudice, or 
ignorance. However, the process of social inquiry involves the public in a self- 
reflective way precisely to discover and address these deficits, and to see how these 
errors themselves contribute to the problem at hand.
In this sense the critique of the one-dimensional character of the dominant 
schools of economics is a moral one. Economics is for solving economic problems, 
and the path to solving these problems, as pragmatism understands it, requires a 
wide array of methods and approaches to even begin to get the problems of econ-
omy right in the first place. The problems are defined in conjunction with the articu-
lation and action of the subjects in the problematic context. Though it has now 
become increasingly popular to criticize the mainstream and policy powering 
branches of economics, Dewey articulated his critique and view of social science in 
the 1930s culminating in 1938, and it is not coincidental that the context within 
which Dewey was writing was the Depression and the concomitant rise of fascism 
and solidification of Soviet communism. In developing a pragmatic understanding 
of social inquiry and economics as a special instance of social inquiry at this histori-
cal conjuncture, Dewey was trenchant in his critique of all forms of political doc-
trine founded upon an understanding of human action and human society that 
reduced the explanandum of history to the explanans of economic agency.
While this historical comment is illustrative, it serves a conceptual as well as 
exemplary purpose. For if pragmatic inquiry, as inquiry, is to get a problem right, 
the unsparing criticism of all forms of economic methodology and scientific prac-
tice that hypostatize principles of inquiry into a priori certainties that control data 
selection and formulation is called for. Thus, while Dewey clearly articulated a dev-
astating critique of Soviet economism in his Freedom and Culture (1939) and 




revolution as “totalitarian economics”, he was no less penetrating in his critique of 
the political and economic doctrines concomitant with liberal political economies in 
the industrial world.19
To close, I have focused on the general features of those aspects of pragmatism 
that solidify its approach to economics as a moral science. I have turned to the fact/
value distinction, the philosophy of social science, and the experimental character 
of inquiry pragmatic philosophy of social science calls for in order to demonstrate 
this link. The precise way in which this becomes a moral issue is through the neces-
sity of enlisting the values and perspectives of the subjects themselves in constitut-
ing the problems social inquiry deals with under the rubric of ‘economics’. These 
conceptual and practical elements are not the only ways in which pragmatic models 
of social inquiry are relevant to a project of reconstructing economics to make plain 
its moral purpose. Specifically, the model of the agents and the availability of pref-
erences for rational evaluation in choice situations is another rich path Putnam and 
others have taken in combining ethics and economics. This is yet another way in 
which two of the dominant schools of economics wielding power in policy and 
intellectual culture, neoclassical and behavioural economics, fall short from a moral 
perspective in the practice of economics.
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Chapter 4
Should Economics Make a Pragmatic 
Turn? John Dewey, Karl Polanyi, and 
Critique of Economic Naturalism
Maciej Kassner
Abstract This article draws upon John Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy to offer a 
critique of naturalistic assumptions underpinning modern economic thought. More 
specifically, mainstream economics is criticized for treating its subject-matter as 
human-independent, maintaining untenable means-ends dualism, and displaying a 
strong tendency to talk about capitalism and markets as if they were quasi-natural 
phenomena. Pragmatic arguments are developed in dialogue with the ideas derived 
from Karl Polanyi, Gunnar Myrdal, and contemporary philosophy of science. 
Throughout the article, institutionalism is singled out as an approach to economic 
inquiry that is compatible with central insights derived from Dewey’s version of 
pragmatism. The article suggests that pragmatism together with constructivism and 
hermeneutics provides a more appropriate philosophical framework for institutional 
economics than other approaches, including critical realism.
4.1  Introduction
In this essay, I will argue that the philosophy of economics – and economic thinking 
more broadly – should make a pragmatic turn. Yet, pragmatism is not a uniform 
tradition and critics vary greatly in their assessment of various aspects of pragmatic 
legacy. Here I wish to concentrate on a version of pragmatism developed by John 
Dewey since it seems to be most relevant for economics and social sciences in gen-
eral. My goal in this essay is to appropriate certain insights taken from Dewey’s 
philosophy in the critique of contemporary economic discourse. Following Dewey, 
I wish to argue that economics, despite its loudly proclaimed scientific aspirations, 
is still held captive by unexamined assumptions derived from various versions of 
This research project was supported by funding form National Science Centre, Poland (No. 
2016/20/S/HS5/00556).
M. Kassner (*) 
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw, Toruń, Poland
46
philosophical naturalism.1 In Logic: The Theory of Inquiry Dewey argued that “the 
net consequences of classical economics was reinstatement of the older conception 
of natural laws by means of a reinterpretation of their content” (Dewey 1938,  498). 
This remark was directed against the old natural law philosophy, which inspired the 
classical economics of Adam Smith and his followers. Similar critique, I would 
argue, can be raised against contemporary neoclassical theory and its allied 
approaches, which based their scientific aspirations on a particular understanding of 
physics and other natural sciences.2
More specifically, strong naturalistic influence can be detected in at least three 
areas of contemporary economic thinking. First, the dominant self-understanding of 
the economic profession assumes that the economy can be studied in the same way 
we study nature. This implies that the subject-matter of economics is treated as 
ontologically independent from human intentions and purposes. Second, neoclassi-
cal economics is based on a very problematic view of human nature and rationality, 
which treats means-ends dualism as a universal feature of rational behaviour. 
Thirdly, naturalistic undertones can be discerned in various conceptualizations of 
capitalism or the market economy which treat them as quasi-natural phenomena 
driven by their own internal laws. When applied to the subject matter of economics 
Deweyan pragmatism can be seen as a form of philosophical therapy. By exposing 
hidden philosophical presuppositions of contemporary economic theory pragma-
tism can loosen its grip over the economic profession and make economists and 
other social scientists more willing to examine alternatives to contemporary 
orthodoxy.
It should be clear from the outset that the argument offered in this essay is not 
neutral between various research traditions within contemporary social sciences and 
rival economic ideologies. On the contrary, it takes a partisan stance and champions 
the institutional approach to the economy as represented by original institutional 
economics and various research traditions within political science, sociology, and 
anthropology. More particularly, it tries to combine pragmatic arguments with 
lessons derived from Karl Polanyi and research tradition inspired by his work. 
Interestingly enough, Deweyan pragmatism and Polanyian institutional approach to 
political economy are not only compatible on a theoretical level but also embedded 
in a very similar social and political outlook. John Dewey and Karl Polanyi were 
1 For students of Dewey’s thought this assertion may be surprising. Was not Dewey himself a pro-
ponent of naturalism both in general and with regard to social inquiry? The answer to this question 
is of course positive. But Dewey’s version of naturalism had nothing to do with the naturalistic 
ambition, which drives contemporary economics. Suffice to say that for Dewey the presence of 
practical purpose and value judgments are two universal traits of all types of inquiry.
2 Although orthodox economics can be easily identified, providing an exact definition of it may be 
difficult. In this paper such terms as mainstream or orthodox economics will refer to various 
approaches that are basically consistent with the central features of neoclassical analysis (i. e. 
mathematical formalism, rationality defined as utility maximization, and equilibrium analysis), 
even if they modify some of its assumptions. On definitional issues see further Arnsperger and 
Yannis (2008); Dequech (2007) and Lawson (2006).
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almost contemporaries.3 Both thinkers offered largely parallel critiques of 
nineteenth- century laissez-faire ideology and naturalistic philosophical assump-
tions behind it. More importantly, they both tried to avoid false alternatives repre-
sented by orthodox liberalism and orthodox Marxism. In order to overcome the 
ideological limitations of his time, Polanyi sought to examine the place of markets 
in different economic systems which existed in the past.4 His radical institutional-
ism, which emphasizes the fact that markets are always socially constructed, reso-
nates well with Deweyan anti-essentialism. Taken together these approaches suggest 
a novel and compelling way to think about the role of markets and institutions in a 
contemporary society.
We can now state our initial thesis in a more precise form. I believe that taking 
the pragmatic turn would make economics less naturalistic, more institutionally 
oriented and more radical in its social outlook. I will try to make this argument in 
the following steps. Firstly, I will examine the present state of economic dis-
course and try to show that some of the shortcomings of modern economics stem 
from its unconscious reliance on very problematic philosophical assumptions. 
Secondly, I will contrast Deweyan social psychology with simplistic utilitarian-
ism, which dominates contemporary economic thought. Finally, I will suggest 
some lessons that we can learn from Dewey and Polanyi regarding the place of 
markets in a just social order. In the concluding section of the paper, I ask what, 
if anything, economics can gain from Deweyan pragmatism and Karl Polanyi’s 
social thought.
4.2  Our Problematic Situation: Mainstream Economics 
and the Legacy of Naturalism
John Dewey teaches us that all thinking has its beginning in some deeply felt 
dilemma or trouble.5 Arguably, Dewey’s thesis has been vindicated by the rise of 
philosophical reflection regarding economic subject-matter. Indeed, the growing 
popularity of such a relatively young subfield as philosophy of economics indicates 
that professional economics is beset by deeply felt scepticism concerning the valid-
ity of its assumptions, models and standard methods of conducting research. There 
is a widespread conviction that not all is well with the way economics is thought and 
practiced today. Economics, it is often said, is a science of choices that people make 
under conditions of scarcity.6 If so, economic methods and concepts are largely 
irrelevant for understanding more complex social situations such as, among other 
things, the present state of economic science. Ordering preferences and listing 
3 For biographical information consult Westbrook (1991) and Dale (2016).
4 See Polanyi (1977).
5 See Dewey (1938, 109).
6 For the classic formulation of the scarcity definition of economics see Robbins (1932, 15).
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possible choices is not a suitable panacea for a deep crisis of professional self- 
confidence. We need to engage in a more interpretative inquiry and ask what kind of 
cultural tensions reveal themselves in contemporary philosophical debates about the 
present state of economic science.
The best way to start the inquiry is to take a closer look at its scientific ambitions. 
Philosophical self-understanding of mainstream economics, to the extent that it has 
any, is defined by naturalistic outlook. By naturalism we mean here the desire to 
imitate the most successful of the natural sciences, most particularly physics. As 
Philip Mirowski (1989) has argued in his book More Heat Than Light modern neo-
classical economics has started out as an attempt to use concepts derived from 
nineteenth- century energy physics to the study of economic subject-matter. From 
that time on, recurrent physics envy is one of the most enduring characteristics of 
mainstream economic thinking. In the early twentieth century, self-understanding 
of naturalism was transformed under the influence of new philosophy of science 
represented by logical positivism and the teachings of Karl Popper. Influence of 
positivism is evident in the writings of such luminaries as Paul Samuelson and 
Lionel Robbins (Macpherson 1983, 97). Arguably, the naturalistic orientation of 
contemporary mainstream economics can be characterized as an attempt to imitate 
a particular image of natural science, which was created by the positivists and the 
Popperians after World War II. In his book devoted to the critical examination of the 
idea of social science in the philosophy of Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Jason Blakely noted that neoclassical economics is a “standard-bearer for natural-
ism in the social science today”.7 Economics is also a major source of naturalistic 
influence for other social disciplines, most notably political science. As many 
authors observed, this naturalistic orientation is revealed in a predominance of 
mathematical formalism, which bears some superficial resemblance to techniques 
used in natural sciences.8 Even more importantly, naturalism brings with itself cer-
tain problematic philosophical assumptions about the character of the subject matter 
of economics.
At the heart of naturalism lies the idea that the economy resembles the natural 
world at least in one essential regard. Both economic and natural phenomena are 
thought to be subject to laws and regularities that are ontologically independent 
from human will and intentionality. From the point of view of Dewey’s pragmatism, 
modern economics is a special case of the spectator theory of knowledge. According 
to this fallacious view, knowing is conceived as radically separated from doing. As 
a consequence, the subject matter of knowledge is conceptualized as ready-made 
and complete in itself. In The Quest for Certainty, Dewey offered the following 
explanation of the consequences of the spectator theory of knowledge with special 
reference to economic thinking:
The doctrine that nature is inherently rational was a costly one. It entailed the idea that 
reason in man is an outside spectator of a rationality already complete in itself. It deprived 
7 See Blakely (2016, 17).
8 On the contested issue of mathematical formalism in economics consult Mirowski (1986).
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reason in man of an active and creative office; its business was simply to copy, to re-present 
symbolically, to view a given rational structure. (…) The doctrine was both an effect of the 
traditional separation between knowledge and action and a factor in perpetuating it. (…) Its 
paralysing effect on human action is seen in the part it played in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth century in the theory of natural laws in human affairs, in social matters. These natural 
laws were supposed to be inherently fixed; a science of social phenomena and relations was 
equivalent to discovery of them. Once discovered, nothing remains for man but to conform 
to them; they were to rule his conduct as physical laws govern physical phenomena. They 
were sole standard of conduct in economic affairs; the laws of economics are “natural” laws 
of all political action; other so called laws were artificial, man-made contrivances in con-
trast with the normative regulations of nature itself. Laissez faire was the logical conclu-
sion. For organized society to attempt to regulate the course of economic affairs, to bring 
them into service of humanly conceived ends, was a harmful interference (Dewey 
1929, 169).
While contemporary economics cannot be said to be uniformly pro-market in its 
ideological orientation, it nevertheless retains essentially the same notion of fixed 
subject-matter that was criticized by Dewey. The essence of this view is to treat 
economics as a discipline concerned solely with a value-free study of pre-existing 
economic reality.
The naturalistic view of the relationship between economics and its subject- 
matter rests on very problematic epistemological and ontological assumptions. On 
the epistemological level, it is questionable whether we really can know the econ-
omy – or, for that matter, anything else – without taking into consideration practical 
purposes which our knowledge should serve. The thesis that knowing and doing are 
always connected in the process of inquiry is one of the distinguishing traits of 
pragmatism. The essence of pragmatic position was captured well by Clarence 
Irving Lewis who said that for Dewey ‘meaning and action are necessarily con-
nected” (Lewis 1939, 572). As Lewis explains Dewey’s logic contains
…distinctive conception, incompatible with most views, that the cognitive or meaning situ-
ation does not admit of bifurcation into an activity of the knower and a preformed object 
which is contemplated; that knowing or meaning is integral with other activities which 
shape the objects to which they are addressed; that meanings themselves serve to frame the 
situations of action into which they enter, and exercise an operational force upon what they 
serve to formulate. It is implied that an idea or a meaning, apart from some possible action 
and the reality in which it should eventuate, is a fictitious entity not found in human think-
ing. And conversely, it is implied that the objects of knowledge, without reference to mean-
ings and the actions to which they may lead, are equally fictitious (1939, 572).
We can glimpse from this quotation how radical the pragmatic theory of knowl-
edge really is. It seeks to undermine basic dualisms of modern philosophy including 
those between subject and object, theory and practice, and knowing and the known. 
What we get instead is a picture of inquiry as a form of practical activity whose 
ultimate aim is to reconstruct its subject matter according to some purpose or plan. 
Thus, the goal of inquiry is not only to understand the world but also to change it or, 
said more precisely, theoretical understanding of the world would be impossible 
without some sort of practical purpose which guides our interpretation of a given 
problematic situation.
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The interconnection between cognitive situation, meaning, and practical purpose 
is evident in Dewey’s conception of the mutual interdependence of facts and val-
ues.9 According to Dewey, judgments about facts and judgments about values are 
closely linked in the process of inquiry. Every inquiry takes place in the context of 
some specific problematic situation. Selection of data and facts is guided by implicit 
or explicit determination of their relevance to the issue at hand. Without reference 
to some problem we do not have facts but only a mass of meaningless information. 
But to say that facts are relevant to a given case is to make a value judgment since 
relevance is obviously an evaluative term. More generally, the way we organize our 
facts depends to a large extent on the value premises of our theories. Strikingly simi-
lar point was made by Gunnar Myrdal with regard to economic inquiry. According 
to Myrdal “all science, at any rate all social science, is «practical», even in its purely 
casual theory, because it must choose one from amongst infinite number of possible 
ways of collecting and ordering its infinitely large mass of empirical data” (1958, 
209). Thus, every principle of selection contains some overt or hidden reference to 
practical purpose. Historically speaking, economic theories emerged as an attempt 
to meet the demands of some “concrete and particular political questions” (1958, 
210). Thus, for Myrdal “practical political economy”, which is defined by its adher-
ence to particular aims and purposes, “logically precedes any causal explanation” 
(1958, 210). Thus, any strict distinction between theory and practice, or positive and 
normative economics is untenable.
Problematic situations, the main subject of social inquiry, are practical in yet 
another sense. As John Dewey noted, problems investigated by social sciences typi-
cally “grow out of actual tensions, needs, «troubles»” (Dewey 1938, 493). Charles 
Wright Mills, who followed Dewey in this regard, argued that a social issue 
“involves a crisis in institutional arrangements, and often, too, it involves what 
Marxists call «contradictions» or «antagonisms»” (2000, 9). In the context of par-
ticular social conflicts, facts can be divided into factors that enable or inhibits the 
realization of certain desired goals (Dewey 1938, 493). Following this further, we 
can note that the perception of social problems is strongly influenced by the per-
spective of particular social actors. Businesspeople, trade unionists, environmental 
activists, and feminists can have different ideas about what counts as an economic 
problem and which data are particularly relevant. Taking this into consideration, 
James Bohman (2002) argues for multiperspectival social science, which includes 
points of view of all relevant actors. Moreover, competing ideologies and social 
philosophies can be interpreted as different ways of making sense of problematic 
situations. They offer divergent hypothesis regarding the nature of social problems 
that should be given a free play in the course of economic investigations. Thus, it is 
vital for an economic inquiry to be open to different theoretical, ideological and 
methodological perspectives. Interpreting the world through the lenses of a single 
9 For Dewey’s view see in particular his essay The Logic of Judgments of Practice (1915) MW 8, 
14–97. For perceptive commentary consult Bernstein (1999, 213–219).
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theory is likely to lead to a strong bias, regardless of how many Nobel prize laure-
ates in economics may be associated with that particular theory.10
In human sciences, facts and values are connected not only epistemologically but 
also ontologically. Dewey made this point in The Public and Its Problems when he 
observed that “political facts are not outside human desire and judgment. Change 
men’s estimate of the value of existing political agencies and forms; and the latter 
change more or less.”11 What seems obvious with regard to political institutions, 
such as constitutions and electoral laws, also remains true for economic institutions 
like money, credit, and banking. In contemporary philosophy similar conception of 
the subject-matter of social sciences has been put forward by the proponents of 
constructivism and hermeneutics. Following John Searle, we can say that the sub-
ject matter of social sciences, economics included, is epistemologically objective 
but ontologically subjective (Searle 2005, 3–5). To say, that the economy is episte-
mologically objective is to maintain that more or less warranted assertions can be 
made about it. To say that the economy is ontologically subjective is to assert that it 
is constituted by institutions, which are collectively created with the use of lan-
guage. In other words, economic objects owe their very existence to human inten-
tionality and judgment as well as moral purpose embodied in them (Róna 2017, 
3–9). For instance, such business artefacts as money and banking are unthinkable 
without rules and shared meanings, which are associated with them. Hence, inter-
pretations are a constitutive part of economic reality.12 Strangely enough, the fact 
that economic reality is laden with intersubjective meanings and purposes is sys-
tematically ignored by mainstream economic theory. Fear of allegedly subjective 
interpretations is evident in the tendency of mainstream economics to treat prefer-
ences as a given property of autonomous individuals.13 As a result, culturally spe-
cific and socially constructed character of human wants and preferences is placed 
outside of the scope of orthodox economic inquiry.
In this section, I have argued against naturalistic self-understanding of economic 
profession, which states that the goal of economics as a positive science is to pro-
duce value-free explanatory theories about the nature and workings of the economy. 
I have found this self-understanding inadequate on both epistemological and onto-
logical grounds. From an epistemological perspective, a positive conception of eco-
nomic inquiry is neither possible nor desirable. It is impossible since we cannot 
have any scientific discourse without judgments related to such values as signifi-
cance, simplicity, fruitfulness, adequacy, and so on.14 It is undesirable since the 
attempt to construct such science makes it more difficult to use the insights of eco-
nomic inquiry for the purpose of social and economic reconstruction. From the 
10 For recent arguments in favour of a greater pluralism in economics see Fullbrook (2008, 13–25).
11 See Dewey (1927, 240). For an elaboration of this point with respect to economics see Dewey 
(1947, 224-238).
12 For a classic statement of interpretative conception of social inquiry based on the view that social 
reality is constituted by shared meanings see Taylor (1971).
13 See Macpherson (1983).
14 For a further elaboration of pragmatic critique of fact/value dichotomy see Putnam (2002).
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ontological perspective, the main shortcoming of mainstream economics lies in the 
neglect of the role of ideas, interpretations, and meanings in the constitution of eco-
nomic subject matter. Ultimately, economic reality consists of historically specific 
practices and institutions, which cannot be adequately conceptualized without tak-
ing into account the category of a shared culture.
4.3  Overcoming the Limits of Rational Choice: Pragmatism 
and Institutionalism
In addition to the conception of economic subject-matter shaped by naturalism, 
neoclassical economics also contains a view of human being as homo economicus, 
devoted single-mindedly to the maximization of utility. Modern economics assumes 
universal human nature and universal rationality, which consists of the capacity to 
choose the most efficient means to a given set of aims. For the followers of main-
stream economics, all human beings from diverse cultures and different historical 
epochs are essentially alike, at least with regard to the type of rational calculations 
that guide or should guide their conduct. Hence, categories developed by neoclassi-
cal economics are believed to be rooted in the very nature of human beings. But a 
closer examination of the philosophical assumptions underlying economic theories 
of human nature and rational action reveal that they are built on very shaky founda-
tions. From the pragmatic perspective at least two elements of the received view are 
extremely problematic. Firstly, the idea of universal human nature breaks down 
when confronted with a variety of culturally specific habits and institutions. 
Secondly, the rigid dualism of means and ends seems to be untenable in the light of 
a pragmatic theory of action which revolves around the idea that means and ends are 
“two names for the same reality” (Dewey 1922, 36).15 That is to say, the distinction 
between means and ends is not absolute but contextual. Those arguments, taken 
together, undermine the behavioural micro-foundations of modern economics.
In order to expose questionable behavioural assumptions behind much of present- 
day economic thinking, I shall compare social psychology of habits developed by 
Dewey in Human Nature and Conduct with individualistic psychology of utility 
maximization that dominates mainstream economics. Dewey offers a broad defini-
tion of a habit as “that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity 
and in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or system-
atization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready 
for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form 
even when not obviously dominating activity.”16 It is important to understand that 
for Dewey habits are functions of social surroundings. They are not inborn but 
acquired through the process of socialization and participation in culture. They 
15 For a theory of creative action build on Dewey’s social psychology see Joas (1996).
16 See Dewey (1922, 31).
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denote typical modes of response to standardized social situations. In this respect, 
they are similar in meaning to the concept of institutions. Affinity of the two terms 
was perceptively noted by Wesley Mitchell, a leading institutional economist and 
Dewey’s student at the University of Chicago. As Mitchell observed, the term “insti-
tutions’” as conceptualized in institutional economics is merely a convenient name 
for “the more important among the widely prevalent, highly standardized social 
habits” (1950b, 373).17 However, rootedness of economic action in the of shared 
habits and institutions is systematically ignored by neoclassical economics and akin 
approaches. Indeed, as Geoffrey Hodgson observed, one of the major limitations of 
mainstream economics is that it is institutionally blind.18 Hence, the integrity of the 
behavioural assumption behind mainstream economics can be preserved only at the 
price of ignoring or downplaying the importance of the institutional context of the 
economic inquiry.
Another problematic aspect of mainstream economic theory lies in its attempt to 
introduce exact mathematical calculus into the study of human conduct. As Dewey 
noted, future pleasures and pains are “subject to incalculable accident” (1922, 38). 
Similar arguments apply also to the notion of marginal utility, which is nothing 
other than an imaginary unit of preference satisfaction. Clearly, calculations made 
in such terms can bring only a distant semblance of exactness and rigor. On the 
contrary, such categories as habits and institutions cannot be easily expressed in 
mathematical formulas. Nevertheless, they have a considerable advantage from an 
empirical point of view. To put it simply, habits and institutions are revealed in spe-
cific patterns of behaviour, which can be recorded and studied with the help of 
appropriate quantitative and qualitative techniques. Norms guiding human conduct 
can be studied through participant observation, in-depth interviews, discourse anal-
ysis and other methods derived from anthropology and qualitative sociology. 
However, institutionalism does not need to shy away from the study of macro- 
phenomena with the use of quantitative methods. Indeed, as Wesley Mitchell, an 
institutional economist and one of the founders of modern econometrics observed, 
“the quantitative workers will have a special predilection for institutional problems 
because institutions standardize behaviour and thereby facilitate statistical proce-
dure” (1950a, 30). Mitchell’s approach, although biased in favour of statistical 
methods, is poles apart from the use of econometric techniques prevalent in neoclas-
sical economics, where “the business of statistician is merely to verify conclusions 
established by deduction” (1950a, 33). To conclude, from a pragmatic perspective, 
studying patterns of behaviour observed in the fieldwork or encapsulated in time 
series of economic data, is eminently more enlightening than building formal mod-
els based on aprioristic assumptions.
Equally serious difficulties emerge when we look more closely at means-ends 
dichotomy, which is assumed by most economics textbooks. Mainstream economic 
theory treats economic rationality as a matter of finding the most efficient means to 
17 Mitchell was Dewey’s student at the University of Chicago.
18 See Hodgson (2002).
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given ends. But such account is ridden with serious difficulties. To start with, our 
ability to act rationally is predicated on the possibility of having adequate knowl-
edge about future states of the world. Unfortunately, social sciences, including eco-
nomics, failed to demonstrate their capability of yielding such knowledge. Following 
Mary Hesse, we may say that natural sciences are instrumentally progressive (i.e. 
characterized by cumulative growth of their ability to predict and control), whereas 
social sciences are not.19 In consequence, economic actors facing the situation of 
choice cannot be sure what the consequences of alternative lines of action will be. 
Moreover, as mainstream economic theory admits, when we are faced with incom-
plete markets or imperfect information rational economic calculations may be 
impossible to perform.20 In short, instrumental rationality, such as means-ends 
schema, can work successfully only in a highly predictable environment. But our 
social and economic world is not of this kind. Indeed, as many writers assert, 
unquantifiable uncertainty is one of the most enduring features of our contemporary 
economic life.21 For that reason, as Dewey reminds us, “all action is invasion of a 
future, of the unknown”.22 Surely, economic action in an uncertain world cannot be 
adequately described as a maximization problem.
Another problem with mainstream economic theory is that in many situations we 
cannot distinguish strictly between means and ends. Suppose that a person wishes 
to attain a state of religious ecstasy.23 It would be inappropriate to suggest that 
essentially the same outcome can be achieved more efficiently through the use of 
certain psychedelic drugs. In such situations, the use of means-ends schema tends to 
misinterpret the character of established social customs. As Michael Macpherson 
observed, “it may in some cases make more sense to conceive of cultural learning 
as supplying «ends to given means» rather than other way round” (1983, 108). The 
means-ends dualism assumes that all relevant means leading to projected outcome 
are known in advance. However, as Jens Beckert (2003) sought to demonstrate, 
creative economic action as personified by the figure of Schumpeterian entrepre-
neur, typically modifies existing patterns of conducting business. Hence, entrepre-
neurship cannot be adequately described as finding the most efficient means to 
preconceived ends. Following Dewey Jens Beckert argues that creative action 
reconstructs both traditional means and established ends and, for that reason, it can-
not be adequately explained within the rational choice framework. Finally, for 
Dewey inquiry does not start with assigning means to ends but with the interpreta-
tion of some problematic situation, when we do not know what to do. Exploring the 
19 Cf. Hesse (1980).
20 See Hahn (1980).
21 On the role of uncertainty consult Davidson (2010).
22 Dewey (1922, 38, 37).
23 The example is drawn from Macpherson (1983, 108).
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intricate complexities of the situation can suggest novel means as well as previously 
overlooked ends.24
Mainstream economics assumes that economic reality can be bifurcated into two 
entirely separate domains. On the one hand, there is a purely objective world of 
means, which can be studied with the aid of scientific methods. On the other hand, 
there is a purely subjective world of ends, which are introduced to the economy 
from outside by economic agents. It can be demonstrated that means-ends dichot-
omy that dominates modern economic thinking is a paradoxical consequence of the 
replacement of deistic naturalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth century with the 
image of science modelled after modern natural science. As Gunnar Myrdal 
observed, “the use of the categories of means and ends to order and arrange knowl-
edge did not become important until political economy has outgrown the naïve phi-
losophy of natural law” (1958, 209). For classical economists, such as Adam Smith, 
nature was inherently moral since it was a part of divine creation.25 The natural 
order was supposed to work according to laws given by God. In Myrdal’s terms 
essence of old naturalism was “direct identification of teleology with causality” 
(Viner 1927, 206; Myrdal 1958, 206). However, with the rise of modern physics 
classical deism fell out of grace and a different image of nature emerged. This time 
nature was depicted as a cold realm governed by impersonal mechanisms which 
were indifferent to human purposes. Thus, new naturalism modelled on the idea of 
physical nature has relegated causality and teleology, or means and ends, into two 
entirely separated realms. The result is extreme relativism, which characterizes 
mainstream economic thinking. All values are regarded as essentially subjective and 
all of them lay outside the scope of theoretical or positive economics.
Needless to say, the economic universe cannot be divided so neatly into means 
and ends. For instance, labour can be regarded both as a means (i.e. factor of pro-
duction) and as an end because it is closely intertwined with the quality of life and 
dignity of human beings. Moreover, as we have already observed, economics errs in 
treating ends as given. The tendency to treat preferences as fixed is especially 
explicit in the economic theory of human behaviour put forward by Gary Becker 
(1976, 5). However, such a perspective is clearly at odds with many popular ideas 
about the nature of rationality and freedom. Especially for the normative purposes, 
rationality cannot be adequately conceptualized as a simple matter of obtaining the 
most efficient means for a fixed set of preferences. As John Dewey argued, “what 
men actually cherish under the name of freedom is varied and flexible growth, of 
change of disposition and character, that stems from intelligent choice” (1928, 110). 
Thus, the formulation of new and potentially more rational aims is far more impor-
tant than finding optimal satisfaction to an existing set of preferences. Indeed, as 
Karl William Kapp observed, “only a sick or neurotic being, one who singles out 
one fixed end and attached an overruling importance to it, can be said to have a 
24 For a more elaborated account of the consequences of situational character of ends see 
Whitford (2002).
25 Cf. Viner (1927).
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given or fixed preference schedule” (2011, 79). Moreover, orthodox economic the-
ory pays little attention to the conditions under which needs and preferences are 
formed. If the dominant set of preferences is created by giant corporations via 
means of advertisement and manipulative techniques of persuasion driven by big 
data technology, then it is not so great compliment to say that the market system is 
the most efficient way to satisfy those preferences. Clearly, what we would like to 
know is how autonomous people are in making decisions in the market and how 
rational their consumption choices are from both social and ecological point of view.
To sum up, the utilitarian account of rational choice, which underpins much of 
modern economic thinking, is inadequate both for the purpose of scientific explana-
tion and moral guidance. Theory of rational action overlooks the role of institutions 
in shaping human conduct and rests on an overly simplified view of the relationship 
between means and ends. Moreover, it tends to miss what is arguably most impor-
tant in moral deliberation and conduct, namely the possibility of rational assessment 
of diverging aims and conceptions of the good.
4.4  Embedded Markets and the Importance of Institutions
The last vestige of naturalism which I am going to discuss in this essay concerns the 
philosophical presuppositions of the language we often employ when talking about 
capitalism and markets. Naturalistic orientation in this area can be detected in the 
tendency to treat capitalism or markets as quasi-natural phenomena. Once set in 
motion, they tend to develop according to their own inner logic, which reflects their 
inner nature or essence. Interestingly enough, such views are entertained both by 
mainstream economists and their Marxist critics. John Dewey and Karl Polanyi 
were keen critics of the aforementioned tendency to treat capitalism and markets in 
a naturalistic manner. Writing to Clarence Ayres, Dewey expressed the hope that in 
the future, economics would offer an account of economic order that would “break 
down the idea that capitalism or any other socio-political order is fixed entity and 
hence exempt from otherwise universal sway of process”.26 For a similar reason, 
Karl Polanyi tended to avoid the word capitalism in his magnum opus The Great 
Transformation, preferring such notions as the market society.27 At the same time, 
Polanyi was aware that the very idea of the market which we inherited from Adam 
Smith is wedded to naturalistic philosophy. One of the main contributions of Karl 
Polanyi to social thought is the recognition that markets are always socially con-
structed.28 John Dewey on his own part offered a very similar critique of market 
naturalism. Writing about the need to reform liberal social thought Dewey argued 
26 Dewey’s letter to Ayres quoted in Tillman (1998, 159).
27 This point was noted early on by Allen Morris Sievers in first book-length study devoted to the 
analysis of Polanyi’s thought. See Sievers (1949, 18).
28 See Polanyi (2011).
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against “the laissez faire doctrine held by degenerate school of liberals to express 
the very order of nature itself”.29 Both thinkers believed that overcoming market 
naturalism is a necessary prerequisite for realistic thinking about the place of mar-
kets in the modern society.
Such considerations may seem as one more curiosity pulled out from the rich 
treasury of bygone social and economic doctrines. Nevertheless, I would argue that 
our own way of talking about capitalism and markets is not far off from the assump-
tions criticized by Dewey and Polanyi. I will try to demonstrate that by discussing 
two recent books strongly influenced by Karl Polanyi’s institutional theory: Fred 
Block’s Capitalism. The Future of Illusion and Steven Vogel’s Marketcraft. How 
Governments Make Markets Work.30 Let’s start with Vogel. His main thesis is that 
“real world markets are institutions: humanely devised constrains that shape human 
interactions” (2018, 1). To be sure, very few people would contest this claim. Even 
the most devoted followers of Hayek and Friedman are ready to admit that markets 
in order to function need a basic legal framework. However, they will also assert 
that when legal courts and property rights are in place markets can function in a 
self-regulatory fashion. However, this is precisely what Vogel denies. For him even 
the daily functioning of markets cannot be explained without accounting for cul-
tural norms and practices, social networks, power relations, and public and private 
acts of governance. In other words, for Vogel markets are institutionalized and 
socially embedded almost to the bone.
One of the most interesting aspects of Steven Vogel’s argument is close attention 
he pays to words we habitually use when discussing markets. In Vogel’s view our 
economic language is still predominantly naturalistic. In our public discourse, we 
tend to treat markets as if they were natural phenomena. They key misleading phrase 
is the expression “free market”, which was popularized by Milton Freedman. As 
Vogel explains this “elegant juxtaposition of the world free and market evokes many 
of the presumptions challenged in this book: that markets are natural; that markets 
arise spontaneously; that markets inherently constitute an area of freedom; and that 
government action necessarily constrains this freedom” (2018, 117). The mislead-
ing imaginary of “freeing” the markets is present in popular expressions such as 
leaving things to the markets or trusting the markets. It also manifests itself in the 
idea of government “interfering with” or “distorting” natural workings of the econ-
omy. Such abuses of language are by no means limited to popular discourse. 
Professional economics also uses rather problematic concepts such as perfect com-
petition or market failure. The theory of perfect competition, as Vogel observed, 
“implies that imperfect markets are the puzzle to be observed and perfect markets 
are natural order” (2018, 122). In consequence, what economics tries to explain are 
deviations from market behaviour and not market behaviour itself (Vogel 2018, 
122). In a somewhat similar vein market failure theory positions government as an 
outside force that corrects some minor dysfunctions of the economy. Yet such 
29 See Dewey (1935, 290).
30 See Block (2018) and Vogel (2018).
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conceptualization is misleading insofar as it suggests that failures are accidental to 
the workings of markets. However, flawless or perfect markets exist only in an 
imaginary realm of pure economic theory. More importantly, real markets would be 
inconceivable without rules, including legal rules sanctioned by the governments. 
Thus, the government cannot be portrayed as a force external to the market, which 
comes down to fix this or that occasional failure.
A similar point can be made also against the notion of capitalism. To be sure, we 
can define capitalism in purely institutional terms as a regime characterized by a 
dominant role of private property, prevalence of wage labour, and markets as main 
mechanisms for allocation of resources. However, it is important to realize that the 
notion of capitalism is very often associated with the image of a fixed system driven 
by its own inner laws. As Fred Block argues, this invokes the image of capitalism as 
a natural organism with his own DNA (2018, 28). From this perspective attempts to 
reform capitalism can be depicted as contradicted by the inner logic of the system 
or inconsistent with its DNA. But such arguments are both misleading and danger-
ous. It is misleading to think of capitalism as a coherent system. As Fred Block 
argues, “market economies depend on complex combination of conflicting institu-
tions and motivations, they are contradictory and unstable, and they periodically 
require major structural reorganizations” (Block 2018, 15). More importantly, the 
view that capitalism is an autonomous system which follows its own inner logic 
puts unnecessary constraints on democratic political action. The image of capital-
ism as driven by its own laws suggests that democratic governments have no choice 
but to conform to its systemic demands.
To sum up, I have argued that contemporary public discourse about capitalism 
and markets is contaminated by unexamined naturalistic assumptions. Naturalistic 
vocabulary is omnipresent both in public debate and in the realm of academic social 
theory. John Dewey’s pragmatism and Karl Polanyi’s institutional theory can be 
seen as parallel attempts to draw our attention to the fact that markets are not gov-
erned by natural laws of economics but rather by man-made legal and political 
rules. Hence, we can always attempt to rewrite those rules in the face of new social, 
economic and environmental problems.31
4.5  Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have argued for a particular set of alliances between different philo-
sophical approaches to social inquiry and rival research programs in contemporary 
social sciences. I have argued that mainstream economics is closely associated with 
positivist currents in philosophy of science. I also noted a series of elective affinities 
between various forms of institutionalism and such philosophical positions as 
31 For a very influential attempt to apply institutional insights about the importance of rules to the 
problems of contemporary capitalism see Stiglitz et al. (2016).
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pragmatism, constructivism, and hermeneutics. It may well be true that the growing 
discrepancy between mainstream economics and institutionally oriented social sci-
ences is one of the most profound divisions not only in academia but also in contem-
porary Western culture writ large. From the historical perspective, it can be seen as 
a modern version of the Methodenstreit in which different philosophical orienta-
tions intersect with methodology and politics. In case of such deep-seated cultural 
conflicts, it is unlikely that the debate can be resolved in any predictable future. At 
any rate, this paper does not claim to offer knockdown arguments against main-
stream economics. Its more modest ambition is to persuade the followers of an 
institutional approach that their arguments can be supplemented with valuable 
insights derived from Dewey’s pragmatism, social constructivism and hermeneu-
tics. By incorporating such a philosophical perspective, proponents of institutional-
ism can not only find new arguments against their neoclassical rivals but also better 
understand philosophical presuppositions of their own theories.32 Institutionalism is 
most persuasive when we recognize that the economy is constituted by socially 
constructed rules and that those rules are being permanently reconfigured in 
response to various difficulties and contradictions, which Dewey once called prob-
lematic situations. The aim of economic inquiry is to aid democratic societies in this 
endless process of institutional reconstruction.
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Chapter 5
Moral Economics – A Theoretical Basis 
for Building the Next Economic System
Zsófia Hajnal
Abstract This paper explores the concept of moral economics in the author’s own, 
complex interpretation. Moral economics is a new approach to the structure and 
nature of the economic system, suggesting changes at several critical points. The 
paper is an interdisciplinary work between philosophy and economics, shifting 
from theory to practice, past to present, and balancing between the normative and 
the positive. The purpose is to change the economic understanding and the per-
ceived economic logic through incorporating the moral factor into comprehen-
sive models.
5.1  Introduction
This paper aims to give a sketch – on this scale and in this scope, it can only be 
called a sketch – of moral economics and of the moral economy. Moral economics 
is not a well-established economic philosophy as of yet. In more recent interpreta-
tions, it is a new school of economic thought, still searching for and paving its own 
ways and opportunities.
The moral economy interpretation of this paper aims to provide smoothening and 
completing elements to the existing system. However, moral economics also aims 
to redefine economics as we know it today, by adding the moral factor to its implica-
tions. The new concept emphasizes the finite nature of humankind’s resources, the 
interests of the community beside the interests of the individual, takes into account 
the needs of future generations, and calculates with giving other species space and 
opportunity to live (Tóth 2016, 38). In the current interpretation, the points to be 
highlighted most should be that – as a philosophy of economics – it is organized for 
sharing, and that it includes rational selflessness in its mechanisms.
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Not making this connection between morality and economics could cause harm. 
“In fact, separating morality from economics, which seems like a disciplinary 
“purification,” is actually the regression in the development of economics.” (Wang 
2015, 84).
5.1.1  Outline and Method
In terms of research questions, there are multiple goals. The questions can be 
grouped into four main categories, whereupon each main chapter responds 
respectively.
First, the questions regarding the taxonomy of moral economics: Where are its 
roots? How did the term shape and change its meaning during the past centuries? 
How can it be applied at present? Where can moral economics be located on the 
shaded map of the economic systems?
Second: Is the moral structure of society and the resulting mechanism corre-
sponding to the Smithian view and its interpretation? Is the bottom-up system of 
capitalist mechanisms sustainable for modern economies? Is it reasonable to build 
an economic system on individual selfishness?
Third, the questions aimed at the apparatus of moral economics: What are the 
mechanisms and structures that would make it work? What does equilibrium mean 
in moral economics, or more accurately, where is the point of equilibrium to be 
reached in this proposed new context?
And fourth but not least, the question connecting the previous findings to the 
present: What are the current tools of migrating into the moral economic system?
Throughout the paper there is a shift from theory to practice orientation, as well 
as from a future-view to a focus on the present. Further, it is neither clearly positive, 
nor purely normative. The attempt to establish a unified and complete system of 
moral economic thinking tilts it slightly into the positivist direction, but its context 
and place on the economic spectrum lends it a normative nature. The normative 
nature should not be perceived as a weakness, as contemporary economists, such as 
Tomáš Sedláček (2012, 21), argue for the normativity of economics itself.
5.1.2  Baseline Assumptions
The need for cooperation is rather a feature of the community, and extrinsic to indi-
viduals, stemming from the lifestyles they created for themselves. The need to help 
others, to respect others and to lift them up, on the other hand, is intrinsic to indi-
vidual human mechanisms. This need can be called rational selflessness. One aim of 
the paper is to demonstrate how economics works better, i.e. how its models form a 
more comprehensive system, if the moral factor is incorporated, both on the indi-
vidual level, and in terms of mechanisms.
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The paper describes economic orderliness as follows: A community has eco-
nomic orderliness, if the needs of the individuals are fully satisfied, without exceed-
ing the individual need-targets, i.e. without wasting resources, and if satisfying 
needs is secured for the future by interacting sustainably with the environment.
The novelty of this definition lies in the emphasis on needs and precision. This 
type of precision implies effective distribution. The first part foreshadows the 
requirement for quantifying human needs. The second part of the definition is not 
novel, yet it has to be stated as a prerequisite for economic orderliness.
Moral economics holds a non-hedonist view about the overall good. It is not the 
pleasure in itself that needs to be maximized, but, rather, order. This order has three 
components that are rules going against present-day tendencies:
First, on an individual level, the goodwill for the whole has to overcome the ego, 
i.e. people have to become conscious of the causes and consequences of rational 
selflessness. Individuals should have enough information, an overview and an 
understanding of the system, so that they recognize the benefits of sharing assets 
and joys with fellow humans. Secondly, pleasure of any type is more valuable if it 
is given to those more in need of it. As Tóth (2016, 200) writes: “Material growth 
of the strong at all costs should not be replaced by de-growth or zero growth, but by 
the growth of the weak, as their utility – and thus the objective utility of those in 
more advanced situations – is greatly increased by their material growth”1 Thirdly, 
and finally, during all the production and distribution, the environment has to stay in 
a sustainable state.
To summarize the above paragraph: Human economic consciousness has three 
levels in moral economics, and only a system in which all the three rules are kept, 
and selflessness is expanded to the whole, can be called a moral economy.
5.1.3  The Approach
As moral economics in the broader context is a relatively new theory, it has to be 
stated that the current interpretation is that of the author of this paper. It builds par-
tially upon relevant literature, but goes beyond that in many aspects, beginning with 
the basics of the approach.
The paper has five underlying axioms not all of which have scientific proof at 
present. In certain cases, we are talking about concepts having been debated already 
for thousands of years, and it is not within the scope of this paper to give proof or 
answers to the related philosophical questions. However, the axioms need to be 
enlisted, as they are necessary for sketching the moral economy.
Firstly, morality’s objectivity is assumed as a premise. Although this assumed 
objectivity does not give direct aid in certain moral dilemmas or lawsuits, it 
1 Own translation. Original in Hungarian: “az erősek mindenáron való anyagi növekedése helyére 
nem a csökkenés vagy zéró növekedés kerül, hanem a gyengék növekedése, hiszen az ő hasznosságu-
kat – és ezzel a fejlettek objektív hasznosságát – nagymértékben emeli az anyagi növekedés”.
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strengthens the intuitive stance that moral advancement is meaningful, and that 
progress has a certain direction. With regard to morality’s definition, the paper bor-
rows from Wang Xiaoxi (2015, 56), a contemporary Chinese economist, the follow-
ing sentence: “Scientifically, ethics has the function of encouraging people to 
constantly improve themselves, and at the same time, continually cherish and 
improve the interpersonal relationships within co-existence, so as to build a better 
living environment based on the concept of rational existence, pushing forward sus-
tainable social development.”
Secondly, humankind is seen now as an entity that constitutes one big commu-
nity. Not only among historians is this evident, but also for the CEO of the largest 
social media corporation: “History is the story of how we’ve learned to come 
together in ever greater numbers – from tribes to cities to nations. (…) Today we are 
close to taking our next step.” (Zuckerberg 2017). Beside the social aspect, this 
statement is also valid for economics. However, a healthy balance is carefully 
intended to be kept between the individuals’ and the community’s emphasis, 
throughout the entire paper.
Thirdly, it is assumed that humankind has a goal: to increase human well-being. 
It is being achieved by progress that is linear to some extent.
The fourth premise is that of rational selflessness. It is an intrinsic human need 
of certain altruism. This need is definitely quite high up on our needs pyramids, but 
it does exist and influence humans. To confirm the existing relationship between the 
needs pyramids and morality, Wang (2015, 68) should be quoted again: “man has 
his own different kinds of unique pursuits, among which, those at higher levels are 
all related to mortality”.
Fifth but not least, this paper takes the stance that individual human needs are not 
infinite, nor are they insatiable. Growing expectations may be experienced when 
needs on higher and higher levels get satisfied, but these expectations are just recog-
nitions of needs which already existed and they do have a rational end, which would 
be more visible in an orderly and just world, tailored to people’s needs.
These axioms may be a matter of faith, but some voices already echo that so are 
the axioms of mainstream economics (Tóth 2016, 198; 284). The special reason for 
that these axioms had to be stated is their intuitive nature. Although – as will be seen 
in the forthcoming chapters – the moral economic models, principles and sugges-
tions are intended to be built up rationally, the system stands on intuitive axi-
oms, mostly.
5.2  Conceptual History and Ideological Context
The following two chapters delve into the conceptual history of moral economics 
and its ideological context. In the former, the paper examines roots and historical 
appearances of the concept, in the latter, whether it is suitable for being the next 
paradigm. This is a crucial part, because it also helps to understand what the current 
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concept of moral economics distances itself from, and what it is debating, or at least 
being critical of.
5.2.1  A Brief History of the Moral Economic Concept
The concept of the moral economy and of moral economics used in this paper is not 
to be confused with the concept which is examined in the context of eighteenth 
century peasant economies, and for which we find the first results when searching 
by the words “moral economy” on the Internet.2 The term moral economy has been 
brought to the historical agenda by the British historian E. P. Thompson in a 1971 
article (The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century), but 
the way he used it, it remained “bound to a specific epoch and a particular histori-
cal context” (Götz 2015, 147). According to the Swedish historian Norbert Götz, 
“the concept [the moral economy] has the potential of improving the understanding 
of modern civil society.” Götz also expressed his concern of Thompson’s concept of 
the moral economy having in fact no moral implications, while Thompson himself 
was “concerned about the conceptual preservation of the historical context that he 
had assigned to the term and about a possible loss of specificity upon its free adap-
tation by others.” (2015, 153). This indicates a rather significant tension between 
near-past and present interpretations, but tensions exist even amongst the present- 
day versions of the moral economy.
For example, this paper separates itself from those moral economic concepts 
which have their emphasis on religion or emotions, without directly linking them to 
or embedding them into economics. The relevant Hungarian literature on emotion- 
economics and humane economics3 can be named, written about by the economists 
Balázs Hámori and Gergely Tóth respectively. According to the author of this paper, 
moral economics should be a broader term, as the aforementioned approaches “do 
not address economic issues in the way they are commonly understood” (Götz 
2015, 147).
The term moral economy has already had several other appearances throughout 
history. The two words are stemming from Latin and ancient Greek respectively. As 
per Götz, the word moral did not need to be added to economy until the middle of 
the eighteenth century, as the word economy contained morality self-evidently. The 
very first emergence of the compound is believed to have taken place in 1729, “in a 
sermon preached before the University of Cambridge”. The time the term appeared 
second was in the Athenian letters, published in 1792 (circulated privately about 
fifty years earlier already): It “was used in a letter purportedly written by the Persian 
King Smerdis corresponding with his agent in Athens at the time of the Peloponnesian 
War”, referring to deity, similarly to the first occurrence. The third (Anglo-Saxon) 
2 This search was carried out through Google on the 2nd of September 2017.
3 Translated by the author from the Hungarian terms “érzelemgazdaságtan” and “humánökonómia”.
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appearance came about in 1762, in a poem of Amyas Bushe, celebrating “the har-
mony of the human will that was equally determined by reason and passion”. 
Meanwhile, Rousseau discussed moral economy in his Encyclopédie article, with a 
similar connotation of justice and balance. An explicit meaning of the term moral 
economy was applied by other authors, e.g. Fortunato Bartolomeo de Félice (1769), 
Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin (1774), Johann Friedrich Wilhelm Jerusalem (1774) 
and Johann Friedrich von Ungern-Sternberg (1785), who “contrasted the physical 
economy of all creatures with the moral economy particular to the human condi-
tion”. So did the Encyclopædia Britannica, in its third (1797) edition. “By the end 
of the eighteenth century the term ‘moral economy’ became part of the title of a 
French dictionary distinguishing political, civil, and moral economy (Beauvray, 
1770) (Götz 2015, 149).”
Later on in the eighteenth century, “the French administration in the Rhineland 
(…) expected seats of higher education to establish ‘un Professeur d’économie 
morale’”, which was rather an evolutionary exploitation of the concept. Staying 
at the topic of the French Revolution, “Michio Shibata frequently used moral 
economy when discussing food riots in the ancient régime and the Parisian sans-
culottes in the revolution.” Also, the economist Jean Herrenschwand “deduced 
ideas about the evolution of increasingly advanced economic systems” “in his 
principal work, De l’économie politique et morale de l’espèce humaine” (1796) 
(Götz 2015, 150). It is worth mentioning Adam Smith at this point, who has not 
used the term moral economics himself, but whose legacy is occasionally spoken 
of by some of his disciples and his modern exegetes as his moral economy (Götz 
2015, 153–154).
There were several religious interpretations of the moral economy in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries, and it was the radical reformers who employed 
the concept to the largest extent (Götz 2015, 150–151). From the early nine-
teenth century on, the term moral economy “could be associated with both capi-
talism and socialism (Götz 2015, 151). The next chapter will expound on the 
relations of these ideologies and economic paradigms with moral economics in 
more detail.
After the publication of E.  P. Thompson’s 1971 article “references to moral 
economy have proliferated […] as a slogan of critics of the market system” and 
many more extended notions have been established, in the non-profit sector as well. 
Whether the emphasis is on the word “moral” or on “economy” varies (Götz 2015, 
155–57).
Science fiction has produced a variety of moral economic worlds, e.g. through 
the pen of the author Thomas Dick (Götz 2015, 151). The space civilization called 
Mül from the French science fiction comic series Valérian and Laureline (1967–2010) 
also has certain features of moral economics. Later on in the paper it will be shown 
that although humankind does not have Mül converters (creatures being able to 
replicate anything they eat), an orderly economy in harmony with nature (such as 
that of Mül) is feasible for humans too.
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None of the enumerated approaches and interpretations correspond to the moral 
economic concept of the current paper. Attempts to broaden the meaning of the 
moral economy are only of recent origin. There is no group in the academic sphere 
yet, who would call themselves moral economists or representatives of the moral 
economy. The term moral economics has not officially been used in the academia so 
far, as the mechanisms and a comprehensive economic description have not been 
elaborated on yet.
The moral economic concept in this paper is not a reference to certain economic 
relations, or any particular dimension or sector of the economy. It is a synonym for 
the ideal structure of the economy, constructible by humankind, so it is encompass-
ing a larger system than the concept of the modern market economy.
5.2.2  Ideological Context and Positioning
Moral economics is a new economic paradigm applicant, a position for which there 
are not many applicants. Even the contemporary Polish economist Grzegorz 
Kolodko’s Chinism (Kolodko 2018, 23) is claimed to be a transition period only, no 
matter how long it will last.
For many decades, the economic profession has excluded (or at least not seri-
ously considered) opportunities of third (or fourth, etc.) variants to be economic 
paradigms. The reason for this may lie in the nature of the alternatives, which have 
actually never stepped out of the socialism-capitalism dichotomy. Ideological 
debate has mostly been about choices between the two (with significant systemic 
shortcomings) and trade-offs of their different variations. Moral economics has 
more dimensions: explanations, principles and solutions (which will be presented 
later on) that are solving or dissolving its predecessors’ problems, at least in theory.
At present times, China is a self-proclaimed socialist system (Wang 2015, 57) 
yet it has mixed features of, and even distinguishing elements from the two major 
economic system-types. Socialism and capitalism, two mammoth-ideologies of 
economics and politics (and even culture), have enormous literature,4 and for most 
of the twentieth century it was these two which “functioned and confronted each 
other in practice” (Kolodko 2018, 2).
Regarding the economic ideologies, recent generations have not inherited a con-
sensus over the different meanings attributed to them. In fact, there is still a “confu-
sion in definitions and the lack of methodological discipline” (Kolodko 2018, 2).The 
reason for this is to be sought (partially or mostly) in the differing variations of these 
economic regimes, not only in space, but also in time (Kolodko 2018, 3), which 
already raises two questions for moral economics. Namely that if it is to be the next 
economic system, should it be universal, or universal only to a certain extent, and 
4 The best known contemporary Hungarian economist, János Kornai, has a life’s work on 
these topics.
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whether the universality of an economic system would be an obstacle for its imple-
mentation in terms of the respect for local culture (the word local could encompass 
whole continents here, as it may stand for certain regions). In fact, the paper does 
not go as far as implementation. The moral economy may at the end of the day be a 
better or a worse system than theoretical moral economics, scientific moral econom-
ics, or – one dare say – textbook moral economics have ever prescribed.
Socialism in the twentieth century in general was too ambitious compared to the 
historical settings, its technological means and the available knowledge. For moral 
economics, all three factors have changed. The distance between the present situa-
tion and the declared goal is estimated to be measurable in units of decades or even 
only years.
Kolodko (2018, 2) describes capitalism very shortly compared to its scope as “a 
socio-economic system based on private capital aspiring to maximize its profits”, 
but even this concise definition is in a major contradiction with moral economics, 
which is based on needs (including the need to help others) and aspires to maximize 
well-being rationally.
In his conference paper about Chinism, Kolodko (2018, 3–6) enlists a number of 
economic system variations from the socialism-capitalism range (or rather plane). 
Just to name a few examples: classical capitalism, ideal communism, socialism with 
Chinese characteristics, state capitalism, the ideal social democracy, the social mar-
ket economy of Scandinavian countries, post-communism, post-Soviet state capital-
ism, emerging markets with a socially-oriented capitalist economy and contemporary 
capitalism. The variables of his categorization were borrowed from the late Italian 
economist Mario Nuti, and are as follows: dominant public property and enterprise, 
equality and large public consumption, economic democracy and participation, 
social control of the main economic variables (employment, income, accumulation, 
growth, inflation, internal balance, external balance). If we ignore some dimensions 
of moral economics, and try to force it onto this scheme, we may say that this per-
pendicular projection stands closer to the existence of all these factors than to their 
nonexistence. Based on the strict evaluation (Nuti’s method of categorization) of 
these factors, the moral economy’s projection is 37.5% capitalism and 62.5% com-
munism, but these numbers are illustrative, and are not suitable for drawing 
conclusions.
Moral economics is no different from other ideologies in that it aims to create the 
perfect economic frame for human coexistence and cooperation. It is new in that 
however  – as this paper claims  – it is the first category on the extended (multi- 
dimensioned) taxonomic map of economic systems that has found the models con-
stituting the perfect frame, and although the statement is not empirically proven on 
the larger scale yet, most of the upcoming chapters are contributing to its verifica-




5.3  Adam Smith Revisited5
This chapter aims to provide a fresh approach to Adam Smith’s moral and economic 
ideas, relying to a certain extent on the original works, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759) and An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations (1776), but also taking new secondary sources into account. Some of the 
broadly accepted, interpreted (and misinterpreted) ideas are challenged, in the con-
text of the international political economy discipline.
Adam Smith (1723–1790) was definitely at the right time (at the dawn of indus-
trialization, and the Scottish Enlightenment) in the right place (Scotland, Britain) 
with his ideas, but presently, these ideas need to be revisited. His ideas have been 
very influential, but are still controversial, often just cherry-picked by philosophers 
and politicians from both sides of the political spectrum (BBC World Service 2017).
The research questions for this chapter start out from a chapter of Varoufakis’ 
book Foundations of Economics: A Beginner’s Companion (1998, 16–21). In both 
of his major works, Adam Smith attempted to justify human systems (that of moral-
ity and that of the economy) through inherent mechanisms of the individuals and 
their interactions. The two models are actually similar in their framework, but not 
necessarily flawless.
5.3.1  The Moral Structure of Society
In early political economy it is common to see references to morality (Sayer 2000, 
84). In his work The Theory of Moral Sentiments – which is in the views of many 
rather of psychological character than of philosophical – Adam Smith built a moral 
system based on individual judgements and empathy (incorporating the notion of 
the “impartial spectator” in his model), “rather than beginning from a philosophi-
cal vantage point above those judgements” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
2013). He adopted a bottom-up approach (BBC World Service 2017), a method 
which he exercised in The Wealth of Nations as well. Still, Smith was a moral uni-
versalist, who followed the Stoic tradition, thinking “that our moral feelings extend, 
if to a lesser degree, to all rational and sensible beings”, and who aspired to provide 
“a structure for morality that reaches out across national and cultural borders” 
(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013).
The moral picture and stance regarding society in The Wealth of Nations seems 
to be in contrast or disconnected from that in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In 
Varoufakis’ interpretation of the former, Smith’s pragmatist attitude suggested that 
5 This chapter is largely based on an essay from the author of this paper, with the title Adam Smith 
Revisited  – An  Inquiry into the  Present-day Relevance and  Applicability of  his Major Works, 
handed-in for the subject International Political Economy, 2017/18, I. semester at the Budapest 
Business School – University of Applied Sciences.
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it is not in the (direct) interest of the merchant and capitalist class to contribute to 
the good of society. They are guided by greed, and if it was not for the automatic 
coordination, they would not take the actions that enhance public good (Varoufakis 
1998, 18). Smith understood self-interest in The Wealth of Nations differently than 
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In the latter, he appeared to understand that 
selfishness is a misconception of self-interest, whereas in the former, he abandoned 
the moral structure. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith is aware of the supe-
riority of morality, in which “a virtuous agent sees things that others do not” and 
where morality “is a way of co-operating with the Deity” (Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy 2013).
In a world that is growing closer together, but is also quickly growing apart 
through its unprecedented interconnectedness, new levels of moral consensus rise, 
whilst previously hidden differences in people’s views come to light. Still, at present 
day, humankind has a broader knowledge about morality, as well as a more elabo-
rate picture of the moral structure of society and of entrepreneurial morality, than 
back in Smith’s times. The general worker (or employee), who is also a consumer, 
has a better opportunity to see how he contributes to the flows of the economy. This 
type of inclusiveness and the feeling of being part of something bigger make it 
easier to be compliant with corporate guidelines, or the economy in general. In addi-
tion, boundaries between today’s “capitalists” and the employees are fading on mul-
tiple frontiers, for example through promotion and shareholdership at the workplace, 
or through broadly available opportunities of entrepreneurship. Furthermore, 
through the – by now almost mandatory – CSR approach, as well as their mission 
statements, firms of different sizes have started to cultivate their moral capital. In 
moral economics, this is considered to be a step forward theoretically, no matter 
whether it happens impeccably in practice or not. Modern entrepreneurs openly 
express how their businesses operate for the good of society and many of them 
engage in philanthropic activities.
5.3.2  The Durability of a Bottom-Up Economic System
Economic systems have boundaries from below and above, thus the Smithian auto-
matic coordination has its limits (Varoufakis 1998, 17). This holds true even in the 
current market economy. Regarding the lower boundary: the economic mechanism 
depicted by Smith is not effective enough to reach those on the bottom of society. 
As for the upper boundary: environmental harm would be escalated through pure 
capitalism. The economy as a growth machine is externally not sustainable.
It is not uncommon in economic philosophy, that the answers generate further 
questions. The question arising from the previous paragraph is whether – with the 
required measures taken – Smithian capitalism is suitable for the economic realm 
within the mentioned boundaries. This is not a hypothetical question, as developed 
countries are – from this viewpoint in slightly different ways – trying to tackle the 
global problems beyond the lower and upper boundaries, i.e. poverty and climate 
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change. Between those boundaries (and in reality extending over them) their mar-
kets function in capitalist structures.
Economic durability lies in a state of equilibrium. On an ever-perfect market, 
Smithian capitalism is leading to the equilibrium of supply and demand. But the 
problem lies not in market imperfection. It is the wrong choice of factors for equi-
librium. A bottom-up economic system, where supply and demand meet each other, 
may have the value of freedom of choice, but is not completely secure on the macro- 
scale. If, however, the choice of factors for equilibrium falls upon the needs of the 
population, and upon their potential output, a more complete and perfect economic 
system can be created. This is a top-down approach, and as history has proven 
(through several failures), humankind has technically not been ready so far for the 
shift. This paper aims to make a point for humankind to rely less on the Smithian 
unintended consequences in economics. Under present-day circumstances it is more 
reasonable to cultivate states’ moral functions than denying these functions and 
keeping the role of the state minimal. From today’s perspective, Smith’s political 
views may seem distorted. “He believed that states could and should re-distribute 
wealth to some degree, and defend the poor and disadvantaged against those who 
wield power over them in the private sector”, yet he was sceptical towards progres-
sivism and “suspicious of large-scale plans for the reform of society”. “He was one 
of the earliest and most fervent champions of the rights and virtues of the poor”, but 
his “writings are permeated by a lack of respect for the sorts of people who go into 
politics” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013). Derived from the quoted 
contradictions, it is not possible to create a harmonious social and economic system 
solely based on Smith’s legacy.
5.3.3  Wrong at Its Roots – What the Broader System Is 
Actually Built Upon
Adam Smith discovered several features of society’s economic design (the power of 
labour division, supply and demand dynamics, and the invisible hand), but in the 
explanation, he laid the wrong foundation stone. This paper argues that the eco-
nomic mechanism of the whole system (i.e. society, national and global) is not built 
upon selfishness, but on needs. Selfishness is a negative trait, whereas needs are 
natural phenomena, and thus neutral.
The world is very complex from the needs aspect. At the moment, in an extended 
need-sense, most of humankind is still just trying to survive. However, many in the 
developed world have realised that humankind would get faster over this problem if 
they cared about those most in need. This recognition can be traced back to suffi-
cient knowledge and information, which most people in Adam Smith’s time, and 
even Smith himself may not have had.
A system built primarily on selfishness will fail on the long term. Proof for this 
are models of game theory (Adami and Hintze 2013) as well as scientific 
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alternatives to the homo oeconomicus (Alger and Weibull 2013). Selfishness does 
not pay off on the long run, and the homo moralis has better chances of success in 
evolution, than the homo oeconomicus.
Varoufakis (1998, 21) writes in his interpretation of Smith that “as capital accu-
mulation and economic growth gather pace, the inequalities between classes will 
shrink; people from different backgrounds will start moving closer together on the 
ever rising escalator.” In the twenty-first century, other tendencies are to be 
observed. The scissors are not closing – they are opening: “How can we decide 
whether there is a net gain to society? In his invisible hand statement, Smith refers 
to the annual revenue of society or the national income, as we would say today. This 
indicates that society gains if the winners in the process of structural change gain 
more than the losers lose. But this is not an entirely convincing argument. Suppose 
that those who gain are already well off while the losers live in poverty. Would we 
not in this case hesitate to say that the invisible hand of the market works in the 
interests of society? And if so, what principles should guide our aggregation of 
individual interests into a measure of the interest of society as a whole?” (Sandmo 
2014, 7).
By now, economics has well-grounded evidence and explanation for the opening 
scissors in social wealth. As Thomas Piketty (2014, 571) asserts in the Conclusion 
of Capital in the Twenty-First Century: “The principal destabilizing force has to do 
with the fact that the private rate of return on capital (…) can be significantly higher 
for long periods of time than the rate of growth of income and output (…). The 
inequality implies that wealth accumulated in the past grows more rapidly than 
output and wages. (…) The entrepreneur inevitably tends to become a rentier, more 
and more dominant over those who own nothing but their labor. Once constituted, 
capital reproduces itself faster than output increases”.
Be it said in Adam Smith’s defence: His ideas were consistent in the context of 
his own times, the times of small manufacturers, and competition seemingly becom-
ing ever more perfect.
5.4  Mechanisms and Structures
At this point the paper turns to the actual micro – and macro-level models of moral 
economics. In the first three chapters, there is an arc to be observed, along which 
moral economics rebuilds economics itself. It goes back to the very basics, and has 
a different starting point. It starts from the selflessness of the individual, and builds 
the system up to the dynamic equation of aggregate needs and output, through intro-
ducing the sharing multiplier. The consequent three chapters expound on these 
models, and fine-tune the system created.
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5.4.1  Homo moralis and Rational Selflessness
In the context of this paper, the concept of homo oeconomicus is a marginal one. 
This view is borrowed from Ingela Alger and Jörgen W.  Weibull (contemporary 
economists), more specifically from their paper “Homo moralis – preference evolu-
tion under incomplete information and assortative matching”. Therein they write 
that “the more general notion of homo moralis (…) should replace the more special 
notion of homo oeconomicus (with zero degree of morality) as a benchmark for 
human motivation” (Alger and Weibull 2013, 29). The two researchers are not alone 
in opposing homo oeconomicus to be the general economic motivational notion. 
However, it is their understanding of the individual as an economic being that stands 
closest to this paper’s stance: “We call individuals with such preferences homo 
moralis and the weight attached to the moral goal the degree of morality. A special 
case is the familiar homo oeconomicus, who attaches zero weight to morality. At the 
other extreme one finds homo kantiensis who attaches unit weight to morality (Alger 
and Weibull 2013, 4). Wang (2015, 56) takes a similar stance: “The fact is, in actual 
economic activities, that the subject thereof is the “moral man”, bringing with him 
economic, social, and environmental responsibilities, whose content is much richer 
than the “economic man.” Therefore, in terms of production, man is certainly con-
trolled by certain consciousness and guided by certain values. The moral conscious-
ness of man directly affects and restricts his enthusiasm and energy release.”
What the current paper is adding to the homo moralis notion is locating and 
describing its selflessness dimension. About two and a half centuries ago, Adam 
Smith (1759, 1) wrote: “No matter how selfish you think man is, it’s obvious that 
there are some principles (…) in his nature that give him an interest in the welfare 
of others, and make their happiness necessary to him (…)”. The human trait called 
rational selflessness in this paper is rational, because – ideally – humans would real-
ize under certain circumstances (i.e. having enough information and knowledge) 
that using more resources would only lead to waste rather than increase well-being, 
so they would redistribute resources among community members. For multiple rea-
sons this mostly does not happen. The general mindset sees the system as open, 
growth possibilities as infinite, and finally, needs as insatiable. Neither of these 
three are true in moral economics. We live in a closed system with limits, and the 
individuals’ consumption can be stopped at a certain level while maintaining their 
well-being sustainably. However, once the latter recognitions reach collective con-
sciousness, following self-interest (as per the invisible hand) will be accompanied 
by a certain self-control.
In fact, the notion of the invisible hand can also be interpreted in the moral con-
text, as Wang (2015, 57) did it: “As an invisible “hand of rationality” or “power of 
rationality”, morality realizes the rational operation of all kinds of capital involved 
in production, guiding people to maximize profits.” Parallels may also be drawn 
between rational selflessness and the objective self-interest defined by the Hungarian 
economist Laura Baritz: “Real human needs and interests incorporate wanting 
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others’ to fare well.”6 And putting it in the negative way, as Wright (1999) quotes 
Herbert Spencer: “No one can be perfectly happy till all are happy.”
Rational selflessness as a mechanism has two theoretical proofs: One is that 
humans cannot reach the top of their needs pyramids until others have reached similar 
levels of well-being, because the “respect for others” need – leading optimally to 
moral self-justification – would not be satisfied. The other is that humankind cannot 
climb higher on the progress pyramid without increasing cooperation. The two phe-
nomena are linked, as cooperation lifts others up. This is one genius of human design, 
and may be a reason for the “link between human nature and human history” (Wright 
1999) in the current paper’s interpretation, namely, that the needs pyramids and the 
progress mountain are linked.
5.4.2  The Sharing Multiplier
This chapter will aim to describe how sharing multiplies the benefits gained from 
sharing value. The value shared could come from multiple sources: from sharing 
information, knowledge (know-how or know-why), (best) practices, certain services 
(e.g. entertainment-related), or even physical property (flats, cars, laptops, etc.). 
Examples of non-shareable goods include food and water, but through organizing, 
wasting any of it can be avoided.
For the sake of simplicity, let the value of the shared good be 1. Every person in the 
model owns something of value 1. One connection or one share between two people 
also has the value of 1, as derived from rational selflessness. The number of people is 
a positive integer: p. If we share something, we are creating a higher value than that of 
what we share. As with sharing a psychological need of sharing or helping is satisfied, 
the value increases by the number of the connections between people ([p × (p − 1)]/2). 
If they are all connected to each other, and if they all share what they own (p × 1), the 
value formula looks like this:
 p p p+ ´ -([ ( )] / )1 2  
Simplified:
 ( ) /p p
2 2+  
This is (p + 1)/2 times more than p (the number of people) itself, which was the 
initial value of the to-be-shared good, as everyone had 1. So if we want to create 
extra value through sharing, p – i.e. the number of people willing to share value – 
needs to be at least 2, because that is when the multiplier is bigger than 1:
 ( ) /p + >1 2 1  
6 Tóth quotes Baritz (2014, 59). Own translation. Original in Hungarian: “Az ember valódi szük-
ségletében, önérdekében a mások jóllétének akarása is benne van.”
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5.4.3  The Basic Equation
The difficulty of writing moral economic equations lies in the fact that they aim for 
creating and describing an economically perfect world, while the world has never 
been perfect as far as we know.
Let us use the following signal letters to describe the moral macro-equilibrium:
 
p population number
O potential output positive of human ac
=
= ( ) tivities f p= ( )( )
 
N = needs (=f(p)); In reality, people have several different needs, but these will 
be seen as unified in this chapter, as the complexity of measuring needs exceeds the 
scope of the paper.
Ideally, i.e. if the systems of distribution worked perfectly, humans only needed 
to produce as much output as is required to satisfy their needs. Thus the following 
equation can be written:
 O N=  
Both sides of the equation are population dependent, so this equation defines the 
ideal population number (at a given level of technology). An estimation of how 
these functions would look like and how they would intersect can be seen in Diagram 
5.1. At a given level of technology (ceteris paribus), it is assumed that the potential 
output equals
 p p p+ ´ -([ ( ) / )1 2  
where p is the number of people, and (p × (p − 1)/2) the number of their connections 
(best case scenario  – they are all connected). This function represents the value 
people create by themselves and by sharing.
As is visible on the diagram, an intersection point exists. At a population number 
below that point potential output is less than the needs to be satisfied. When trans-
lated into a realistic economic scenario, this means scarcity. Exceeding the ideal 
population however also leads to economic problems: unemployment, waste of 
resources, and an economic crisis requiring artificial demand boosts.
As this diagram stands for a given level of technology, this is also the main deter-
minant of and the main limit to the ideal population number. When writing “level of 
technology”, each level can be understood as a stage of materialized cooperation, 
including connectedness, with an ever-improving infrastructure. Levelling up in 
technology terms requires historic discoveries and inventions, e.g. from the past: 
fire lighting, the alphabet, the compass, the printing press, the steam engine, the 
telegraph, etc.
The model assumes that no output is wasted. This requires us to consume every-
thing we produce. Recycling and renewable energies are thus crucial. The human 
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input into these industries has to be incorporated into the calculation of potential 
output, so that all human potential is realized while producing exactly as much as is 
needed. On the other side of the equation, punctual and up-to-date need- quantification 
is just as important, as already pointed out in the paper.
The diagram is only for the illustration of the relationships’ (between population 
number, needs and output) nature, as it is beyond the scope for this paper to calcu-
late the needs and potential output of billions of people, who are not even fully 
connected, as of now. Also, the needs and the output functions are currently more 
sensitive in reality, as there are several influencing factors. However, in theory, this 
(Diagram 5.1) is what aggregate needs and output look like in the moral economy. 
Thus it is not the numbers, and not even the ratios on the diagram that are realistic 
and important, but the form of the needs and the potential output functions.
Factors that diverted attention from this rather evident relationship, and that hid 
the form of the needs and output functions, were: the lack of connectedness, the 
dependence on non-renewable energy resources and the belief of human needs 
being infinite and insatiable.
5.4.4  The Moral Economic Measurement of Inequalities
The following micro-indicator of task sharing’s inequality can be applied to labour 
division, if the tasks are measurable, despite the differences in the nature of tasks. 
Let us assume that two people (who represent the micro-level) are supposed to share 
Needs and potential output as a function of
the population
total of needs (in energy) potential output (in energy)
Diagram 5.1 Total of needs and potential output as a function of the population. (The diagram 
was established by the author)
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a task. The basic indicator of the inequality of task sharing between two people can 
be calculated as follows:
 
U ||I I || I I= ( ) +( )1 2 1 2– /  
With words: The unfairness factor equals the absolute value of the difference 
between the individual commitments, divided by the sum of the input of the 
individuals.
As the absolute value of the difference is in the nominator, the lower the value of 
the whole indicator, the better (the less unfair the task sharing). The lowest possible 
value is 0, the highest 1. If the value is 1, that means one of the individuals is com-
pletely relying on and exploiting the other.
For the distribution of wealth between two people, an equation of a similar struc-
ture can be used:
 
U ||W W || W W= ( ) +( )1 2 1 2– /  
According to the concept of rational selflessness, inequality of wealth (or income) 
affects well-being negatively. Analogously, inequality of task sharing affects pro-
ductivity negatively.
On the micro-level, both the level of well-being and that of productivity have to 
be multiplied by (2-U) in order to get a result. If U is 0, that gives the potential well- 
being or productivity, without inequality, i.e. the double of the assumed basis. The 
Swedish proverb “Shared joy is double joy” comes to the mind.
An illustration of task sharing can be found on the diagram below. The “Result” 
curve, which has the value (2–U) × 100, mirrors the moral economic fact that shar-
ing has added value, manifesting itself in positive externalities (Diagram 5.2).
On the macro level, it is similar to say that a country’s GDP would have the 
potential to be: the given GDP  +  the given GDP multiplied by (1  – the Gini 
coefficient).
Potential means that this would be the given country’s GDP, if there was an 
equality in distribution and sharing tasks. To illustrate this, the author extracted 
GDP/capita data for the 80 countries where the Gini index was available for the year 
of 2010. (The reason that the year 2010 was selected is that this is the latest round 
year with the most available data.) The numbers have been sorted by GDP/capita 
ascendingly. As is visible from the diagram, equality would make the biggest effi-
ciency difference in the relatively wealthiest of the countries, some of them with 
relatively wide income gaps (Diagram 5.3).
The prevalence of rational selflessness however (which is a requirement to 
achieve the full potential of a given community) depends on the level of intercon-
nectedness. Interconnectedness in a given community can be measured by the num-
ber of existing connections (or opportunities to connect), divided by the number of 
all possible connections: r/((p × (p − 1))/2). If this ratio reaches 1, the community is 
fully connected. The more interconnected a community, the higher there are the 
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chances for rational selflessness to create mechanisms driving the community 
towards fairness, thus also towards higher levels of productivity and well-being. 
This sub-conclusion, and the equations presented in this chapter together are a start-
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1
Two individuals sharing a task of 100 units
Input by individual 1 Input by individual 2 Result
Diagram 5.2 Task sharing and its efficiency according to the laws of moral economics. 























































































































































GDP per capita and its potential according to moral economics
GDP per capita (current US$) Potential GDP per capita according to moral economics
Diagram 5.3 GDP per capita and its potential according to moral economics. (World Bank 2010; 
and edits by the author)
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5.5  Tools and Solutions
This chapter is about relating certain phenomena in the economy to moral econom-
ics, because they can function as tools to reach a higher state of well-being.
5.5.1  Robotization and Universal Basic Income
We have a quick and massive robotization process on our threshold, which promises 
to lead to abundance, yet threatens with the devaluation of many human activities 
and jobs. Many believe that this will be the first era, where we can eliminate the 
human factor from the production process.
Meanwhile, the policy of Universal Basic Income is emerging as a potential solu-
tion to present-day economic problems. “Governments around the world are evalu-
ating its use, and some are embarking on pilot studies” (Coppola 2017). Some 
would call UBI the social vaccine of the twenty-first century. Their approach has 
similar characteristics with the hope of fully automated luxury communism 
(Sadowski 2016).
Robotization trends are interlinked with Universal Basic Income proposals. This 
is perfectly illustrated by the 2015 EU Draft Report with recommendations to the 
Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (Delvaux 2015). The report came to 
public attention mostly through introducing the concept of electronic persons 
(Delvaux 2015, 12) but it refers to the new industrial revolution, likely to be 
unleashed by “sophisticated robots, bots, androids and other manifestations of arti-
ficial intelligence”, and also expresses the “concerns about the future of employ-
ment” (Delvaux 2015, 3). It considers the cases of autonomous vehicles, medical 
robots, and human repair and enhancement, just to name a few examples (Delvaux 
2015, 8–9). Up until now, this plan is the most comprehensive and detailed public 
legal document on the two, linked issues of robotization and Universal Basic 
Income. The comprehensiveness lies in the suggestion of “a coherent approach to 
regulation at European level” (Delvaux 2015, 4) and in inviting all Member States 
to seriously consider a general basic income in the light of the possible effects on 
the labour market of robotics and AI (Delvaux 2015, 10).
Moral economics supports robotization, as it drives us towards sustainability. 
The challenges robotization poses to the labour market (i.e. the challenge of 
unemployment) can be neutralized by the many more potential channels, con-
necting people in need to those with the solutions. However, the system may 
indeed need buffers, such as Universal Basic Income. Critics could ask how moti-
vation to work would be sustained. The response is that meaningful work is a 
human need as well.
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5.5.2  Blockchain in the Moral Economy
The moral economy could draw on blockchain technology, mostly because of the 
accountability aspect arising from the potential use of smart contracts, but also 
because of yet undeveloped implementation ideas and opportunities, such as a com-
mon blockchain calendar. According to The Economist, blockchains are “a way of 
making and preserving truths” (The Economist 2015). The moral economic impli-
cation of a blockchain calendar is that important actions and events are “set in 
cryptographic stone” (The Economist 2015) enforcing honesty and fairness, both 
characteristics of the moral behaviour set.
Accountability contributes to order as an important feature of orderly social sys-
tems. Blockchain provides the technological  – and to a certain extent even the 
legal – infrastructure for accountability and transparency. Some developers in the 
so-called “Crypto Valley” (Zug, Switzerland) are already sketching applications of 
blockchain, in which all state expenditures, i.e. the whole government budget is 
traceable. The implementation of these “social smart contracts” is said to be an 
ultimate game-changer in the operations of politics ((Mohácsi 2018).
But as the paper shall stay more or less within the boundaries of economics, the 
focus will now be turned on the moral economic aspects of implementing block-
chain technology in order to reach an accountability coverage, meaning that for all 
possible event outcomes (especially those negatively affecting humans) somebody 
can be held responsible. Moral economics is designed for sharing, and this raises a 
privacy concern, at least as long as the privacy-transparency gap has not been 
bridged. Through accountability and its legal consequences, the checks and bal-
ances of the legal framework to sharing could be planted. This would prevent the 
abuse of information on the sites and applications through which sharing is orga-
nized. The latter statement’s significance is shown by a tendency: the currency of 
value in certain fields, especially online, is shifting from money, through personal 
information, to trustworthiness.7 Although, as Sedláček (2012, 117) would argue: 
money itself, as a social abstraction, is based on trust, an unwritten social contract, 
detached from matter, space, or even time (2012, 122).
Also, there is word about an “Internet of Value” (Mohácsi 2018). This “Value 
Web” would make value exchange “as easy as exchanging information today on the 
web” (Larsen 2015). Furthermore, the author of this paper envisions a blockchain 
based calendar, where people could share and verify events, actions and plans 
throughout time. And there exists the institution of smart contracts. The paper will 
not go into detail regarding smart contracts, but one feature of them needs to be 
mentioned: They are deterministic. They cover all possible scenarios and enable a 
complete scenario analysis (Mohácsi 2018). This characteristic combined with the 
blockchain calendar could ultimately lead to predicting humankind’s future together.
7 For more information in this topic, see the 2012 TED Talk by Rachel Botsman: The currency of 
the new economy is trust. https://www.ted.com/talks/rachel_botsman_the_currency_of_the_new_
economy_is_trust/transcript?nolanguage=eg (Accessed March 28th, 2018).
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In one sense, blockchains are trusted third parties (The Economist 2015) and in 
a more subtle, moral one, they fulfil the role of impartial spectators, with enforcing 
morality through being “truth machines” (The Economist 2015).
5.5.3  Artificial Intelligence and the Internet of Minds
When you look beneath the roiled surface of human events, beyond the comings and goings 
of particular regimes, beyond the lives and deaths of the “great men” who have strutted on 
the stage of history, you see an arrow beginning tens of thousands of years ago and continu-
ing to the present. And, looking ahead, you see where it is pointing. (Wright 1999)
Channelling creates a network, and the most comprehensive network known 
today is the Internet, not just in itself, but interweaving our infrastructure in many 
ways (for example as the Internet of Things). An enhancing technology to this net-
work is artificial intelligence. AI is currently an “aspirational term reflecting a 
goal” (Pavlus 2017). This goal is to be achieved by making progress in machine 
learning, deep learning and developing neural networks (Pavlus 2017). Much of our 
image about AI and its future is speculation. In general, opponents of AI and robot-
ization view the opportunity of singularity with scepticism. They imagine a world, 
where nature and human life are completely simulated, all data is stored, retrievable 
and evaluated, and machines can answer all questions and remember everything that 
has ever happened. They fear the loss of basic human characteristics and peculiari-
ties (MAK 2017).
This view, generalized, resembles the furthest look into the future. On the mid- 
and short term, we find scientists, and leaders of giant technology companies wor-
rying about artificial intelligence, for example: the late physicist and cosmologist 
Stephen Hawking, Bill Gates and Elon Musk (Balkam 2015). For part of the general 
public, the spread of artificial intelligence and robotization gives the impression of 
a threat to privacy, jobs and potentially their safety. However, we might have several 
reasons to change this perspective and to embrace AI. It is already made use of in 
combatting infectious diseases, tackling gun violence, fighting cancer and sight 
loss, and managing energy supply  – just to cite a few examples (Gray 2017). 
Changing to an AI interwoven system is sometimes compared to other events in the 
history of technological development. “AI will enliven inert objects in the way elec-
tricity did over 100 years ago” (Balkam 2015). Thus, “We should view AI not as 
something competing with us, but as something that can amplify our own capabili-
ties” (Gray 2017).
Given the benefits from AI for the healthcare and security sectors, AI could also 
help humans fill economic knowledge and information gaps in order to satisfy all 
needs, by – in general terms – filling the spaces and connecting the dots of the eco-
nomic system. Early movers have already spotted this opportunity, for example in 
the real estate industry (Sicklick 2017).
The most developed and feasible network we can imagine at present is the 
Internet of Minds. This network would connect and give access to each other’s 
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thoughts. Implementing this network, potentially enhanced with artificial intelli-
gence, would most probably lead to opportunities not even known as of today to 
humankind. There have been recent events which mark the first milestones of the 
process. Last September, an article emerged stating in the title that “Researchers 
Have Linked a Human Brain to the Internet for the First Time Ever” (Caughill 
2017). The move turned the brain into a node in the system. For now, the experiment 
was one directional, but “In future, there could be information transferred in both 
directions – inputs and outputs to the brain” (Caughill 2017).
The internet of minds would be a new means for transparency, and a new type of 
organism. Its creation would be a moral revolution in itself. The Finnish computer 
scientist Harri Valpola has already started laying down the technological basics for 
an internet of minds. From the perspective of this paper, one of Valpola’s statements 
has unique importance: “In the first wave of AI you had to be a programmer. In the 
second wave of AI you have to be a data scientist. The third wave of AI – the more 
moral you are the better” (Manthorpe 2017).
In the current interpretation, morality in the field of AI is not only needed in 
order to create moral AI beings. Artificial intelligence – whatever its form may be – 
would soon recognize the genius design of humankind, where morality is the crucial 
strategic element of sustainability. Thus, humans would also need to be moral in 
order to cooperate with AI, a more knowledgeable entity or entities than humans 
themselves, for their own good.
The previous statements, of course, only hold true if morality is naturally a posi-
tive function of intelligence, especially from the point on when human capabilities 
are surpassed by AI. However, this paper assumes that, similarly to the other five 
axioms laid down at the beginning.
5.6  Outlook (Into Space)
Elon Musk once said: “I would like to die on Mars, just not on impact” (Al-Greene 
2013). If moral economic tendencies are projected on the more distant future, the 
renowned tech entrepreneur proves to have reached a very logical conclusion.
Further improvements in technology would demand lower and lower population 
numbers, according to the basic equation. The reason for that: the decreasing inter-
section point of total needs and potential output. If we use the level of technology as 
a multiplier of potential output, the quadratic function “draws closer” to zero, with 
every improvement. With rising technology levels, fewer and fewer people are 
needed to sustain themselves while their needs are staying satisfied. Following this 
logic would lead to a diminishing population and the end of humans as a species.
An exciting way not to become extinct is to find new purposes, such as inhabiting 
other planets. This would lead to “Making Humans a Multi-Planetary Species” 
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5.7  Conclusion
Part of the physicist profession is still on the quest for a unified theory, and so are 
certain economists in their own field. The author of this paper believes that regard-
ing economic theory, the unified theory must lie in moral economics, or that at least 
it is the clearest path thereto. The conclusion of this paper is aimed at supporting the 
previous statement, through drawing the very essence from the paper and through 
presenting the consequences.
The paper started with formulating its purpose, and introducing the axioms 
which moral economics stands on: that morality is objective, further, that human-
kind constitutes one big community whose goal it is to increase their well-being, 
that human motivations include rational selflessness, and that human needs are nei-
ther infinite, nor insatiable. Upon these axioms the paper has started to introduce a 
new school of economics.
A whole chapter was dedicated to being clear about the meaning and the ideo-
logical position of the moral economic concept. The usage of the words “moral 
economy” and the apparently newly coined term “moral economics” are reflecting 
in this paper a different approach from any earlier attempt, in their comprehensive-
ness, their strength through the arguments and models, and their completeness. It 
was not mentioned in the ideological chapter yet, but it can be drawn as a conclusion 
from subsequent chapters that – in a rather political context – the moral economy 
unites the freedom of a bottom-up with the security of a top-down society.
The reflection on Smithian economic theory has shown how we are witnessing 
today, in real-time, the proliferated successes and malfunctions of the mechanisms 
Smith described over two centuries ago. However, present-day capitalisms are dif-
ferent from “pure” Smithian capitalism. The systems contain morality. Several firms 
and owners of capital have recognised that fostering and cultivating corporate 
morality pays off on the mid- and long term. Furthermore, a top-down perspective 
is starting to make more sense than continuing with bottom-up mechanisms, at least 
over the limits of sustainability, i.e. in poverty alleviation and environment 
protection.
Models were formed where economics and ethics could coherently and logically 
be fitted into. Economic value can be stabilized through adjusting the factors influ-
encing aggregate demand and supply (needs and output), and striking a balance 
between them. Economic order (or orderliness) is to be taken more seriously and to 
be acted upon with more responsibility, on the level of a closed system, i.e. incorpo-
rating our natural environment into the economy.
At the heart of moral economics lies rational selflessness, a relatively undiscov-
ered side of economic behaviour and an inherent attribute of humans. Rational self-
lessness was discovered by the author as a hidden building block of the Maslowian 
(Maslow 1943) needs pyramid, and then made it far in the theory of this paper as a 
determinative human feature, as well as a motivational concept. The connections 
between the models, leading to find the intersection point of the needs and output 
functions, were established through rational selflessness.
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The multiplicator effect of sharing value and tasks contributes largely to moral 
economics’ feasibility. The sharing multiplier is a combinatorial one, on which the 
output function is based, but its underlying philosophy has an effect on sharing from 
even between as few as two people, up to nations’ economies.
Creating order through channelling needs and their responses has power. Through 
making motivation and information meet, it brings humankind to a shift, for which 
it is more than ready. The shift involves the implementation and maintenance of 
artificial intelligence, applying the policy of Universal Basic Income, implementing 
blockchain technology broadly and creating a transparent environment, amongst 
other measures. Regarding blockchain, the paper projects the invention of a block-
chain calendar which would ultimately extend the accountability coverage, thus 
creating a “blockchain of good.” The Internet of Minds was also envisioned.
The mechanism of the intersection point (that of needs and potential output) 
drawing closer to zero, and thus human work and input becoming less needed, can 
be compensated with setting further goals, such as inhabiting other planets. This, of 
course, has second priority at the moment to creating order in the current system. 
However, the preparations for the more distant future can already be a part of the 
current order.
With regard to further research opportunities, there is both space for research in 
the theoretical and in practical directions.
In the theory, the exact concept of economic value in the moral economic context 
requires further exploration, both in narrower and broader interpretations. Also, the 
concepts of rational selflessness and order could be deepened, in the philosophical 
sense, meaning that they should be deconstructed first. Questions arise where they 
came from or how they came into being, and whether the answers to these questions 
contribute to the philosophy of moral economics.
The moral economic stance on fair distribution should be clarified, answering the 
questions when and to what extent there should be equality, and on what basis, other 
than the human needs. As the models have shown, there might be more justification 
to moral economics than to a simple egalitarian utopia. Moral economics does not 
define concrete taxes or concrete ratios for fair distribution. Equality is aimed for on 
the very long (secular) term.
The practical research possibilities all relate to the implementation of moral eco-
nomics. Firstly, the equation of aggregate needs and potential output should be 
translated into real numbers, through quantifying the level of technology as well. 
Second, the exact mechanism of channelling and how it makes improvements ought 
to be explored and be described with examples, in order to justify more-than-zero- 
sumness. As a value and moral economic tool, transparency should be incorporated, 
which largely contributes to channelling. Morality should also be studied on the 
level of institutions, organizations and companies.
After reaching the national level in moral economic studies, the research will not 
be far from establishing country specific implementation plans, including assess-
ments of potential negative consequences, if the measures were applied too early. 
There should be an emphasis on bringing different moral systems closer together, 
and on learning from each other. From the Chinese perspective, for example, it seems 
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that “the most developed countries in the world (…) they have never really under-
stood the special roles played by morality in the economy” (Wang 2015, 55). This 
shows that global knowledge about morality still needs to be integrated. To quote 
Wang (2015, 72) again:“… moral capital realizes its value through its own value 
progress. On the one hand, such progress mainly lies in the improvement of various 
expressly stated moral norm systems, and the rationality and feasibility of expressly 
stated moral regulations and rules. On the other hand, it lies in the constant assimi-
lation between not expressly stated moral spirits, moral beliefs and moral concepts”.
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Chapter 6
How (Not) to Connect Ethics 
and Economics: Epistemological 
and Metaethical Problems for the Perfectly 
Competitive Market
Caspar Willem Safarlou
Abstract This paper addresses Joseph Heath’s attempt to derive moral obligations 
from the conditions that are specified by the model of the perfectly competitive 
market. Through his market failures approach to business ethics he argues that firms 
should behave as if they are operating in a perfectly competitive market. However, 
I argue that this derivation of moral obligations runs counter to the metaethical prin-
ciple that moral actions need to be voluntarily chosen from a set of alternatives. To 
the extent that Milton Friedman’s derivation follows the same lines, my objection is 
also applicable to his approach to business ethics. I bring out the fact that the condi-
tions required by the model of the perfectly competitive market cannot be realized 
in the actual world and argue that this causes problems for any moral obligations 
that might follow. My objection is illustrated by an intuitive example of someone set 
to an impossible task. I also bring in a way that Heath could work around this objec-
tion, but I argue that this would imply the collapse of his approach into another kind 
of theory that he wishes to distinguish himself from. More deeply, I show that my 
metaethical objection has epistemological consequences that undermine the very 
basis of the model of the perfectly competitive market. I conclude by stating that we 
need a different conception of competition, pointing to the facts that such a perspec-
tive would need to take into account, and suggesting that the concept of rivalry is up 
to the job.
6.1  Introduction
In recent years, Joseph Heath has provided a novel moral defence of markets with 
his market failures approach to business ethics (Heath 2014, vii-viii; 173; 199n14). 
His approach holds that firms have a moral obligation not to “seek to profit from 
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market failure” on the basis of the economic model of the perfectly competitive 
market (Heath 2014, 89). This basis uniquely distinguishes Heath’s approach from 
other stockholder theories that attempt to derive moral obligations by also involving 
general morality.1
I share Heath’s goal of providing a moral defence of the free market, but I do not 
think that the model of the perfectly competitive market is suited to this end. My 
primary aim here is to show that his attempt to derive moral obligations from the 
model of the perfectly competitive market contradicts the metaethical principle that 
moral actions need to be voluntarily chosen.
Although I think that this metaethical problem originates in the deeper epistemo-
logical foundations of the model of the perfectly competitive market, the brunt of 
my criticism is directed towards the metaethical component of Heath’s justification 
of the market failures approach. Without first trying to make strong claims about 
these deeper foundations, I will show that the issues that I will tackle are important 
for any usage of the model of the perfectly competitive market in an ethical context. 
For example, I will also show how Milton Friedman’s business ethics is vulnerable 
to the same line of criticism. My analysis of Heath’s justification of the market fail-
ures approach will thus centre on the way in which moral obligations are derived 
from the model of the perfectly competitive market.
First, I will start out by explaining the way in which Heath tries to derive moral 
obligations from the model of the perfectly competitive market. This will include 
the way in which he relates the role of the government to the privileges and opera-
tion of firms and the role that he assigns to the model of the perfectly competitive 
market. I will also touch upon the way in which Friedman’s business ethics tries to 
perform the same kind of derivation of moral obligations (as interpreted by Heath).
Second, I will provide a metaethical objection to Heath’s (and by extension, 
Friedman’s) attempt at deriving moral obligations from the model of the perfectly 
competitive market. I bring out the fact that the conditions required by said model 
cannot be realized in the real world and argue that this causes problems for any 
moral obligations that might follow. This objection is illustrated by an intuitive 
example of someone set to an impossible task. I also bring in a way that Heath could 
work around this objection, but I argue that this would mean the collapse of his 
approach into another kind of theory that he wishes to distinguish himself from. I 
conclude this section by pointing out why it is in principle impossible to provide 
such a workaround, as my metaethical objection shows a deeper fault within the 
epistemological basis of the model of the perfectly competitive market.
Lastly, I conclude that we need a different conception of competition for cor-
rectly theorizing about competition from a moral and epistemological point of view 
and point to a conception of competition that seems to be a good alternative.
1 For a comparison between Heath’s foundational approach and those of Langtry and Goodpaster, 
see Heath (2014, 90).
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6.2  Heath’s Market Failures Approach
Heath starts arguing for his market failures approach by observing that firms are 
legal constructs which have certain privileges regular citizens do not have (such as 
limited liability). This means that firms exist only by virtue of the fact that the gov-
ernment grants them these privileges. Consequently, Heath says, the government 
may “impose certain obligations [upon firms], in return for the privileges granted” 
(Heath 2014, 29). In principle, these obligations can range from ethical obligations 
that ask the firms to adhere to a certain set of rules to government-enforced regula-
tions that are backed up by legal sanctions.
Next, Heath asks the fundamental question why governments should grant these 
privileges in the first place. His answer to this question is fairly complex, but it boils 
down to the idea that “society wants to encourage competition between suppliers” 
because it “secures the operation of the price mechanism” without which “you sim-
ply cannot organize a complex economy” (Heath 2014, 29; 30). Under the correct 
conditions, the price mechanism makes sure that the prices of goods are “cleared” – 
which means that there will be no unsold goods nor unsatisfied customers. According 
to Heath, we should look to the model of the perfectly competitive market to pro-
vide us with these conditions:
The central conclusion [of the first fundamental theory of welfare economics] is that the 
outcome of a perfectly competitive market economy will be Pareto-optimal—which means 
that it will not be possible to improve any one person’s condition without worsening some-
one else’s. (Heath 2014, 29–30)
In a perfectly competitive market, there is a “race to the bottom” between suppli-
ers of goods. Each supplier is able to achieve profit by lowering their prices under 
those of their competitors, making up for the lower price because they attain a larger 
number of sales. This means that competitors keep undercutting each other to the 
point at which all prices in the market are cleared and all profits have disappeared.2 
In the end, competition allows for “a more efficient allocation of [society’s] 
resources and labor time” than economic systems in which competition is absent 
(Heath 2014, 30–31).3
In the next step, Heath connects this institutional argument back to the privileges 
that the government can grant to firms. This means that the conditions under which 
firms are to be granted their privileges are those dictated by the model of the per-
fectly competitive market. This provides the basis for both government regulation of 
firms and moral obligations for firms. Heath argues that firms need to be regulated 
by the government in such a way as to create the conditions that will make sure that 
the prices of the goods they produce will be cleared. Since profits are price signals 
that show whether there are still customer needs to be satisfied or resources to be put 
2 The technical name for these profits in the model of the perfectly competitive market is pure 
profits.
3 Heath illustrates this contrast by discussing the way in which the absence of the price mechanism 
caused problems for the former Soviet Union Heath (2014, 30).
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to a better use in another place, firms gain a moral obligation “to do what is neces-
sary in order for the firm to maximize profits in this way” (Heath 2014, 31).
However, the conditions demanded by the model of the perfectly competitive 
market to achieve a Pareto-optimal outcome are not always met. In such a case, 
market outcomes are not Pareto-optimal and are called market ‘failures’ as they 
haven’t lived up to the standard of the perfectly competitive market.4 The next ques-
tion that arises is: Should the state start regulating firms in order to make sure that 
market failures are prevented from happening?
Although Heath holds that there is a basis for the government to regulate firms 
through the legal mechanism because their privileges are granted by the govern-
ment, he argues that these regulations are unfeasible. He says that the legal appara-
tus is “a somewhat blunt instrument” and that in too many cases “the state simply 
lacks the information needed to implement the necessary measures” that are needed 
to make sure that market failures do not occur (Heath 2014, 36–38). Even in cases 
where the government has enough information to regulate for situations in which 
the market fails, he argues that the administrative costs that are incurred in such a 
situation are so high that they turn government regulations into an unfeasible task. 
It is at this point in the argument that firms become subject to moral constraints that 
are not backed up by legalized force:
Imagine for a moment a deontically perfect world, in which everyone could be counted on 
to comply with all moral requirements. How should an ethical corporation behave in such 
a world? The answer is quite simple. The firm should behave as though market conditions 
were perfectly competitive, even though they may not in fact be. (Heath 2014, 37)
In this respect, Heath agrees with Milton Friedman’s metaethical approach to 
business ethics (Friedman 1962). In his interpretation of Friedman’s business ethics, 
moral obligations of firms are also grounded in the model of the perfectly competi-
tive market; firms are thus morally obligated not to exploit market failures (Heath 
2014, 31–35). However, Heath is very critical of Friedman’s approach and criticizes 
it on two grounds. His first criticism is directed at Friedman’s derivation of norma-
tive ethics from his metaethical basis. According to Heath, Friedman “arbitrarily 
limits the set of obligations [for firms] to those that support only some of the many 
Pareto conditions [demanded by the model of the perfectly competitive market]” 
(Heath 2014, 35). In this respect, Heath wishes to be more consistent in the deriva-
tion of moral obligations from the model of the perfectly competitive market. He 
illustrates this through a very compelling argument that will at the same time pro-
vide us with a concrete example of the moral obligations that both authors have 
in mind:
…Friedman argues that pollution reduction is one of the illegitimate responsibilities 
pressed upon managers in the name of “social responsibility.” But pollution is a negative 
externality—a cost associated with some economic activity that is transferred to a third 
party without compensation. These externalities exist because the set of markets is incom-
plete. We cannot exercise property rights over the air that we breathe, for example. As a 
4 For a compelling critique of the very idea that markets can fail, see Simpson (2005).
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result, while we can charge people for dumping noxious substances on land that we own, 
we cannot do the same when they dump it in the air. For this reason, one of the Pareto condi-
tions effectively requires that there be no externalities. Any corporation that pollutes is 
essentially profiting from a market imperfection. This means that there is no difference, from 
the moral point of view, between deception and pollution—both represent impermissible 
profit-maximization strategies. Friedman’s decision to prohibit deception, while giving the 
wink to environmental degradation, is arbitrary and unmotivated. (Heath 2014, 35)
This brings us to Heath’s second criticism of Friedman’s approach, which is 
directed at the way in which Friedman thinks that we can approach the ideal of the 
perfectly competitive market. Let us take a closer look at what kind of ideal is pre-
sented. The abstraction of the perfectly competitive market is claimed to be an ideal 
model such as that of a frictionless plane or a mathematically perfect circle. Any 
attempt to approach such a type of ideal is a simple corollary of the ideal in ques-
tion. For example, if one draws a circle on a whiteboard by means of a pair of com-
passes, then one approaches an ideal circle quite linearly and directly. Friedman 
phrases this idea as follows:
No one has ever seen a Euclidian line—which has zero width and depth— yet we all find it 
useful to regard many a Euclidian volume—such as a surveyor’s string—as a Euclidian 
line. Similarly, there is no such thing as “pure” competition. Every producer has some 
effect, however tiny, on the price of the product he produces. The important issue for under-
standing and for policy is whether this effect is significant or can properly be neglected, as 
the surveyor can neglect the thickness of what he calls a “line.” (Friedman 1962, 120)
It is not this type of ideal abstraction that Heath finds problematic, but its func-
tion as a gauge for the approximation of the ideal itself. He notes that “we may be 
tempted to conclude that if perfect competition generates perfect efficiency, then 
near-perfect competition should generate as close as possible to perfect efficiency” 
(Heath 2014, 39). It is this line of reasoning that is blocked by the second-best theo-
rem (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956):
This theorem shows that in a situation in which one of the Pareto conditions is violated, 
respect for all of the other Pareto conditions will generate an outcome that is less efficient 
than some other outcome that could be obtained by violating one or more of the remaining 
conditions. In other words, while perfect competition generates a perfectly efficient out-
come, a situation that is as close as possible to perfect competition will not generate an 
outcome that is as close as possible to perfect efficiency. (Heath 2014, 39)
According to Heath, the implication of this theorem is that Friedman is blocked 
from making “the big sweeping generalizations that were the stock-in-trade of 
economists of Friedman’s generation” (Heath 2014, 40). If one wishes to approxi-
mate the ideal presented by the model of the perfectly competitive market, then one 
cannot use Friedman’s top-down reasoning to achieve this end.
In order to derive actual moral obligations for firms, Heath wishes to use a more 
bottom-up approach.5 He notes that every individual trade that takes place still 
causes a Pareto improvement and that this makes the Pareto-optimum of the 
5 For the reason why the second-best theorem can’t be used to derive moral obligations, see Heath 
(2014, 40).
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 perfectly competitive market model irrelevant for everyday life. Instead of appeal-
ing to the Pareto-optimum, one would need to “appeal to the particular efficiency 
gains that the firm is able to realize among its shareholders, its employees, and its 
customers” (Heath 2014, 40). On the one hand, this means that the model of the 
perfectly competitive market is still the source and foundation of the moral obliga-
tions that firms have to adhere to. On the other hand, the way in which we could 
determine what the moral obligations are of firms in day-to-day situations is turned 
into a much more contextual enterprise that needs to take into account the particular 
efficiency gains of the situation in question. Heath notes that:
…actually making the case [for specific moral obligations] requires a more detailed analy-
sis, one that examines the specific conditions of the market in question. These remarks are 
clearly unsatisfactory. The more general research program, however, is one that I believe 
has considerable promise. (Heath 2014, 41)
6.3  A Metaethical Objection to Deriving Moral Obligations 
from the Model of the Perfectly Competitive Market
Although Heath tries to separate the way in which we can determine day-to-day 
moral obligations from the conditions specified by the model of the perfectly com-
petitive market by means of his bottom-up approach, the justification of these obli-
gations can still be found in said model. It is at this point in the argument that my 
objection comes in.
The model of the perfectly competitive market is an ideal whose conditions can 
never be fully met. Firms can thus never completely follow the requirements set out 
by Heath’s ethic. This is something Heath recognizes and tries to work around. For 
example, he says that firms need to “minimize negative externalities” because 
“without some pollution there would be no economy” (Heath 2014, 36: 37). These 
market failures unavoidably occur because the set of property rights is not complete 
(as not everything in the world is owned or “can be owned,” such as most parts of 
the sky and the sea) and because all actors on the market do not have access to all 
necessary information (Heath 2014, 35). As we can readily see, a minimalization of 
pollution is not a complete elimination of negative externalities. Although we 
wouldn’t be able to reach such an elimination in reality, such an elimination of nega-
tive externalities is demanded of us by the model of the perfectly competitive mar-
ket. This means that firms are put in an impossible situation. On the one hand, they 
are supposed to (in the end) eliminate their negative externalities, but on the other 
hand, it is impossible to avoid such market failures in practice.
Heath tries to work around this problem by saying that companies should there-
fore only try to minimize negative externalities, but a basis for such a proviso cannot 
C. W. Safarlou
97
be found in the model of the perfectly competitive market.6 Its Pareto-optimal con-
ditions demand the end of these negative externalities, among other things.7 The 
same holds true for Friedman’s business ethics, as it tries to ground obligations in 
the model of the perfectly competitive market along similar lines. As long as the 
model of the perfectly competitive market is held to be the sole foundation for the 
ethical obligations of firms (and no “general morality” or any other purposes are 
brought in), these ethical obligations are ultimately void.
In this regard, the model of the perfectly competitive market would demand all 
firms to become the idealized entities that the model theorizes. As economists read-
ily recognize, these idealizations were never meant to become a possible reality. 
However, by setting the model of the perfectly competitive market as the foundation 
of ethical obligations, these impossibilities are still, in the end, demanded of firms.
If the government would grant firms their unique privileges under the market 
failures approach, then they would be put in a morally impossible position. Because 
firms aren’t the idealized entities of the world of perfect competition, the state 
would be asking them to strive for an impossible ideal. Such a demand goes con-
trary to the very nature of morality, because it would not allow firms to ultimately 
choose between moral and immoral actions. This negates the very fact that makes 
morality possible, which is our volition (Binswanger 1981, 8). To be moral, an 
action needs to be voluntarily chosen from a set of alternatives. Because the world 
can never be fully consistent with the model of the perfectly competitive market, 
firms are, in the end, not allowed such an alternative. This means that as an ethic, the 
market failures approach cannot get off the ground because it fundamentally derives 
moral obligations from an impossible standard.
Let me try to illustrate this objection with an example that was mentioned previ-
ously. Consider a person who aims to draw a mathematically perfect circle with a 
pair of compasses on a whiteboard. Such a person will most definitely fail in this 
task, because the circle that he ends up drawing will always differ from a mathemat-
ically perfect circle. This might have several causes. For example, his compasses 
might have shifted a little bit, or his marker might not have excreted an even amount 
of ink while being dragged across the whiteboard. In the end, one can always argue 
that the atoms that make up the circle are vibrating a bit because of heat energy. This 
means that in reality, one is always unable to draw a mathematically perfect circle. 
The implication of this fact is that it is impossible to derive moral obligations from 
the task of drawing a mathematically perfect circle. Someone tasked with such a 
goal would never be able to achieve it, as it cannot be successfully achieved. 
Consequently, such a task is outside the realm of morality. The attempt to derive 
6 Heath says that society needs to accept this minimal pollution in exchange for the goods that are 
produced, but no argument is given that would explain how this consideration would be connected 
to the grounding of moral obligations in the model of the perfectly competitive market Heath 
(2014, 36). As it stands, it seems that this proviso runs counter to Heath’s idea that moral obliga-
tions are solely derived from the model of the perfectly competitive market and do not involve 
general morality.
7 For more examples, see Heath (2014, 37).
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moral obligations from the model of the perfectly competitive market proceeds 
analogously, as it asks people to commit to an abstraction that is impossible to real-
ize in reality.8
When discussing possible excusing conditions for immoral behaviour by firms, 
Heath seems to be aware of the kind of objection that I am posing here:
…it cannot be argued that these demands [of the market failures approach] are too onerous 
in principle, since the demands simply articulate the way that capitalist economies are sup-
posed to function in the first place. (Heath 2014, 38)
Heath holds that firms are supposed to function according to the model of the 
perfectly competitive market because that is what the government should demand of 
firms. However, this does not take into regard the point that the demands set upon 
firms by said model are in principle impossible.9
It seems that the only way that Heath could work around this objection is by 
bringing in other moral principles or purposes that would allow him to mitigate the 
moral impossibilities that are caused by the model of the perfectly competitive mar-
ket. The downside to such a defence seems to be that if he would attempt it, then his 
approach would collapse into the kind of stockholder theory that (partly) derives 
moral obligations from general morality. This is problematic for Heath’s approach 
because he sees it as an important innovation of his approach that it does not need 
to appeal to general morality (Heath 2014, 90).
In order to concretize this possible workaround, let us relate it to the example of 
the person that tries to draw a mathematically perfect circle. We now ask him to 
draw a mathematically perfect circle that is good enough. But the question that then 
arises is: Good enough with respect to what? Any attempt to limit the precision of a 
mathematically perfect circle needs to be justified by some kind of outside consid-
eration. For example, one might say that the circle needs to be good enough for 
people to see that it is a circle instead of an oval. In such a case, one has brought in 
a purpose that comes from outside the model of the mathematically perfect circle.10 
8 Note that the difference between the task of trying to draw a mathematically perfect circle and 
Heath’s market failures approach is just the way in which one determines practical action. As dis-
cussed in Heath’s critique of Friedman’s approach, Heath argues that his ideal cannot be achieved 
linearly (whereas the approximation of a mathematically perfect circle can be achieved linearly). 
This is beside the point of my example, however, as it serves to illustrate the nature of the abstrac-
tion that is being used instead of the nature of the way it can be approximated. For an analysis of 
why the type of abstraction that the model of the perfectly competitive market utilizes is faulty, see 
Reisman (1998, 425–437).
9 As I will argue at the end of this section, the fact that firms can fundamentally never behave in line 
with the model of the perfectly competitive market is a failure of the descriptive power of the 
model. It seems to me not a surprise that firms cannot conform to an inaccurate description of their 
behaviour, but an inversion of the relationship between theory and reality.
10 Bear in mind that the standard for perfection in this case has shifted because its purpose has 
shifted from a purely mathematical to a visual purpose. A regular circle drawn on a whiteboard 
with a pair of compasses is visually perfect, as it allows one to distinguish it from other kinds of 
shapes (such as ovals). Thus, the drawn circle perfectly fulfils its standard. As will be argued in the 
next paragraph, however, such an application is not possible when trying to realize the model of 
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The line of defence that is open to Heath is analogous to this example, as it would 
need to bring in moral principles or purposes that come from outside the model of 
the perfectly competitive market. But as was noted, such principles or purposes 
would then require their own justification and collapse the market failures approach 
into the kind of stockholder theory that Heath wishes to distinguish himself from.11
In a deeper sense, however, it is not possible to successfully execute such a 
defence.12 Because market failures always inevitably occur (as Heath recognizes), 
human beings can fundamentally never behave as specified by the perfectly com-
petitive market model. From an epistemological point of view, this means that the 
model of the perfectly competitive market does not accurately capture the nature of 
human volition with respect to the actual ways in which humans can and do act. 
This is where the analogy between the model of the perfectly competitive market 
and the model of the mathematically perfect circle comes apart. Because humans 
possess fundamentally different properties than mechanistic entities such as circles, 
they cannot be modelled with the same kind of mathematical idealizations.13 The 
fact that market failures inevitably occur is an epistemological problem for the way 
in which the model tries to describe actual human behaviour, instead of an opening 
that can provide a basis for moral obligations. In this sense, my metaethical critique 
of the perfectly competitive market model hinges on a metaphysical fact (volition) 
that backfires on the very epistemological basis of the model once said fact is rec-
ognized.14 The implication of this criticism is that we need a fundamentally different 
the perfectly competitive market (which partly shows why the model is faulty). See Binswanger 
(1981) for an extended defence of this conception of perfection.
11 As discussed in footnote 6, Heath seems to say that the inevitable market failures that ‘slip 
through the cracks’ of government regulations and moral obligations need to be accepted by soci-
ety in exchange for the goods produced. But why should society accept this exchange? It seems 
that any attempt to answer this question would require a defence along the lines that I have sug-
gested, as it would involve moral principles or purposes that come from outside the model of the 
perfectly competitive market.
12 I thank Péter Róna for pressing me on this issue.
13 Let us note again that one can draw a perfect circle, if one recognizes that the concept of perfec-
tion then becomes a function of visual aptness (i.e., being flawless when seen with the naked eye) 
instead of a function of mathematically infinite precision. However, one cannot shift the function 
of the adjective ‘perfection’ in the model of the perfectly competitive market, as said model is sup-
posed to be a direct standard for actual markets Heath (2014, 39–40). The implication of this point 
is that the type of abstraction that the model of the perfectly competitive market engages in differs 
fundamentally from that of the mathematically perfect circle. For an analysis and critique of the 
type of abstraction that the model of the perfectly competitive market engages in, see Reisman 
(1998, 425–437).
14 Note that that the model still has value as a game-theoretic scenario that is a logically sound way 
of describing the activity of abstract actors. However, this activity cannot be properly called ‘com-
petition’ and claiming that it is only leads to the confusion that the model serves as a standard for 
what competition both is and should look like. This means that a renaming/rebranding of the model 
of the perfectly competitive market is necessary. I thank Brendan Hogan for gently pressing me on 
this issue.
6 How (Not) to Connect Ethics and Economics: Epistemological and Metaethical…
100
way of looking at competition that can successfully describe how people can and do 
behave. Here, it is important to note that the model of the perfectly competitive 
market is not the only game in town.15
6.4  Conclusion
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the model of the perfectly competi-
tive market is not a suitable source for moral obligations and, by extension, for a 
moral defence of markets. If we wish to preserve the metaethical principle that 
moral actions need to be voluntarily chosen from a set of alternatives (and, as a 
corollary, take into account volition), then we need an approach for looking at and 
modelling competition that does not abstract away from essential aspects of human 
nature. In order to judge and defend the operations of the market, we need episte-
mological and ethical theorizing that can correctly conceptualize human action and 
does not result in a type of idealized abstraction that cannot be realized in reality.16
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Chapter 7
Research Ethics in Economics: What If 
Economists and Their Subjects Are Not 
Rational?
Altug Yalcintas and Eylül Seren Kösel
Abstract Economists and their subjects are not always rational. The problem is so 
significant that economics is not able to satisfy the principal criterion for science 
that several philosophers of science have formulated since the logical positivists in 
the Vienna Circle in the 1920s: In order for a theorem to be meaningful, it has to be 
confirmed by the facts of the world. The increasing frequency of unverified and 
invalidated theories in economics suggests that economics suffers from the conse-
quences of a questionable research practice in the processes of scientific knowledge 
production – the practice of refusing to reject theories that are invalidated by hard 
evidence and counter argumentation.
7.1  Introduction
In response to the observation that the shocks are imaginary, a standard defense invokes 
Milton Friedman’s (1953) methodological assertion from unnamed authority that “the more 
significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions.” More recently, “all models are 
false” seems to have become the universal hand-wave for dismissing any fact that does not 
conform to a favorite model. The noncommittal relationship with the truth revealed by these 
methodological evasions and the “less than totally convinced ...” dismissal of fact goes so 
far beyond post-modern irony that it deserves its own label. I suggest “post-real.” 
Romer (2016a)
In a well-known article, Thomas Herndon et al. (2013a) replicated two of the 
papers by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010a, b). In their papers, Reinhart and Rogoff 
argued that “median growth rates for countries with public debt over roughly 90% 
of GDP are about 1% lower than otherwise; average (mean) growth rates are several 
percent lower.” Herndon, Ash, and Pollin found that the works of Reinhart and 
Rogoff featured coding errors (especially where no data were available for some of 
the European countries), exclusion of data (of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
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and Denmark), and unconventional summary statistics. They claimed that “selective 
exclusion of available data, coding errors and inappropriate weighting of summary 
statistics lead to serious miscalculations that inaccurately represent the relationship 
between public debt and GDP growth among 20 advanced economies … when 
properly calculated, the average real GDP growth rate for countries carrying a 
public- debt-to-GDP ratio of over 90% is actually 2.2%, not −0.1% as published in 
Reinhart and Rogoff. That is, contrary to [Reinhart and Rogoff], average GDP 
growth at public debt/GDP ratios over 90% is not dramatically different than when 
debt/GDP ratios are lower.” Austerity policies, they concluded, were unnecessary. 
Papers by Reinhart and Rogoff have been two of the papers frequently referenced 
by those who argued for the austerity plans in Europe and the US after the 2008 
Financial Crisis. In other words, the proposal(s) for the necessity of austerity plans 
relied on a paper full of errors and miscalculations. Reinhart and Rogoff (2013) 
responded to their critics in a newspaper article and accepted that their papers 
involved errors. However, the papers were not retracted from the American 
Economic Review and the National Bureau of Economic Research Working Papers. 
The editors of the American Economic Review rejected their work.1 Herndon et al. 
(2013b) published their paper in the Cambridge Journal of Economics in 2013.
7.2  Primum Non Nocere
Scientists can cause harm in many ways.2 They plagiarize.3 They also fabricate and 
falsify data (Fanelli 2009). If you think these are all an economist needs to know 
about harm in science, you might be seriously wrong (Necker 2014). Working 
papers published on the websites of Replication Network4 and Replication Wiki5 
have shown that the authors of a significant number of articles in economics have 
not disclosed their data and computer codes for independent researchers to test the 
model of the original article. Papers presented at conferences6 and special issues of 
1 Personal correspondence with Thomas Herndon (September 2018). See also Jakob Kapeller’s 
editorial in the Heterodox Economics Newsletter, 3 March 2014.
2 Plagiarism, (data) falsification, and (data) fabrication (or manufacturing) have considered to be 
the most common and significant forms of research misconducted by the authorities of research 
integrity around the globe, including the Office of Research Integrity (US), the National Institutes 
of Health (UK), and ALLEA – All European Universities (EU).
3 See the RePEc Plagiarism Page available online at https://plagiarism.repec.org [Accessed March 
2019]. See also Enders and Hoover (2004) and Karabag and Berggren (2012).
4 Replication Network: https://replicationnetwork.com; [Accessed March 2019].
5 Replication Wiki: http://replication.uni-goettingen.de/wiki/index.php/Main_Page [Accessed 
March 2019].
6 See for instance “the International Workshop on Scientific Misconduct and Research Ethics in 
Economics” (organized by Association for Social Economics and Ankara University, held in Izmir, 
Turkey, August 2014), “Replication in Microeconomics,” “Meta-analysis of Reproducibility in 
Economics Research,” and “Replication and Ethics in Economics: Thirty Years after Dewald, 
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economics journals7 report that a significant portion of the previously published 
works that are replicable are either unverifiable or invalidated. Blogposts published 
by Retraction Watch8 suggest that economists have continued to cite the articles that 
were retracted by the journals in which the articles were published.
The number of academic articles and books on research ethics in economics are 
continuously growing. Since the 1990s, economic methodologists such as Deirdre 
N.  McCloskey, Arjo Klamer, Stephen T.  Ziliak, James R.  Wible, and George 
F. DeMartino, among others, have expressed concerns regarding a persistent prob-
lem in applied economics. They argued that the economic profession has ignored 
“the ethical challenges that attend the profession’s influence over the lives of 
others.”9 Economic methodologists have also claimed that the issues related to the 
scientific integrity in economics have become a pressing issue since the 2008 
Financial Crisis.10 The foundations of economic science are now seriously chal-
lenged by the cumulative consequences of a general absence of accountability and 
responsibility in economic research. A growing interest among economists in 
research integrity in economics suggests that research ethics will soon be the next 
turn in economic methodology where the consequences of questionable research 
practices will be discussed and analysed.11
Our primary goal in this paper is to introduce and develop this new focus. We 
think that the theories that cannot be verified and validated by empirical data should 
be abandoned (Yalcintas 2016). Economists who do not abandon unverified and 
invalidated theories give rise to an ethical problem in the profession. Economists 
who do not abandon the theories when theories are unverified or invalidated by 
empirical facts do not behave according to the “standards for intellectual honesty,” 
as Imre Lakatos (1970) once put it. As the case of Reinhart and Rogoff shows, how-
ever, economists stick to their guns when they are challenged by counterevidence 
and refuting argumentation.
We claim that economics should be a part of a system of research ethics.12 
Research ethics is a field of study in which scholars examine the harmful conse-
quences of researchers who are involved in questionable research practices. As 
Thursby, and Anderson” (organised by the American Economic Association, held in Chicago, IL, 
January 2017), and many other events organized by the Association for Integrity and Responsible 
Leadership in Economics and Associated Disciplines. See the AIRLEAP website at http://www.
airleap.org [Accessed October 2018].
7 See, for instance, the Review of Social Economy, Special Issue on “Scientific Misconduct and 
Research Ethics in Economics” (2016). See also the calls for papers by Energy Economics and the 
Journal of Economic Psychology that will publish special issues on replication studies in 2018 
or later.
8 Retraction Watch: https://retractionwatch.com/category/by-subject/economics/ [Accessed 
October 2018].
9 DeMartino and McCloskey (2015).
10 DeMartino (2011a, b), Dow (2013).
11 Wible (2016), Yalcintas and Wible (2016).
12 See Kapp (1963, 3–4) who was among the first economists who put forth this argument.
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David B. Resnik (2015) argues, “[m]any different disciplines, institutions, and pro-
fessions have norms for behavior that suit their particular aims and goals. These 
norms also help members of the discipline to coordinate their actions or activities 
and to establish the public’s trust of the discipline.” In the absence of scholarly 
norms, self-interested researchers do not always cause the epistemic welfare of 
other scholars to grow. Scholarly norms include responsibility, accountability, 
respect, trustworthiness, and other scientific virtues that lead to a sustainable pro-
cess of knowledge production. A sustainable process in science amounts to correct-
ing errors in the first place. However, self-correction is not naturally embedded in 
scholarly practices. In order for errors to be corrected, the scholarly community not 
only need to be able to criticize the works of others. Among other things, the schol-
ars should also be able to abandon the theories that are invalidated by counter evi-
dence and refuting argumentation.
In the medical sciences, where there are a number of professional institutes doing 
research on questionable research practices, researchers are thoroughly trained 
before they are involved in new projects. Prestigious medical journals publish 
papers on research ethics as well. Economists have been inspired by biomedical 
scientists in many ways. However, research on questionable research practices in 
economics has not been common. Since the eighteenth century, economists have 
imitated the ways in which physicists conducted scientific research. Economists 
have also copied and reproduced various types of research practices in biomedical 
sciences. Since Dr. Quesnay who published his Tableau Économique in 1758, a 
book on which William Harvey’s invention of blood circulation played a biggest 
role, such economists as William Petty, John Locke, Joseph Clément Juglar, amongst 
many others, have either been trained in or heavily influenced by medical sciences.13 
Today, biomedicine is in the process of becoming a dominant paradigm in econom-
ics. Economists use metaphors that they abduct from medical sciences, such as eco-
nomic crises, toxic assets, recovery programs, healthy economies, and economic 
prescriptions written by IMF and World Bank. More importantly, economists’ ways 
of conducting research resembles the ways in which biomedical scientists conduct 
theirs. Economists publish fewer and fewer books than articles in which an increas-
ing number of them are being multi-authored rather than single authored. The num-
ber of citations to the work of an economist is as important as the argument of the 
work. As it has become more visible to the general public since the 2008 Financial 
Crisis, amounts of research monies granted to economists and salaries paid to econ-
omists sitting in the advisory boards of big companies of the banking industry all 
around the world without being accountable to the public are more or less identical 
to those of the pharmacologists, cancer researchers etc. In other words, types of 
questionable research practices in economics are similar to the types in biomedical 
sciences but there is no powerful sign of concern amongst economists toward inter-
nalizing the spill-over effects of questionable research practices. We claim that pri-
mum non nocere (“first, do no harm”) is not only one of the principles that medical 
13 Groenewegen (2001), Clément (2003).
A. Yalcintas and E. S. Kösel
107
students are taught at health institutions. It should also be a condition for econo-
mists to reach their ideals. We see morality as a must-condition for economics based 
on facts.
Therefore, we ask: what if economists and their subjects are not rational? While 
we were formulating the research question, we were inspired by one of the works of 
Arjo Klamer, entitled “As If Economists and Their Subject were Rational” (1987), 
in which he argued that “[t]he real goal is not to know how we … can design rational 
criteria of truthfulness; it is instead to comprehend how economists actually argue 
and how their argumentation works.” He claims that economics is an art of persua-
sion and the assumption of rationality is a metaphor where economists study their 
subject of research (i.e. humans) as if they are rational. Most of us would argue that 
humans are not always rational. Klamer would agree. “Talk based on the pretense 
that everyone is rational,” Klamer says, “may simply not be that interesting.” 
However, one of consequences of not designing rational criteria of truthfulness is 
the loss of fact-checking and verification. In his article, Klamer does not confront 
the results of a fact-free world. It is obvious that a post-fact economics is not what 
Klamer has intended when he argued against rational criteria of truthfulness. Then, 
the research question becomes the following: What are the consequences of the 
behaviour of the economists who are not rational?
We think that the consequences of the fact that economists and their subjects are 
not always rational have been understudied.14 The problem is so significant that 
economics is not able to satisfy the principal criterion for science and scientific 
theories that several philosophers of science have formulated since the logical posi-
tivists in the Vienna Circle in the 1920s: In order for a theorem to be meaningful, it 
has to be confirmed by the facts of the world. Today, logical positivism (or “verifi-
cationism,” as many philosophers of science would like to call it) is “perceived 
almost universally as a villain,” Wade Hands (2001,72) argues, “a wrong move that 
is responsible for much of what is wrong in nearly every intellectual discipline.” As 
a result, only a limited number of economic methodologists15 have studied the 
nature and consequences of the absence of verification, an ideology that Karl Popper 
(1935/2002, 18) once thought is “logically inadmissible.” We disagree. We argue 
that the increasing frequency of unverified and invalidated theories in economics 
suggests that economics suffers from the consequences of a questionable research 
practice in the processes of scientific knowledge production – the practice of refus-
ing to reject theories that are invalidated by hard evidence and counter 
argumentation.
14 Necker (2016), Hoover (2006).
15 Ward (1972), Hutchison (1984), Machlup (1955 and 1984).
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7.3  Post-factual Economics
It has been more than a decade since the 2008 Financial Crisis hit the global econ-
omy. There is now a growing economic literature on the nature and consequences of 
the crisis. One of the widely accepted views about the crisis has been that it was not 
only a crisis of the global economy; it was a crisis of the economics profession as 
well.16 Economists have played roles in the emergence of the crisis.
However, we have found that research ethics has not been commonly taught in 
economics departments around the globe since then. The number of papers pub-
lished in the journal of economics education and economic methodology is also 
very limited.17 In our view, it is not unfair to say that the issue of immorality among 
economists has been disguised in the abstract debates in economic methodology 
since the 2008 Financial Crisis.18 We think that being suspicious about hard facts 
and evidence has played a role in excluding ethics from methodological debates in 
economics. As Boumans and Davis (2010, 171) argue “[t]he most important meth-
odological value judgments in economics involve three kinds of choices made by 
economists regarding how economics should be carried out: (i) the choice of the 
subject matter to be investigated; (ii) the method to be used in investigating that 
subject matter; and (iii) the criteria standards, and norms used to assess and judge 
the validity of the investigation’s outcomes.” Indeed, theory rejecting is as important 
as theory choosing. The former is an ethical matter whereas the latter is 
methodological.
One of the first sources that helped the economists to focus their attention on the 
nature of the 2008 Financial Crisis was Inside Job (2010), a Hollywood documen-
tary, directed by Charles Ferguson. This documentary not only explained how the 
complex financial tools worked. It also gave an overview of the period of deregula-
tion from the 1980s to date. The view that the documentary held was that big com-
panies such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Lehman Brothers knew that 
the crisis was coming; but they did not do anything about it. The documentary was 
shown in Cannes, Toronto, and New York film festivals in 2010. It also won the 
2010 Academy Award.
Inside Job is the first-ever Hollywood production that touches upon the issue of 
research ethics in economics. Ferguson argues that the economics profession is 
fully corrupted. The documentary provides evidence that economists write reports 
to financial companies and consulting agencies, but they do not always express it 
openly that they do. According to Ferguson, this leads to the issue of conflict of 
interest in economics.
Conflict of interest in the academe is a big issue.19 But it is not the only form of 
questionable research practices. Mathematization, amongst others, has also been an 
16 Colander et al. (2009), Kirman (2010), Elliot (2010), Lawson (2009), Harvey (2012).
17 Yalcintas and Selçuk (2016).
18 Maziarz (2017).
19 Valdés (1995), Mirowski (2002), Perkins (2004), Easterly (2006).
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issue that economic methodologists have focused their attention on in their criti-
cisms. For instance, Jesus M.  Zaratiegui (1999) argues that “[m]athematics is a 
powerful symbol of the internal logical consistency that economics has developed 
during this century. Nevertheless, it has been accused of making a non-critical use 
of mathematical methods and of converting these methods into a weapon of eco-
nomic imperialism.” Likewise, in two of his most recent papers, the 2018 Nobel 
Memorial laureate Paul Romer argues that macroeconomic theory suffers from the 
lack of empirical evidence to support the mathematical models of economic growth. 
He calls it “mathiness.” Mathiness, according to Romer, is a misuse of mathematics 
where economists do not provide the reader with the facts of the world to back up 
the theoretical model. Romer (2016b) thinks that non-existent empirical content in 
economics “signals a shift from science to academic politics” causing a scientific 
failure:
The style that I am calling mathiness lets academic politics masquerade as science. Like 
mathematical theory, mathiness uses a mixture of words and symbols, but instead of mak-
ing tight links, it leaves ample room for slippage between statements in natural versus for-
mal language and between statements with theoretical as opposed to empirical content.
Romer is not against the use of unrealistic assumptions in economics. He is con-
cerned, however, with the fact that mathematical macroeconomic models cannot be 
verified because the models are not tested whether they fit to the true facts of the 
world. Romer’s views on macroeconomic theory, according to our understanding, 
are a reformulation of the general discontent among many economic methodolo-
gists who have pointed out the risks of the overuse and misuse of mathematical 
techniques in applied economics since the WWII. Paul Romer, a macroeconomist 
who has been known for his mathematical contributions to the literature on endog-
enous growth theory, made the point although he did not provide evidence in some 
of his most cited papers, such as “Endogenous Technical Change”20 and “Economic 
Integration and Economic Growth”,21 to support his mathematical models, either. 
But he is as clear as any professional economic methodologist:
My conjecture is that string theory and post-real macroeconomics illustrate a general failure 
mode of a scientific field that relies on mathematical theory … conformity to the facts is no 
longer needed as a coordinating device. As a result, if facts disconfirm the officially sanc-
tioned theoretical vision, they are subordinated. Eventually, evidence stops being relevant 
(Romer 2016b).
20 Romer (1990).
21 Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).
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7.4  The “New” Dichotomy
Economics profession has long suffered from fact-free theorizing. The arguments 
“proven” with some tests of statistical significance22 under certain (and unlikely) 
circumstances have been accepted and widely used as if the models were verified by 
facts and data. As Toby Young (2016) put it “we are all post-truthers and probably 
always have been.”
“We are living in a world of post-truth,” says Ralph Keyes in his book, The Post 
Truth- Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life (2004) “Post- 
truthfullness exists in an ethical twilight zone. It allows us to dissemble without 
considering ourselves dishonest.” The prevalence of factually inaccurate conclu-
sions in economics have also drawn the attention of many economists since the 
2008 Financial Crisis. The problem that we think has led to post-factual theorizing 
in economics is that economists do not behave responsibly while they conduct 
research. The main source of the lack of responsibility is that
• economists do not refer to data and facts
• they do not abandon theories when theories are refuted by data and facts
Originally, an understanding of ethics in science refers to the normativity debate 
on the dichotomy between “is-statements” and “ought-to-statements.” The follow-
ing statement is an is-statement: “The average rate of the US annual growth was 
over 4% between 1983 and 1988.” The statement is replicable and it is produced by 
the researchers who are allegedly accountable at the World Bank.23 However, the 
following statement is an ought-to-statement where the proposition is prescriptive 
and originating from an opinion: “In order for the global economy to achieve sus-
tainable growth, it ought to introduce the free market policies of the US.” The nor-
mativity debate has been popular in economic methodology since David Hume first 
formulated it in his A Treatise on Human Nature (1739). Many economic method-
ologists have often referred to it when they talked about “value judgments” and 
“morality.”24
Here, we claim that in order for economists to remedy the problems of the age of 
post-factual economics, economists should reconsider the old dichotomy with new 
lenses. The “new” dichotomy refers to the logical distinction between a correct 
statement (or “is-statement”) and an incorrect statement (or “is-not-statement”). 
Economists should insist on working with is-statements (such as “According to 
IMF, the global economy grew at 3.5% in 2017”25) whereas they should reject is-not 
statements (such as “… median growth rates for countries with public debt over 
22 Ziliak and McCloskey (1996, 2004, 2008).
23 Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=US [Accessed 
March 2019].
24 For instance Blaug (1980, 49–134).
25 Source: https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/
WEOWORLD Accessed March 2019.
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roughly 90% of GDP are about 1% lower than otherwise; average (mean) growth 
rates are several percent lower”26). Failure to distinguish between an is-statement 
and an is-not-statement, which is in fact a logical condition, gives rise to ethical 
problems in scientific research. An is-statement is a statement where the model or 
explanation is evidenced by data and verified by the facts of the world. An is-not- 
statement, on the other hand, is a statement where the model cannot by supported by 
data and facts. Today, an understanding of ethics amounts to bringing data and facts 
back into science so that we can distinguish between correct and incorrect statements.
When economists do not reject a refuted theory, they do not behave responsibly 
to the audience because economists who keep using an is-not-statement inflict harm 
on other researchers. The condition for economists to account for the world in 
meaningful ways, they are required to stick to is-statements and reject is-not- 
statements. In order for a theory to produce a meaningful explanation, the theory 
should be verified with facts in the first place. Only theories that are verified by facts 
can lead to meaningful explanations. In other words, economics is not only value-
laden, it is also fact-laden.
Fact-ladennes of a theory is a condition for the process of knowledge production 
to operate without interruptions. Interruption can occur when economists are not 
able to correct inconsistencies and manipulations. If a theory is free from facts, it is 
unlikely that a criticism is able to eliminate the abstract nature of the theory where 
the theory is not able to account for the causes of an event. Under such conditions, 
academic conversations can be easily locked in to ideological nonsense where the 
explanation does not have any relevance to the facts of the world. In other words, 
fact-free theories do not always produce pragmatic results about the world in which 
we live.
Theories that are free from facts cause opinions to replace evidence in scientific 
inquiry. An economist who only refers to opinions can build fictive models in which 
critics might be unable to spot erroneous contents. Fictive models are often able to 
account the facts of the world. Although the main problem is not necessarily fictive 
models per se, as the case of Reinhart and Rogoff suggests; is-not-statements that 
are invalidated by evidence inflict harm on the community of researchers as well as 
the general public.
7.5  Looking Forward
Economists have long been interested in the state of economics.27 Back in the 1970s, 
Wassily Leontief focused on the misuse of mathematics in economics. In his 
“Theoretical Assumptions and Nonobserved Facts” (1971), he claimed that “[i]n the 
presentation of a new model, attention nowadays is usually centered on a 
26 The statement belongs to (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010b) and it is refuted by Herndon et al. (2013b).
27 Babbage (1830), Marx (1859), Veblen (1909), Hoover (1926).
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step-by- step derivation of its formal properties … By the time it comes to interpreta-
tion of the substantive conclusions, the assumptions on which the model has been 
based are easily forgotten … What is really needed, in most cases, is a very difficult 
and seldom very neat assessment and verification of these assumptions in terms of 
observed facts.” In fact, the finding of Reinhart and Rogoff that “median growth 
rates for countries with public debt over roughly 90% of GDP are about 1% lower 
than otherwise; average (mean) growth rates are several percent lower” was, in 
Leontief’s terms, a “nonobserved fact.” Therefore, one of the questions that eco-
nomic methodologists often asks is the following: What is wrong with economics?28 
Economists, to a large extent, believe that ethics is irrelevant to what they are doing 
in the labs, classrooms, and conference halls. Especially applied fields of economics 
in which economists use data and algorithms to account for what they think is 
important for the economy is where morality and ethics are least requested.
As The Economist (2016) put it straightforwardly, “humans do not naturally seek 
truth. In fact, as plenty of research shows, they tend to avoid it.” Historically, we 
think that abstention from data and facts has started with David Ricardo. Ricardo 
was one of the first steps to also move away from the moral philosophies of Adam 
Smith and David Hume. When Ricardo thought that he refuted Smith’s theory of 
value, he in fact refuted the morality that Smith’s theory involved.
Abstract methods, many applied economists would tell, do not require ethics and 
morality. For instance, in The Elements of Pure Economics (1874), one of the most 
influential works in the history of economics, Léon Walras (1874, 39) claimed thus: 
“we need not concern ourselves with the morality or immorality of any desire which 
a useful thing answers or serves to satisfy.” Milton Friedman (1953, 180–213) 
agreed with Walras when he argued that: “Positive economics is in principle inde-
pendent of any particular ethical or normative judgements.” Economics requires 
excellence in using the tools that an economist is equipped with. Besides all, there 
are certain mechanisms that deal with the consequences of immoral behaviour. If 
you are a doctoral student, you advisor will monitor your actions. But if you are 
professional economist, does your department or your faculty hold you responsible 
for your actions at the universities at all times? The evidence suggests that this is 
always the case. We think that the unresponsiveness among economists has a lot to 
do with the belief that “truth will out.” Indeed, why do economists need to concern 
themselves with “the morality or immorality” of a subject if the truth, as Hercule 
Poirot (David Suchet) said it in one of the episodes of Agatha Christie’s Poirot 
(2013), “has the habit of revealing itself”? It is this belief that economic methodolo-
gists should question.
28 Fullbrook (2004), Coy (2009), Bell and Kristol (1981), Krugman (2009).
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Chapter 8
Economic Choice Revisited: Lessons 
from Pre-modern Thinkers
Agnieszka Wincewicz-Price
Abstract This paper explains why economics needs a better understanding of 
human moral agency. It argues that more thorough conceptualisation of economic 
choice as human choice exposes what is missing in the neoclassical account of the 
economic agent. The view of human agency presented here is derived from Aristotle, 
Thomas Aquinas and Adam Smith. It is a view rooted in the virtue ethics tradition, 
one that highlights the concept and value of practical reason for agency.
8.1  Introduction
The prevailing view of standard economic theory is that economists need not engage 
in the analysis of moral agency. For purposes of explanation and prediction, we are 
told, neoclassical economic theory requires that behaviour of the economic agent 
under investigation should merely conform to a set of axioms whose plausibility is 
mostly theoretical. To the limited extent that the behaviour of persons corresponds 
with these assumptions, economic activity can be explained in the framework of 
rational choice.
In what follows I argue that broader and therefore better understanding of human 
choice can help improve the quality of economic explanation. While the uniqueness 
of a human economic agent conceived of as a moral person surpasses the limitations 
of the text-book economic theory of choice, it nonetheless plays an important role 
in informing some of its premises.
The view of human agency I want to offer for the consideration of economists is 
one that is rooted in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, important parts of which, 
as I will try to show, are shared by Adam Smith. It is a tradition marked by virtue 
ethics and development of practical wisdom. This tradition’s anthropological claims 
about human action expose what is missing in the neoclassical account of the eco-
nomic agent.
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The way I approach the moral aspects of human choice is intended to engage 
critically some core elements of modern economic theory of preferences. The word 
‘moral’ in this context refers to human rational agency which encompasses one’s 
ability to reason, to formulate one’s goals, values and principles of action, and to 
pursue one’s goals in line with those principles or values.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses some prob-
lematic elements in the standard economic understanding of human agency and 
choice. Particular attention is given to the lack of nuance in the treatment of ends 
and inexistence of a sound theory of ends formation in this theory. The following 
section encapsulates the essence of what human moral agency meant in the pre-
modern virtue-ethics tradition. Directions for possible application of this broader 
approach to human choice in economics are suggested next. Final section 
concludes.
8.2  Neoclassical Account of Economic Agency
8.2.1  Economic Agent – ‘Not Human But Important’1
From its very inception as a subject of enquiry, economics has been studied as the 
product of human agency under conditions of scarcity. These were understood to be 
real actions of real human persons. With its emancipation from the theological and 
philosophical vision of man, modern economics gradually lost interest in the moral 
aspects of human action and agency. Already in the seventeenth century, economics 
and moral philosophy separated into two distinct paths of enquiry. Nonetheless, the 
human person as a moral agent continued to be treated in one way or another as an 
important factor of economic analysis. The famous definition of economics pro-
posed by Alfred Marshall in the late nineteenth century retained the spirit of that 
approach. In his Principles of Economics he called it ‘a study of mankind in the 
ordinary business of life’ which ‘examines that part of individual and social action 
which is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of material 
requisites of well-being’ (Marshall 1890, 1).
Since around the middle of the twentieth century, however, there has been a ten-
dency in economics (as well as in other social sciences), to avoid explanation of 
phenomena, which originate in human action, by appealing to the conscious deci-
sions of persons in favour of impersonal factors (Evans 2002, 14). As the subject of 
economic science and analysis, human beings have increasingly been losing their 
distinctiveness as persons, as moral agents, being replaced by impersonal economic 
agents, necessarily non-moral. It is the latter, not the former that is considered the 
core subject of today’s economic analysis.
1 Cf. Ross (2012).
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In the course of modernisation and specialisation, the discipline of economics 
emancipated itself from a broader discourse of moral science. As a result many 
important normative concepts associated with human choice and decision making 
were left outside of economic analysis. With the arrival of the modern world, mod-
ern economics was born whose assumptions of human conduct originated arguably 
in the ideas about human rationality and reason which were developed in the 
Enlightenment period (Langholm 1992, 1–10).
The concept of agency employed in standard micro and macroeconomics is one 
of the rational agent. Rational agency in the economic sense originates directly from 
the axioms of rational choice theory and it should not be confused with other con-
cepts of rationality employed especially in philosophy or ethics. The neoclassical 
concept of the economic agent derives from the work of Samuelson (1947). A 
Samuelsonian economic agent, as Ross (2005, 245) defines him, is simply ‘any 
system that observes certain consistency conditions in its behaviour, such that it can 
be interpreted as if it is maximizing the value of a function that maps a system of 
preferences over commodity bundles onto the real numbers’.
Standard rationality theory, or expected utility theory, is axiomatic in nature, in 
that it is formulated around a specific set of logical assumptions (completeness, 
transitivity, independence, and continuity) chosen in order to produce well-defined 
preference orderings (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). The ‘von Neumann- 
Morgenstern utility function theorem’ states that ‘if these four axioms are satisfied, 
any set of well-ordered preferences can be represented by a distinct (monotonic) 
individual utility function’. The utility function is the theory’s representation of the 
agent. The individual is defined as no more than a collection of preferences (Davis 
2006, 70).
Ross argues that nothing in economic theory requires that economic agency be 
identified with individual persons, because economists use it to build abstract mod-
els of firms, nations, labour unions, consortia in auctions, lineages in evolutionary 
games, and other feedback-sensitive, incentive-driven systems that have no evident 
psychological properties at all. Economic agents are thus ‘representative’ optimiz-
ers, whose ontological status is indeterminate. Davis (2006, 70), for example, notes 
that there is nothing in the current understanding of choice that requires it to apply 
to any type of agent in particular:
The representation of choice now dominant in economics, which involves nothing more 
than maximisation of a formal objective function, applies equally well to any type of agent, 
whether it be a single individual, a collection of individuals, an animal, a collection of ani-
mals, or even a programmed machine.
It is therefore not important for rational choice analysis that the economic agent 
is a human being, let alone a moral person. The issue of what constitutes the indi-
viduality of this agent never arises. It is not a problem that economists find 
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interesting for their purposes. The economic agent is an abstraction, a useful but 
merely theoretical construct of the smallest unit of activity under analysis.2
Economists of the formal neoclassical school grant that they abstract from the 
over-determined conditions of social reality, by disregarding all but the economic 
motives of actors in constructing theoretical models. They do not consider it neces-
sary that their models should correspond with concrete human natures or even a 
general extra-economic idea of ‘human nature’. In short, neoclassical economics, 
with its focus on abstract rational choice theory, no longer needs a distinctive notion 
of a person to explain economic phenomena.
8.2.2  The Peculiar Concept of Preferences
Although nothing in the theory requires that the agents in question be persons con-
ceived of as moral agents, this fact alone does not mean that economics is uninter-
ested in individual behaviour. Its interest in individual behaviour, however, is usually 
limited. Most economists study human choice because it is a building block in the 
analysis of social phenomena, rather than because they are concerned with explain-
ing individual persons qua individual behaviour. In this they rely on the abstract 
conception referred to as homo economicus which co-defines rationality and indi-
viduality, not in connection with human behaviour, but by reference to the logical- 
mathematical properties of equilibrium analysis. Thus, rational choice theory is not 
treated as psychological theory. The theory considers only the formal or mathemati-
cal properties of the agent’s preferences. What the latter term should be taken to 
mean is a formal ordering relation, constructed so as to allow equilibrium analysis. 
Hausman defines preferences as ‘total subjective comparative evaluations’. He 
illustrates this with the example: “To say that Jill prefers x to y is to say that when 
Jill has thought about everything she takes to bear on how much she values x and y, 
Jill ranks x above y” (2012, 34, italics mine). So: a preference is comparative (x is 
ranked above y); the comparison is in terms of value; the valuation is subjective 
(‘how much she values …’); and it takes account of the totality of factors that the 
individual thinks relevant to the comparison (‘everything she takes to bear on …’).
As total or overall evaluations, preferences are already informed by reflection on 
what there is reason to do. Nature of reasons for action is not inquired into. The 
content and rationality of preferences themselves is considered irrelevant to the 
theory. What matters is that preferences are known and stable over time. In order to 
2 As Becker (1993, 402) writes: ‘while the economic approach to behaviour builds on a theory of 
individual choice, it is not mainly concerned with individuals. It uses theory at the micro level as a 
powerful tool to derive implications at the group or macro level. Rational individual choice is 
combined with assumptions about technologies and other determinants of opportunities, equilib-
rium in market and non-market situations, and laws, norms, and traditions to obtain results con-
cerning the behaviour of groups. It is mainly because the theory derives implications at the macro 
level that it is of interest to policymakers’.
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guarantee some set of rational choices, preferences must satisfy three other condi-
tions: they must be complete, transitive and independent of irrelevant. These condi-
tions guarantee some ‘most preferred’ subset of the available options which define 
a rational choice. Included in the ‘most preferred’ subset are those options which 
bring about the highest level of utility – another concept of purely analytical value 
which has no psychological meaning.
Preferences are outcomes of comparative assessments rather than inputs into 
deliberation. The existence of an all-things-considered preference ordering presup-
poses that the economic agent has been able to compare the available options from 
different points of view or according to different reasons or motivations that she 
may have had, in order to choose among those options. Models that explain and 
predict choices in terms of constraints, beliefs, and total comparative evaluations do 
not deny that human agency and motivation are complex matters. They instead 
locate those complexities in theories of preference formation and change and not in 
theories of choice. Only this way of defining preferences makes it possible to take 
them as determinants of choice. The separation of deliberation about ends and 
choice of means, however, is mostly of analytical use and has little to do with how 
most human decisions are made.
Such separation can only apply to deliberations wherein objects of preferences 
can be unequivocally compared. And therein lies the rub. In such deliberations the 
agent has some single, well-defined goal or function (a dominant end); or the differ-
ing goals which he pursues have some common factor, such as the satisfaction of a 
known desire. This approach has no use in the—not uncommon—situations in 
which one needs to combine two or more different goals, virtues or standards, which 
he feels he cannot ignore or downplay but which seem to demand incompatible 
things of him. In the standard economic approach, a person experiencing different 
motivations, who may find it impossible to compare all options, and also be unable 
to make a clear-cut decision between them, would be considered a case in which the 
agent’s preferences are not fully formed (incomplete). And so he or she is incapable 
of a rational action. An example of such a case is a choice one has to make between 
integrity or charity, on the one hand, and some other incompatible goal one might 
have, say, the pursuit of a suitable retirement, or subsistence, or approval of others 
(Taylor 1985, 236–7). One can compare the strength of one’s desire to have a cup of 
coffee now with one’s desire to have a cup of tea now, and the degree of respective 
enjoyments and satisfactions. But how can either of those desires and their satisfac-
tion be compared with one’s desire to be a fine scholar, a good father, a true friend? 
Such alternatives are incommensurable, much like vacationing at the beach vs. 
vacationing in the mountains (Finnis 2011, 424), vs. not vacationing at all and hav-
ing more money in the bank. Each possibility has some intelligible appeal not found 
in what makes the other appealing. It is often impossible coherently to combine all 
the demands that we might consider important and valid. An agent can see one rea-
son as outweighing another only if the two reasons are contained within a single 
evaluative perspective. While admirable in its generality, however, this theory has 
almost no descriptive content. More complex incidents of human choice which 
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involve incommensurate options cannot be easily explained in the strict terms of 
rational choice theory.
Thus, economists in the neoclassical tradition begin their analysis of choice at 
the point where ends are (or are assumed to be) set. In the Humean spirit they con-
ceive of rationality in an instrumental manner: their task is to specify structures that 
are appropriate means of achieving those ends, whatever they may be. They do not 
account for ends which emerge from deliberations about incommensurate desires or 
evolve from the processes of one’s maturation and learning from experience. The 
main reason for this is the neoclassical economics’ agnosticism about values. The 
formation and ranking of human ends is intimately connected to values. Desires can 
only make sense in relation to one’s idea of the good. Otherwise we cannot explain 
what we find valuable in them, and deciding between two or more conflicting desires 
is even more problematic. Choice, empirically speaking, involves not merely instru-
mental but also practical reason. When we try to decide what to do, or when we 
explain our own conduct or conduct of others, we invoke reasons for action. Yet, the 
assumption of stable and invariable fundamental preferences makes the discussion 
about values entirely redundant for economists (in line with the old maxim: de gus-
tibus non disputandum est) and formation of values ceases to be economists’ prob-
lem. In the rational choice framework, all values are converted into a single currency 
of meaningless utility.
It seems paradoxical that economic choice should not be concerned with the way 
real people decide, choose, and act. Lacking in its account is any meaningful defini-
tion of preferences as ends and of preference formation. This indeed is not a satis-
factory achievement for a discipline which claims competence in explaining not 
merely economic phenomena but non-economic issues as well. Some evolutionary 
economists go as far as to claim that selection and ordering of ends proves to be the 
most fundamental economic problem and lament the abandonment of the problem 
by orthodox economics.3
Economists explain their ignorance in the realm of human ends with the claim 
that this is subject for other social scholars’ authority such as anthropologists, soci-
ologists, and philosophers. In what follows I suggest that better grasp of human 
ends should not be contracted to other disciplines but revisited in the spirit that was 
dominant in pre-modern economic thought on which its modern successor was 
built. I propose that the pre-modern thinkers, who did not have a separate notion of 
an economic agent, but who analysed all human decisions and actions in broader 
ethical terms, can offer important insights into what is involved in economic choice 
qua human choice. They show that the former cannot be completely and cleanly 
separated from the latter without some meaningful loss. Just how much is missed in 
the simplified account of economic choice can be illustrated by a short sketch of a 
3 See for example Fudulu (2014a, b). Fudulu claims that even Ludwig von Mises (1949 ,92–93) and 
Lionel Robbins (1932, 12) produced merely tautological definitions of ends, while Frank Knight 
who famously stated that ends are ‘the most obstinate unknown of all unknowns’ (2009, 12) ques-
tioned the value of making any inquiries into this obscura realm.
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much more thorough understanding of reason and choice, one that is based on an 
old and well-established conception of practical reason.
8.3  Pre-modern Economic Thought: Self-Development 
and Practical Reason
Contrary to the analytical framework of modern economics, it was the focus on the 
person that located political economy among the moral sciences in the tradition of 
Western political philosophy. What are now called the human sciences (economics, 
sociology, etc.) were traditionally referred to as the moral sciences. The mark of this 
tradition, from Plato and Aristotle, throughout Christian antiquity, the Middle Ages 
(especially following Aquinas), and the Scottish Enlightenment of Adam Smith, is 
its placing of economic thinking within the area of moral actions of human beings. 
It is this tradition which informed an alternative conception of reason to that which 
prevailed in the Enlightenment. As Hollis (1977,12; italics mine) notes, ‘there was 
another voice in the Enlightenment, a voice that argued that the power of reason 
allows humans to master nature, manipulate society, change culture and, indeed, 
shape our own selves’. The capacity for shaping our own selves is a distinctly 
human feature which signifies our capacity for deliberative self-determination and 
indicates a dynamic and undetermined character of human goals. It was given a 
special focus in classical philosophy and especially in the virtue ethics tradition as 
the below cursorily discussed works of its important representatives will show.
Virtue ethics is the oldest and broadest stream of ethical theory in the study of 
human conduct. Introduced by Plato and Aristotle, it was taken up by the Stoics, 
used by Cicero, and finally adopted into Christianity in its most lasting form by 
Thomas Aquinas. In this tradition, right action is defined as that which leads to the 
‘well-being’ of the individual. The term ‘eudaimonia’ is a classical Greek word, 
commonly translated as ‘happiness’, but perhaps better described as ‘well-being’ or 
‘human flourishing’ or ‘good life’. The essence of eudaimonia consists in one’s 
striving toward excellence based on one’s unique potential. At the centre of the 
eudaimonistic ethics is the view of the person as a being conscious of oneself and 
one’s own will, concerned not only with the question of what one should do but also 
of what one should and could desire. In the language of modern economics we 
would say that the person is concerned with what her ends should be, what she 
should value. Thus, in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, moral behaviour is not 
only about fulfilling one’s duty or obligation to others and following rules. It is just 
as much a theory of the formation of the will, and a development of desires and 
aspirations (Koslowski 2006). One does not need to accept Aristotle’s theory of the 
will or even regard the will itself as a meaningful concept (there is a powerful mod-
ern trend to treat it as obsolete) to recognize some truth in this observation.
Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Adam Smith are three particularly important 
representatives of this tradition. What connects the three philosophers is an explicit 
8 Economic Choice Revisited: Lessons from Pre-modern Thinkers
124
account of human nature characterized by man’s striving for the good and self- 
formation (‘man’ was then used, but especially in Aquinas’s case, ‘human being’ is 
what was meant). Their insights offer a potentially valuable addition to what has 
been only partially recognized by economic utility theory, decision theory, and 
other rationality studies. They provide building blocks for a richer concept of the 
economic agent conceived of as a moral person whose preferences are not fixed and 
stable but forming and changing. The concept of changing and undetermined pref-
erences highlights the dynamic aspect of human agency and suggests that it is not 
merely satisfaction of preferences but the very process of their formation which 
makes human agency different from non-human agents and constitutes part of peo-
ple’s welfare. Contrary to the instrumental means-ends approach of the neoclassical 
economic theory of choice, this process calls for the exercise of practical reason by 
the person in question – a distinct feature of human agency.
8.3.1  Practical Wisdom in Aristotle
The great influence of Aristotle not only on ethics, but also on what later came to be 
called economic thought,4 makes his works a natural starting point of enquiry into 
the moral nature of an economic agent and economic choice. Aristotle is the first 
thinker to analyse economic life systematically, so that it is seen as ‘embedded’ in 
the extended fabric of the community. For Aristotle, economic affairs do not have a 
free-standing status but properly belong to practical philosophy. Unlike modern 
economics, he treats of economic phenomena such as production, consumption, 
exchange, in the context of virtues. Aristotle’s anthropology stresses the importance 
of man’s capacity and propensity to develop and practise virtue, and accounts for a 
person’s responsibility for acquiring a good character. His ‘economic analysis’, 
which is usually identified in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics and Book I of the 
Politics, is only a sub-section within an enquiry into other, more essential subject- 
matters (Finley 1970, 5). The most important criterion of evaluation of these various 
matters appears to be the opportunity for each agent to realize his own potential and 
thus to fulfil himself in a flourishing life. When reading Aristotle’s reflections on 
what we call today economic or market behaviour, one cannot resist the impression 
that economics for him is mostly about human values, concerned more generally 
about eudaimonia (Pol, I, 9, 1257b, 40-1258a, 2).
What are today referred to as economic pursuits, though important, are for 
Aristotle simply one among other means toward human flourishing and excellence. 
One’s endeavours related to securing some level of material status have a functional, 
not finalistic, nature and it is a necessary, but not sufficient, instrument for attaining 
a good life. It is true that a good life cannot do without the possession of material 
4 The Scholastics used the Nicomachean Ethics as one of the leading textbooks. Some important 




goods. Nonetheless, it is not exhausted by the material component, but depends, 
rather, on a plurality of human dimensions. Present in Aristotle but missing in mod-
ern perception of the economic agent is the motivational complexity of every human 
choice and thus of economic choice, too.
Aristotle is famous for his strongly teleological perspective according to which 
the highest human good involves activities that are goal-directed and have purpose. 
Most importantly, the essential end point (telos) is to achieve the best that is within 
us. As paraphrased by Johnston (1997, 6): ‘The excellence of the human being is 
thus going to be associated with growth towards some final realization of his or her 
true and best nature.’
For Aristotle, an agent is roughly defined as a being who can entertain, and take 
steps to fulfil, ‘reasonable desires’. For him, the rationality that is the distinguishing 
mark of agency is neither merely formal nor only instrumental. His is the rationality 
understood as prudence (phronesis). The ‘phronimos’ in Aristotle is the person who 
has practical wisdom (as compared to theoretical wisdom), full reasonableness (as 
opposed to perfect rationality). This includes the ability of discerning what things 
are good for himself and for mankind at the point of choice, rather than merely theo-
retically. Such a person is the norm of action, both economic and non-economic 
(NEII.6:1107a1; VI.11:1143b15: VI.5:1140b8-10).
It is because of complexity and multidimensionality of choice that Aristotle, con-
trary to the standard economic approach appreciates that deliberation about man’s 
ends does not benefit from the means-end paradigm (Wiggins 1980). Instead, it 
requires practical wisdom. For Aristotle, it is the mark of the man of practical wis-
dom to be able to ‘deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not 
in some particular respect (health, strength) but about what sorts of things conduce 
to the good life in general’ (NE, Book VI). Deliberation in Aristotle is not primarily 
a search for means, but rather a search for the best specification of the good that one 
wants. A nontechnical deliberation is one in which man has a vague description of 
something he wants—a good life, a satisfying career, a fulfilling hobby, etc. The 
problem is not to see what will be causally efficacious in bringing this about, but 
rather to see what really qualifies as an adequate and practically realizable specifica-
tion of what would satisfy this want. As long as this specification is not available, 
there is no room for means. This observation is not given enough consideration in 
the mainstream economics account of human choice.
Aristotle’s account of human choice and deliberation indicates the unfinished or 
indeterminate character of our ideals and value structure, which are constitutive 
both of human freedom and practical rationality itself. The life of virtue consists in 
intellectual and moral virtue, i.e. in the ability to discern what is best and the ability 
to act on this judgment. In other words, moral virtue serves to bring our actual 
choices and preferences into line with what our better judgment recommends to us 
(Veatch 1962, 101). Aristotle’s account of deliberation indicates that the human 
choice situation cannot always be treated as forming a closed, complete, consis-
tent system.
One of the purposes of wise decision making is to discover what we prefer or 
what is really of value. For it is only through wise and morally imaginative 
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deliberation that we gain clarity about those objects we have previously deemed to 
be of value. Wise decision making does not assume that we already have a fixed and 
absolute set of preferences or values:
Matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity. The 
agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion (NE 
1103b 26).
In Aristotle (and, as will be shown below, also in Aquinas) a person is conceived 
through his actions as en route toward some completion (Schenck 1976). Aristotle’s 
good man develops over time (Burnyeat 1980, 69). Virtue is not something we are 
born with but something we acquire. In a way, the whole Nicomachean Ethics is 
Aristotle’s reply to the question of how we grow up to become the fully adult and 
self-sufficient rational animal that is the end toward which the nature of our species 
tends. This process of self-completion and all that it entails reveals the human per-
son to be a potential and not a fully actual being.
8.3.2  Aquinas and the Scholastics: The economic Realm 
as Space for Personal Development
Influenced by Aristotle, the scholars of medieval universities in Europe known as 
the Scholastics adopted a similar approach to the study of human action. The moral 
dimension of human behaviour served as a basis of what was later called scholastic 
economics.5 Most medieval writers who ventured into the discussion of economics 
saw it as a form of behaviour which like all others must be considered within the 
discussion of human beings as of God’s creation and, as such, morally or law-bound 
actors. Scholastic anthropology claims that persons are beings capable of moral 
(self-)rule, whose sense of duty is ‘an important but not the only determinant of 
their conduct’ (De-Juan and Monsalve 2006; Decock 2013; Langholm 1998).
Although economics was not yet acknowledged as an independent discipline, it 
formed a consistent body of doctrine according to which economic relations ought 
to be ruled, by the laws of distributive and commutative justice, always finally by 
the ‘law of charity’. The economic realm is just one among other spheres of human 
activity where learning of virtuous conduct takes place. The anthropology underly-
ing the scholastic paradigm in economics is not that of the homo economicus whose 
goal is the satisfaction of given preferences. Their famous doctrines of usury and 
just price are ultimately grounded in the vision of a morally responsible man whose 
5 According to Schumpeter, it was the ‘Scholastic doctors’ of the Middle Ages who deserve the title 
of founder of economics: „It is within their systems of moral theology and law that economics 
gained definite if not separate existence, and it is they who come nearer than does any other group 
to having been the ‘founders’ of scientific economics.” (Schumpeter 1954, 93). In Schumpeter’s 
view ‘the scholastics and the natural-law philosophers had worked out all the elements of’ eco-




will is thought to be autonomous, capable of creating its own laws, or at least ruling 
itself (De-Juan and Monsalve 2006). That is one way to speak of ‘free will’. But 
within the hierarchy of laws, the will remains subject to a plethora of heteronomous 
laws. Those laws include positive human laws, divine law, and natural law (Decock 
2013, 523). This vision of human nature implies the possibility to act contrary to 
right reason and to positive law. Nothing is pre-determined or „given” but has to be 
reasoned through and decided by each individual.
Among these Scholastics it was particularly Thomas Aquinas who, in 
Schumpeter’s view, contributed most to establishing the grounds of modern scien-
tific analysis (1954, 8). Summa Theologiae sketches a broad view of Thomas’s 
understanding of human being in which he further develops Aristotle’s insights con-
cerning moral agency. In Thomas’s vision, as in Aristotle, human action is teleologi-
cal or purposive, in that man’s goal is to achieve the virtuous life which realizes, so 
far as possible, one’s potential as a human being. The intellectual and moral virtues 
perfect the human intellect and appetite in proportion to human nature (ST Ia IIae., 
q. 62, art. 2).6 In Aquinas’s formulation, the human person is naturally ordered 
toward seeking the true and achieving the good through the operation of the intellect 
(reason) and the will, even as sin has corrupted this nature. Whether man seeks good 
or ill, there is a general orientation toward perceived goods. He does not choose 
what he knows to be fully bad. Whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect 
of good (ST I-II, q.1).
Being human, however, means that we can be very much mistaken in our judge-
ments and decisions. Thus, Aquinas’s approach, similarly to Aristotle’s, focuses on 
man’s imperfect knowledge of the self and his fundamental uncertainty with refer-
ence to what he wants and what he should value. For Aquinas, the telos of persons 
is grounded in self-consciousness and self-mastery. Man always strives for increas-
ingly more complete self-fulfilment: ‘all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, 
and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated above’ (ST 
I-II, q.1, art. 5). In order to become a good person, one needs to acquire the virtue 
of prudence, which is covered in Aquinas’s notion of ‘prudentia’: ST II-II q.47 aa 
1–7. Prudence enables us to reason well towards the choice of commitments, proj-
ects, and actions, and to apply general practical principles to concrete circumstances 
in order to choose rightly. Prudence involves both the choice of the end sought and 
the means to attain that end. It calls for reason rather than impulse; and takes coun-
sel from others in the selection process of ends and then of means to achieve the 
chosen end (Elmendorf 1892, 4). In the Summa, prudentia is described as superior 
to theoretical knowledge, for prudence perfects the cognitive faculty.
Aquinas’s conception of the person characterized by prudentia resembles 
Aristotle’s account of the virtuous person. For Aristotle, ‘the virtuous person per-
forms the right action in the right way at the right time on the right objects’ (Rorty 
1980, 380), and for Aquinas it is someone ‘really knowing what one is doing, being 
6 Unlike Aristotle, the ultimate goal is set beyond human nature in sharing in the divine nature 
which was described above as the beatific vision.
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aware of the circumstances and consequences of one’s actions, with the right con-
ception of the sort of action one is performing’ (Aquinas, question 61, articles 3 and 
4). In both accounts the source of action is the human himself. Life of virtue is the 
gold standard, the end toward which man is striving.
8.3.3  Moral Maturation in Adam Smith
Adam Smith may not be the most obvious thinker to be associated with the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. Yet, his thought is very much in line with the con-
cept of the human agent as a moral person developed by the two great philosophers. 
The sources of his moral enquiry, especially, go back to the ancient tradition of the 
Greeks and the Romans (Szulczewski 2015, 91). Smith’s essential premise, which 
he shared with the ancient thinkers, was that moral science could only proceed from 
a thorough understanding of human nature and human agency was the root of his 
economic understanding (Oakley 1994, ix). His understanding of man was much 
broader than the one that is often mistakenly ascribed to him today. Smith believed 
that many behavioural regularities can be explained better by an understanding of 
people’s attitude toward actions, rather than their valuation of final outcomes. He 
notes that many of our choices are ‘not so much founded upon [their] utility,’ but 
reflect primarily ‘the great, the noble, and the exalted property’ of the action or 
activity itself. Related to this, he thought that we should never investigate human 
nature as such, in a void, namely merely theoretically. Even if such an investigation 
were possible, it would prove disappointing, for it could teach us little about the 
origins of men’s attitudes. He, in a likewise manner to Aristotle and Aquinas, puts 
the practical above the theoretical in most things.
Smith did not accept the static view of man as coming into the world already 
fully equipped to make correct moral decisions. To him, such a conception of man 
neglects the everyday process by which moral decisions are actually arrived at. His 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS, henceforth), in particular, shows man’s devo-
tion to self-improvement. It accounts for the crucial process to which all people are 
subject, that ‘of moral and psychological development from the early stages of 
childhood to that of the mature moral agent’ (Brown 1994: 95; Montes 2008: 45). 
Indeed, Adam Smith’s TMS is devoted to the question of how people form moral 
sentiments. The Smithian individual agent forms his moral sentiments through an 
informal learning process that is realized in social interactions (Thoron 2016).
Smith posits in TMS and again in WN a common human ‘desire of bettering our 
condition’ (WN II.iii.28; TMS I.iii.2.i); and implies, though he nowhere states it 
explicitly, a broad notion of ‘betterment’, including ‘a moral kind that involves 
improving our character and has nothing to do with acquiring material goods’ 
(Fleischacker 2004, 63; see also Raphael and Macfie 1984, 9; Heyne 2008, 59–63; 
Griswold 1999, 130–136; and Otteson 2002, 196–197). The desire for self- 
improvement, both material and moral, which Smith takes to be natural for human 
beings, seems incompatible with the posited behaviour of the creature called 
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rational economic man. He saw virtue in one’s self-improvement, not only in mate-
rial but also, moral aspect. He says, ‘upon many occasions…
[what] prompts us to the practice of those divine virtues is not the love of our neighbour, it 
is not the love of mankind (…). It is a stronger love, a more powerful affection, which gen-
erally takes place upon such occasions; the love of what is honourable and noble, of the 
grandeur, and dignity, and superiority of our own characters [italics added].
It is not so much the calculation of potential gains, as the desire to do proper 
things, to do things that would meet the approval of a disinterested by-stander, the 
impartial spectator (Choi 1990, 293); God, even. Choi (1990, 294) posits, in a 
Smithian vein, that it is the awareness of the presence of others like oneself and 
moral judgments made with this awareness that make a person a human being. 
Knowledge of what constitutes the proper thing is not always obvious and often 
requires deliberation. In Smith this deliberation is supported by what he calls the 
impartial spectator: the hypothetical observer who passes positive or negative judg-
ments upon the actions of those around him, directed by virtuous considerations, 
whether of the intellectual or some other kind; an imaginary construction that indi-
viduals call upon as they evaluate their own sentiments and conduct. We endeavour 
to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator 
would examine it. The impartial spectator signifies one’s ability to distance oneself 
from his particular situation and subjective point of view, and to see oneself from a 
perspective that he can share with others. It also emphasizes the desire for approba-
tion as a key fact of the human condition.
Smith argues in TMS that it is not the love of praise and attention that motivates 
moral actions, but the love of praiseworthiness. Though we care about the opinions 
of others, we care much more about the opinions of the impartial spectator and want 
to avoid his disapprobation. The ‘man within the breast’ is thus often seen as the key 
to Smith’s account of the faculty of conscience:
The jurisdiction of the man without, is founded altogether in the desire of actual praise, and 
in the aversion to actual blame. The jurisdiction of the man within, is founded altogether in 
the desire of praise-worthiness, and in the aversion to blame-worthiness (TMS, III, i, 31–2).
In Storr’s phrasing, the impartial spectator is ‘the imaginary figure that each of 
us constructs to offer us moral guidance as we negotiate our lives’ (Storr 2013, 3, 
emphasis added). The use of the word ‘negotiate’ is of great importance here. Many 
of our decisions need judgment. Judgment, in turn, is an outcome of a particular 
type of dialogue we exercise with the impartial spectator as we negotiate various 
aspects of our lives, or – to put differently – as we try to determine what ends we 
ought to pursue.
The impartial spectator is both a guide as we experience the world and is affected 
by our experiences in the world. The refinement of the impartial spectator marks our 
maturation as agents. That is why, in practical reasoning, it is not assumed that we 
act from a well-defined base of knowledge but rather that this knowledge is con-
stantly in a process of formation, which in turn depends to a large extent on our 
experience—for instance, as to whether it is a more or less wise spectator. As an 
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outcome of a dialogic process, such judgment is ‘freely subscribed to and freely 
acted upon, and cannot be predetermined or rule-bound’.
Smith, like Aristotle, understands moral judgment as the exercise of ‘practical 
wisdom necessary for right actions in particular situations’ (Hanley 2009, 87). He 
discusses on a number of occasions how our knowledge of our own best course of 
action comes from our experience as opposed to solely abstract calculation. Smith’s 
moral agent is not someone who calculates choice based solely on a set of motiva-
tions. His capacity of calculation is imperfect, and his motivations are dynamic and 
constantly under formation. The inclinations to choose one concrete goal over 
another and the activity of evaluating others’ and one’s own behaviours are both 
formative processes for Smith, not initial assumptions. This can be seen in his 
extensive discussions of the formation of knowledge and the formation of desires, 
values, and interests.
Economic theory treats the formation process as an aside or an afterthought to 
the judgment about action, while for Smith it is the judgment itself that forms our 
objectives—meaning the whole process of judging—as it is also the means we take 
to realize them.
Whereas economists in the neoclassical tradition analyse choice under a full- 
information assumption (Levy 1995, 305), Smith’s theory of the impartial spectator 
indicates that any person’s preferences, values, and purposes are neither given nor 
stable. They are unknown fully at any one moment, but not ultimately unknowable. 
The epistemic limitation is a result of man’s limited self-experience. The eventual 
(partial) knowability is a result of careful and ongoing observation of one’s own 
moral life as if one were a third-party spectator. A critical mark of Smith’s theory is 
that man needs to learn to see his interests in their true perspective. Finding out what 
those interests are, however, is a process that economists are unable to capture if 
they assume given preferences. As Fleischacker (2004, 61, 63) notes, ‘[w]hen we 
ask after the ‘nature’ of human beings we are looking for what human beings ‘really’ 
want, beneath the surface trappings (…) Human nature always includes what people 
aspire to, for Smith; it is never reduced [as in the economist’s version of utilitarian-
ism] to the desires they merely happen to have.’
The view of the human agent that emerges from the above discussion of Aristotle, 
Thomas Aquinas, and Adam Smith is a picture of a human being directing himself 
in relation to his own good by practical reason (phronesis in the Greek, and the 
virtue of prudentia for Aquinas). When a person acts on the basis of practical wis-
dom it means his choices are embedded in an ongoing process of self-formation. 
His decisions shape his judgment of his capabilities and interests, which then inform 
his future decisions. He does not possess complete and accurate knowledge of him-
self and others, but he is constantly in a process of (self-)development. His wants 
and needs are not certain and given determinants of his actions, as they are in the 
mainstream economic assumptions. It is rather his actions which from his unique 




8.4  Towards a Better Explanation of Choice
Rational choice theory explains decisions and choice ‘as if’ they were brought 
about by rational economic agents. While successful in domains which do not need 
to take account of complexity of human choice (e.g. basic consumption decisions) 
this approach has significant costs for the study of less obvious decisions of the 
morally constituted person in the economic realm. One can go so far as to say that 
its limiting assumptions have deprived the human economic agent of almost every-
thing that could make it a person. It has denied the economic agent the ability to 
learn about what is good for him and to make value choices. The formal strictures 
of this theory make it impossible for it to capture an image of an evolving self, 
indicative of a conscious change in one’s values and preferences. In short, it has 
neglected his capacity of practical reason. For purposes of analytical rigor and pre-
dictive power, it has abstracted this capacity away, as if it were not there. Important 
aspects of human agency which are not conceivable in the rational choice frame-
work are left outside of the picture. Failing to take account of the nature of human 
ends it has seriously limited its descriptive and predictive capacity.
And yet, although the above analysed factors of human choice do not meet the 
strictures of economic rationality, they could nonetheless serve as important objects 
of economic analysis. For they inform many consumer, investment, and entrepre-
neurial decisions, as well as choices involved in our work relations and relationships 
with ourselves and the environment and other people. These situations call for deci-
sions which are not—or at least not exclusively—driven by instrumental means-end 
reasoning. They may be better characterized by the agent’s openness to unforeseen 
possibilities and learning. As the above necessarily sketchy accounts of the great 
pre-modern thinkers show, formation of ones ends – the key category in rational 
choice theory – is not possible without practical reasoning. This is particularly vis-
ible in problems of preference conflict, instability and uncertainty about one’s goals.
There are many examples of conflicts among preferences, and of preference 
change, that lead to behaviour that is very puzzling from the point of view of 
received economic theory. They show that richer and less rigid conceptions of 
agency are needed to account for the fact that a person may have not just a single set 
but competing sets of preferences; or even contradictory preferences or preference 
sets. Moreover, meta-preferences which rank the preference sets, and a person’s 
preferences, may oscillate between alternative states. Decision making based on 
practical wisdom rejects the notion that all alternatives can be compared on a single 
measure of utility. Rather, this process entails an exploration of the multiplicity of 
incommensurable values embedded within the available options.
Unlike the abstract homo economicus, persons have the capacity to form, revise, 
and change their preferences as they see fit.7 They can even have no preference at 
all! While the mainstream theory assumes complete and transitive preferences 
7 ‘Choice’, as John Dewey (2008, 96) put it, ‘signifies a capacity for deliberately changing 
preferences.’
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which implies that all aspects of a choice setting can be weighed off against each 
other and all alternatives can be ranked in terms of ‘betterness’, people can some-
times refuse to do this. Real-world persons often do not, cannot, or will not reach 
judgements about some things.
Likewise, the idea of rational economic choice is an inadequate representation of 
human choice in conditions of an unknown or not fully specified goal. Whereas 
rational choice theory paints a picture of a goal-oriented agent, guided by known 
and stable references, human decision making is not always based on a well-defined 
goal. As the above discussion shows, the moral person seeks to construct a good life 
for himself and those who depend on him guided by a vision of the good which he 
is open to revisit based on new experience. Through the exercise of practical reason, 
he develops and improves his vision of the good and the good life.
The process of self-formation and development of one’s idea of the good should 
be regarded as part of human moral agency. Obvious general examples are quitting 
an addiction or taking up a challenge to become physically fit. Moral human agent 
is someone who strives for self-betterment through conscious formation and change 
of preferences—meaning, constant refinement of the preferences, and the reasons 
for (continued) preferring of something or someone over other possibilities. Without 
enough experience or at least reflection about what the goal entails, we cannot pro-
vide an explicit description of how to arrive at it. We often choose from many imag-
ined futures and can rarely expect with certainty that what we choose will work out. 
Through open-ended involvement in the various practices of our life we learn to 
exercise a practical judgment, a judgment that becomes operative in practice but 
which we cannot always give a fully specified or systematic account of. We none-
theless act on it. It enables us to express what is valuable for us and to form our-
selves in accordance with what we find valuable.8
What makes persons distinct economic (and moral) agents is thus not to be found 
merely in the content or character or solidity of preferences, but rather in their insta-
bility and process of formation. Unlike nonhuman agents, humans possess a reflec-
tive capacity which enables them to form their preferences and make judgments 
about their preference orderings, as well as change these preferences as a result of a 
change in their values and purposes. In less formal language we can say that only 
human choice is preceded by attempts to sort out: (1) what is worth doing (choice 
of ends), and (2) what sort of person to be or become (as a distinct end). This shows 
that moral agency is not to be defined only by its capacity for altruistic or other-
regarding sentiments but also by one’s striving for self-betterment through a con-
scious formation and change of preferences in line with chosen ends. As such, the 
human agent (the person) is more complicated and less certain about his preferences 
than the traditionally-conceived economic agent. Such agent can better be portrayed 
not by more elaborate interpretations of what brings utility, but by accounting for 
the uncertainty and instability of his preferences.
8 Similar ideas are exercised by Charles Taylor (1985) in his notion of human identity, which is 
defined by our fundamental evaluations, that is articulations of what is worthy, more fulfilling, etc.; 
and Harry Frankfurt in his essay ‘The Importance of What We Care About’ (1982).
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This implies, however, the need to relax the two above-mentioned economic 
assumptions: (1) that preferences are given and (2) that they are stable. In fact, 
behavioural economists have also questioned these assumptions. Many aspects of 
human choice, which were traditionally regarded as insignificant in standard neo-
classical theory, have been gaining importance. This is challenging the prevailing 
view that there is no need for economists to delve into the complex issues determin-
ing human choice. It is now more readily admitted that better understanding of how 
people choose can help develop better ideas about what contributes to their welfare 
and design better policies. A more complex picture of agency has been inspiring 
departures from mainstream micro- and macroeconomic models.9 These new devel-
opments, however, stop short of connecting their conclusions to the moral nature of 
human agency. Not only does the formation of preferences depend strongly on the 
many psychological and cognitive factors that do not affect choice according to the 
rational choice approach (the framing-effect of the problem, the predetermined 
default rules which prefer certain selection decisions, the way risks are conveyed 
etc.), but it is also affected by conflicts of interests, values, wishes and desires. Clear 
and obvious long-term preferences, say, good health, can come into conflict with 
short-term preferences, such as yielding to temptation and having another cigarette. 
The value of caring for an old parent may be incompatible with long hours spent at 
work to maintain one’s family. Choices like this are not made easier by correcting 
for behavioural biases. They instead require practical reason and, indeed, 
moral wisdom.
Practically speaking, the strictures of rational choice theory also turn out to be 
particularly difficult for welfare policy. If policy advice is to be based on the promo-
tion of individual well-being, the advice that comes from assuming that people are 
well-behaved preference satisfiers cannot apply to a world where individuals fail to 
reveal well-behaved and well-defined preferences. Since real persons fail to behave 
as predicted by expected utility theory, because their choices reveal incoherent pref-
erences, their behaviour cannot be meaningfully represented by a utility function. 
Welfare economists thus lose evidence concerning that which promotes their wel-
fare, in all but the most basic or general preference sets (water, shelter, food, 
clothes…). In other words, they do not have an obvious way to determine what 
people’s ‘true’ preferences are, or – to be more precise – what they value (Hargreaves- 
Heap 2013).
Better understanding of how people choose and what constitutes their welfare 
requires that human agents are understood and explicitly treated as moral, and not 
merely economic, agents. For, as I tried to illustrate, moral considerations are insep-
arable aspects of economic activity. They co-determine the choice behaviour of eco-
nomic agents and thereby direct the outcome of economic activity. Abstracting them 
away or forcing them into the strictures of rational choice theory limits the extent to 
which many contexts of human choice can be meaningfully explained and trans-
lated into policy.
9 Cf. Simon (1957), De Grauwe (2012).
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The above discussion also shows that moral agency cannot be treated as an extra 
ingredient in the existing framework of economic explanation. Moral agency as 
understood in this paper is an element which challenges the very fundaments of the 
rational choice framework. People do not only care about what happens. They are 
not mere consequentialists. Driven by various non-instrumental considerations, 
they also care how and for what reason things happen. From the perspective of a 
moral agent a choice is rational if the chooser can acceptably answer the question 
‘Why did you make that choice? or ‘What is the value of your choice?’ In this per-
spective, inability to grasp and articulate the importance of various goods  – i.e. 
reasons – for one’s conduct is unreasonable, if not plain irrational.
It appears then that part of what it means to be rational involves also deciding 
about or defining one’s conception of the good and acting on it. Forming a rational 
response to one’s environment, rejecting preferences one cannot satisfy, or develop-
ing preferences that are in line with one’s principles, depends on one’s idea of the 
good. It depends on one’s values, which one learns and endorses or rejects over time 
while making choices. An important aspect of human agency is to be found in one’s 
pursuits of underdefined goals. Persons define themselves and their good (at least 
partially) through the exercise of this form of agency.
Even in decisions which to an outside observer may seem as primarily driven by 
reasons based on means-end calculation, people are often motivated by reasons 
which fall outside of this framework of instrumental reasoning. Consumption which 
is traditionally regarded by economists as a textbook case of means-ends thinking 
could instead be seen as an act of discovering one’s needs, one’s values, and even 
self-formation. Similarly, many entrepreneurial decisions which involve high levels 
of risk and creativity are difficult to explain ex ante merely as the entrepreneur’s 
motive of profit maximisation. If economists want to better understand how people 
form their preferences, outside of the most trivial contexts, they would benefit from 
a better understanding of the ‘non-economic springs of economic action’ 
(Hirschman 2013).
8.5  Conclusion
The moral character of human choice is inconvenient for the orthodox economic 
perspective. There is no place and no logic within this perspective for incomplete 
and changeable preferences, which in turn precludes any possibility to correctly 
understand choice. The neoclassical perspective on preferences remains agnostic 
about the reality of human values which inform their desires, wants and ultimately 
their choices.
One can wonder, however, whether economists really do not need criteria for 
distinguishing human individuals as distinct and independent beings, who do not 
dissolve into social aggregates and patterns. Is there really no use for economic 
theory to acknowledge that persons count because they are not reducible to eco-
nomic agents? That their choices also count as their own precisely because the free 
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will and self-formation cannot be reduced to instrumentally conceived eco-
nomic agency?
Pre-modern virtue ethics tradition and its account of the place of economic activ-
ity in a broader context of human moral life provides some valuable insights into 
how various elements constitutive of the human choice could be better integrated. 
While rational-choice account of human agency is of purely formal, instrumental 
and arguably value-free character, the notion of practical reason in the pre-modern 
tradition of Aristotle, Aquinas and Adam Smith, takes a distinctively normative 
question as its starting point. It typically asks, of a set of alternatives for action none 
of which has yet been performed, what one ought to do, or what it would be best to 
do. It is thus concerned not with matters of fact and their explanation, but with mat-
ters of value, of what it would be desirable to do. In practical reasoning, agents 
attempt to assess and weigh their reasons for action, the considerations that speak 
for and against alternative courses of action that are open to them. Part of what it 
means to be rational involves also deciding about or defining one’s conception of 
the good and acting on it. Insofar as these ‘hidden’ aspects of choice are important 
in the explanation of choice and the analysis of welfare, they should not be over-
looked in economics.
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Chapter 9
Between Individual and Collective 
Rationality
Anna Horodecka and Liudmyla Vozna
Abstract The paper raises the question of irreducibility of collective rationality to 
individual rationality. The irreducibility of collective rationality to individual ratio-
nality is explained by the phenomenon of complexity and complex character of 
human nature. Taking the complexity theory approach to the analysis of institutions, 
it discusses the question of dependency of individual rationality on collective ratio-
nality. It is asserted that collective rationality emerges not merely from the human 
capacity for rational reasoning but from a variety of other human capabilities which 
influence the formation and functioning of socioeconomic institutions. Institutions, 
in turn, are understood here to be a specific embodiment of collective rationality.
9.1  Introduction
The concept of rationality is one of the fundamental and most controversial ele-
ments of economic theory. Since the rationality assumption forms the basis of many, 
primarily mainstream, macroeconomic models, it influences macroeconomic pol-
icy. Thus theories of rationality can have far-reaching effects on economic reality.
Generally speaking, economic rationality is associated with optimisation and 
efficiency. In modern economics, the concept of rationality is primarily related to 
the neoclassical doctrine which focuses on the behaviour of individuals (consumers, 
firms) and assumes that their rational strategy consists in the maximization of their 
expected subjective utility. This is exactly a core of the mainstream theory of ratio-
nal choice, which is also associated with positivism, instrumentalism and method-
ological individualism. However, despite the popularity of the neoclassical approach, 
the concept of rationality has been approached from various angles and, in the lit-
erature, one can find various definitions and classifications of rationality. For exam-
ple, Herbert Simon (1955) made an important distinction between “substantive 
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rationality” and “procedural rationality”, paying special attention to the latter. Other 
authors distinguish between methodological and material (or between formal and 
practical) rationalities. In the analytical sense, the definition of rationality has two 
components: the first one concerns the rational choice of goals, and the second 
one – the means to realize the goals.1 In addition to that, some leading economists, 
notably Vernon Smith (2008), distinguish constructivist and ecological forms of 
rationality.
The list of other possible classifications can be continued. Since the economic 
system as a complex system consists of many different levels (e.g., micro-level, 
meso-level, macro-level), it makes sense to consider a specific hierarchy of different 
rationalities. These differences are determined by the goal pursued by a system 
under consideration, the level of a system (from individual to meta level), the time 
and space criteria. In this hierarchy, neoclassical rationality occupies only one of the 
places and, at the same time, can diverge from other types of rationality. For exam-
ple, imagine a community of people which in order to survive in the short-term, in 
accordance with neoclassical rationality, harvests a forest for immediate sale. 
However, in the long-term, deforestation can cause such changes in the ecosystem 
(such as the problem of floods), which can then endanger further existence of this 
community and the costs associated with these consequences far outweigh the ben-
efits realised from the harvesting. This example demonstrates both the contradiction 
between the short-term and long-term rationalities, and the inconsistency that is 
possible between individual and collective rationalities. The choice that seems to be 
rational from the individual point of view can be irrational from the standpoint of 
collective choice, and vice versa.
Using the simplistic understanding of rationality, we risk failing to explain the 
more complex phenomena such as, for example, the functioning of some fundamen-
tal social institutions, which are associated with collective rationality. The goal of 
the article is to demonstrate the irreducibility of collective rationality to individual 
rationality. Also, using the complexity theory approach, we raise the question of the 
dependency of individual rationality on collective rationality, i.e. we assert that the 
former is conditioned by the latter rather than vice versa. Alan Kirman, one of the 
leading specialists in complexity economics, makes a similar assumption when he 
writes that “it is the type of organization rather than the individual behavior that is 
central to achieving coordination. Once in place, the organizational structure, itself, 
coordinates individual activities and makes them consistent” (2010, 6).
One of the key problems addressed here concerns the question of the influence of 
human emotions on rational decision-making. For explaining collective rationality, 
if we start from individual rationality, which implies decision-making is based on a 
conscious (calculated) choice, we inevitably lose the emotional component of 
human behaviour. However, some human emotions (such as affection, confidence, 
curiosity, despair, fear, pride, empathy, trust, and others) play an important role in 
the formation of social values and the functioning of a number of social institutions. 
1 See, for example, Hogan and Marcelle (2017).
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Institutions, in turn, are understood here to be a specific embodiment of collective 
rationality. Therefore, it is assumed that collective rationality inevitably contains a 
component of human emotions, and the irreducibility of collective rationality to 
individual rationality is also explained by the constitutive factors of complexity 
determined by human nature.
9.2  The Problem of Irreducibility of Collective Rationality 
to Individual Rationality
One of the basic premises of rational choice theory is that aggregate social behav-
iour results from the behaviour of individual actors, each of whom makes their 
individual decisions. A central concept in this theory is the principle of transitivity 
and the aggregation of individual preferences as a mode to define a collective, social 
(rational) choice. The principle of transitivity is fundamental in the ordinal utility 
theory and it orders the preferences of an economic agent on an ordinal scale. It 
means that if a consumer (economic agent) deciding between any three goods (out-
comes, choice options) X, Y, and Z, prefers X to Y and Y to Z, he must prefer X to 
Z. This principle is considered to be an important feature of the rational behaviour 
of economic agent as the transitivity principle relates to the laws of logic.
Such a view of rationality is also strictly connected with the understanding of 
economics as a positivist science, i.e. free from subjective judgements and values. 
Researchers point out that early neoclassical economists “still had traces of the old 
honorable concern of the classical writers, like Adam Smith, for the well-being of 
society” (Walsh 2007), and it was Lionel Robbins who, in the 1930s, played an 
important role in the transformation of neoclassical economics into the science of 
instrumental rationality that is “value free” and related with a choice of (scarce) 
means for the reaching (alternative) purposes (ends) (Cedrini and Novarese 2014). 
Vivian Walsh (2007, 64), in particular, notes that this methodological shift occurred 
not without the influence of logical positivism, still popular at the time, and “the 
positivist claim that there was a sharp dichotomy between matters of fact (the 
domain of science) and values”.
Yet, by following the transitivity principle to determine collective choice we risk 
coming to paradoxical conclusions. In fact, the Arrow’s impossibility theorem, 
which considers voting systems, and the prisoner’s dilemma demonstrate the very 
problem of conversion of individual preferences into desirable community-wide 
acts of choice. As Amartya Sen remarks, internal consistency of choice “is essen-
tially confused, and there is no way of determining whether a choice function is 
consistent or not without referring to something external to choice behavior (such as 
objectives, values, or norms)” (2002, 122).
Also, in line with methodological individualism, choices made on the basis of 
individual rationality lead to the best possible allocation of resources, so they are the 
guarantors of systemic rationality understood as macroeconomic rationality. In 
9 Between Individual and Collective Rationality
142
other words, market outcomes, such as equilibrium or allocative efficiency are 
results of individual behaviour of agents who are rational maximisers of their utility 
(profits). In this vein, macroeconomic rationality is associated with the Pareto opti-
mum state, under which the situation of one of the market participants cannot be 
improved without worsening the situation of others.
However, this assertion is not supported by empirical data and, in particular, by 
experimental economics. For example, on the basis of laboratory experiments with 
the use of computer simulations, Shyam Sunder (2002) concluded that “weak form 
of individual rationality, far short of maximization, when combined with appropri-
ate market institutions, can be sufficient for the market outcomes to approach the 
predictions of the first fundamental theorem” (according to this theorem, under cer-
tain idealized conditions, any competitive equilibrium leads to a Pareto efficient 
allocation of resources), and that “markets can exhibit elements of rationality absent 
in economic agents”. (Rationality of markets relates here in particular to the effi-
ciency of markets, namely their ability to allocate the limited amounts of resources 
in a way that maximizes the satisfaction of consumers.)
Similarly, Alan Kirman challenges the approach, according to which “if we start 
with well-behaved individuals we will obtain well behaved aggregates” and “well 
behaved individuals have nicely structured behavior derived from their optimizing 
behavior” (Kirman 2010, 20). Using the example of the fish markets, he demon-
strates that the behavioural “regularity” is more apparent at the aggregate than at the 
individual level. In general, in his opinion, the relationship between the behaviour 
of the individual participants and the market as a whole is mediated by the way in 
which the market is organized, i.e. the way in which the market allocates resources 
depends on the type of market institution (Kirman 2010, 60–66).
9.3  The Bounded Rationality Versus the Variety 
of Human Nature
To explain the above-introduced problem of irreducibility, it is important to at least 
consider the following three questions. First, individuals are not rational in the neo-
classical sense. Second, even if individuals do not behave rationally in the neoclas-
sical sense, they can reach goals that are rational. Third, the rational behaviour of 
individuals can lead to irrational outcomes.
9.3.1  Individuals Are Not Rational in the Neoclassical Sense
One of the features of basic neoclassical models, such as the consumer behaviour 
models that use the indifference curves and budget lines (elaborated by F. Edgeworth, 
E. Slutsky, J. Hicks), is the implicit assumption about a consumer who has perfect 
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information. In other words, a consumer, maximizing utility and choosing a combi-
nation of the two goods (for example the cups of coffee and the pieces of cake), 
knows perfectly in advance the taste of these goods, his future pleasure from their 
consumption and so on. It seems plausible that, if a consumer, performs the same 
actions regularly, is devoid of the spirit of experimentation or (and) the ability to 
cognize the new, it is easier for him to comprehend his expected cumulative utility. 
However, if our consumer decides to sacrifice additional cups of coffee in the name 
of an additional unit of a product, which is absolutely new for him, he takes a very 
serious risk of disappointment. Thus, such models are actually static.
The assumption of perfect information is also implicitly linked to the assumption 
of the availability of time, sufficient to make the best decision. For example, in the 
case considered here, the consumer needs to have enough time to collect (obtain) 
the necessary information for making the optimal decision. Such a period of time 
can extend also into the past, forming sufficient experience for making decisions in 
the future. On the one hand, if the consumer makes a decision very quickly and does 
not have the necessary information at the same time, i.e. irrationally, he risks mak-
ing a choice which can be illustrated as a point remote from the point that corre-
sponds to the maximum utility (equilibrium point). On the other hand, if our 
consumer has an infinitely long time to exercise his best choice, he runs the risk of 
repeating the fate of the Buridan’s ass: failing to choose between two identical piles 
of hay, the poor animal eventually dies of hunger. Therefore, from the point of view 
of the dynamics and viability of the economic agent, it should be better for him to 
consume less utility but be at the right time than in an effort to maximize the utility 
lose it altogether.
The best-known criticism of the neoclassical concept of rationality came from 
behavioural economists especially from Herbert Simon whose new concept of 
bounded rationality refers to the limited human ability to process information 
(resulting, among others, from the lack of time, attention and ability to concentrate). 
In particular, Herbert Simon critically refers to the understanding of self-interest as 
the most important goal and to the way of understanding rationality as a choice of 
preferred alternatives of action by means of a system of values enabling assessment 
of the results of activities.2 His criticism refers to the realism of the assumption 
about full knowledge of a person about possible alternatives, as well as the physical 
possibility of his/her mind to process this information and the willingness to make 
such an assessment. For this reason, individual decision-making behaviour does not 
follow from a calculation of all variants and the selection of the optimal, but from 
the available values and criteria, which are considered by the subject as the basis for 
selection. The lack of realism of neoclassical assumptions manifests itself also in 
the fact that, for example, for a neoclassical rational man it would be rational to 
violate social rules (if it does not involve costs), but people often refrain from doing 
so. So, according to Herbert Simon, rationality of decision-making in the 
neoclassical sense is not possible. In place of neoclassical rationality, he proposes 
2 See, for example, Simon (1997).
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the concept of bounded rationality, which accounts for a rational choice that takes 
into account the cognitive limitations of both knowledge and cognitive capacity. 
Simon (1997) emphasizes the important role of habit, which allows for the eco-
nomical use of spiritual and mental efforts.
The view that “the economy is not just governed by rational actors” and “much 
economic activity is governed by animal spirits” (i.e. people have noneconomic 
motives), was already expressed by John Maynard Keynes in his The General 
Theory (1936). Referring to Keynes, George Akerlof and Robert Shiller, in their 
book Animal Spirits (Akerlof and Shiller 2009) have provided a detailed illustration 
of this idea. In particular, they demonstrate that, in making significant investment 
decisions, economic actors often don’t behave according to prescriptions of stan-
dard economic theory. The latter, in turn, asserts that, for making rational decisions, 
people consider all the options available to them, consider the outcomes of all these 
options and how advantageous each outcome would be, consider the probabilities of 
each of these options, and then they make a decision (Akerlof and Shiller 2009, 13). 
However, under conditions of uncertainty, it is impossible to define precisely those 
options and probabilities. So in reality people do not act rationally but act according 
to what they trust to be true (rational). This also means that the decisions of eco-
nomic actors depend largely on their beliefs and trust. Akerlof and Shiller empha-
sise the large role of confidence, for example, in the growth or decline of credit 
markets, and remark that the meaning of a term confidence goes beyond the rational 
and it is related with human feelings or, in other words, “animal spirits”.
9.3.2  The Behaviour That Seems Irrational Can Lead 
to Rational Results
Behavioural economists, such as e.g. Gerd Gigerenzer, Daniel Kahneman, Amos 
Tversky and many others, point to the role of techniques, different from logical 
reasoning, which help people to solve problems and make the best decisions quickly. 
They emphasize the role of effort and time which a person must devote to rational 
analysis. Mental activity is associated with a high-energy consumption (the brain 
absorbs the most energy), so people, aiming at minimizing energy expenditure, 
apply heuristics  – so-called “quick” thinking instead of logically analysing the 
problem (“slow” thinking), which claims less costs (calculated by time and effort).3 
Heuristic is a technique associated with a simplified way of thinking, a simple way 
to make a conclusion without resorting to mathematical calculations or scientific 
thinking. As Gerd Gigerenzer (2008, 20) underlines, “unlike statistical optimization 
procedures, heuristics do not try to optimize (i.e., find the best solution), but rather 
satisfice (i.e., find a good-enough solution)”; the models of heuristic cognition focus 
on situations in which people need to act fast. There are many heuristics, such as 
3 Kahneman (2012).
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e.g. a rule of thumb, trial and error method, “imitate the majority”, “imitate the suc-
cessful” and so on. Daniel Kahneman (2012) discusses particularly the availability 
heuristics, heuristics of representativeness (used in the situation of assessing state-
ments referring to probabilities) and heuristics of anchor and matching (it is used for 
the quantity evaluation). People use different heuristics depending on the situation 
and environment, and the same heuristic can be successful or not depending on the 
circumstances. In general, the use of heuristics can be explained by a diversity of 
human capabilities. As Gigerenzer notes, “without the evolved capacities, heuristics 
could not do their job”. Among other examples he mentions the human capacity for 
recognition memory (such as face, voice, and name recognition), the capacity to 
imitate and the evolved capacity for reciprocal altruism (2008, 25).
It can be seen that the heuristics method is connected with human abilities that 
go beyond the limits of conscious activity, and reveals the richness of human nature, 
an important part of which consists of emotions (sympathy, antipathy, affection, 
fear, confidence and so on). In particular, with regard to long-term rationality, the 
emotional part of human nature is sometimes capable to challenge the boundaries of 
individual rationality based on hedonistic understanding of maximization utility. As 
an illustration imagine a greedy man who tries to “row for himself,” i.e. to take more 
from other people than to give them. In the end, he risks losing friends and their 
possible support in case of need, etc. A rational person, who is capable of under-
standing the far-reaching consequences of his actions, can consciously be generous 
toward his friends (i.e. “invest” in his friends). These are two different motives for 
behaviour, but here it is possible to see how the specifically human needs and capac-
ities (the need for friendship, the ability to be generous and kind) may on the outside 
be compared to the behaviour of a man whose rationality extends over a long period 
of time.
In the same vein, we can perceive the relation of human beings to the natural 
environment. Aside from people who do not pollute the natural environment only 
because there are external (public) prohibitions or because of pure economic rea-
sons (in accordance with a logic of economic imperialists), there are people who do 
not pollute and do not damage nature because they feel affection for it and regard it 
as a living being. Therefore, the human love of nature contributes to the long-term 
preservation of the natural habitat, much like the rational actions based on the com-
plex mathematical calculation of the future consequences of the present damage of 
nature would.
There are many other examples like this, e.g. in the realm of education and the 
investment in human capital, the creation of family, pension contributions, etc. But 
all of them in one way or another demonstrate that the bounded rationality and 
bounded human nature (in the sense of poverty of a human nature) converge at a 
certain point. In other words, the diversity of human nature compensates the limita-
tions of human mind related to the lack of information and the inability to make 
long-term calculations. It seems in fact that to some extent, the rational and emo-
tional parts of human nature substitute and enhance each other.
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The Rational Behaviour of Individuals Can Lead to Irrational Outcomes In their 
book mentioned above, Akerlof and Shiller describe situations when, as it happened 
before the Recession of 2001 and the Great Recession of 2007–2008, individuals in 
financial markets behaved in accordance with the theory of rational choice, as they 
were following their own self-interests (2009, 35). However, since they invested in 
risky financial assets, their “rationality” did not lead to a macroeconomic equilib-
rium, but to speculative bubbles and eventually to a financial crisis. Therefore, in the 
end, their behaviour was not rational from the perspective of the economy as whole, 
and eventually from the perspective of the “rational” investors themselves.
9.4  Information, Complexity and the Principle of Emergence
Is a donkey rational, going after the carrot which is hanging on a stick in front of his 
muzzle? Having seen a carrot, a donkey theoretically can have a reason to take a 
step toward it. It can theoretically take a few more steps. We cannot call irrational 
the first steps of the animal, because the donkey is driven by hope, optimism and the 
absence of experience. If the donkey is stubborn in its hope, then we can call him 
the Donkey. The general conclusion of this example: the economic subject behaves 
irrationally, when he does not use (he does not try to use) accumulated experience. 
In other words, he does not accumulate information (his information resource equals 
zero), does not use it, i.e. does not learn and is characterized by (perfect) ignorance. 
In this example, the problem of bounded rationality, as it has been formulated by 
Simon, is not so much the problem of limited information (the static problem) but it 
must be connected with the problem of accumulation of information and the process 
of learning (dynamic context).
Accumulation (conservation and transmission) of information is a characteristic 
of complex systems. Complexity can also be defined by other considerations, 
including those of time and space. The economic system with a shorter lifetime is 
simpler in comparison with a relevant system with a longer lifetime. Thus, rational-
ity associated with a short time utility maximization must be characterized as atom-
istic and also must be a characteristic of a very simple (socioeconomic) system. 
Since the length of time in question is connected with complexity, it is not acciden-
tal that, for example, in experimental economics the results for one-shot games 
(compare them with a short-term system) differ from results for repeated games 
(compare them with a more complex long-time system). Namely, according to the 
principal findings of experimental economics, in repeated personal, social, and eco-
nomic exchange, as studied in two-person games, cooperation exceeds the predic-
tion of traditional game theory (Smith 2008). In light of the foregoing, since a 
socioeconomic system has a high level of complexity and, correspondingly, of 
diversity and heterogeneity, one of possible answers on the question about irreduc-
ibility of macro (systemic) rationality toward individual one, may lie in the principle 
of emergence. The latter, in turn, means that “the whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts”, i.e. that a complex system as an entity demonstrates properties that are 
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absent in the constituents of the system, due to interactions among these constitu-
ent parts.
Furthermore, assuming the connection between rationality and information abil-
ity of a system, and also considering a bigger information ability of a more complex 
system, we can suppose that individual rationality is determined by collective ratio-
nality rather than a system (collective) rationality is being determined by the indi-
vidual one. In general, it is consonant with the fact that a human as a reasonable 
being is possible only as a product of society (“social animal”). As Friedrich Hayek 
wrote, “[The] interaction of individuals, possessing different knowledge and differ-
ent views, is what constitutes the life of thought. The growth of reason is a social 
process based on the existence of such differences” (Hodgson 2015, 292).
It is also consonant with the thesis (the result of research) that biological species 
with a high level of cooperation have a greater propensity to learn, adapt, survive, 
and, in general, to evolutionary development. The researchers point out that the 
cultural evolutionary process depends crucially on the size and interconnectedness 
of our populations and social networks; it is the ability to freely exchange informa-
tion that accelerates adaptive cultural evolution, and creates innovation, and, at the 
population level, it is much better to be social than to be smart (Henrich 2015).
In other words, among other things, the rationality of individuals depends on 
their ability to learn from each other and from experience (to use accumulated infor-
mation). Such a view seems to be similar to the approach of evolutionary and com-
plexity economics. In particular, Alan Kirman remarks that, in markets, “the habits 
and relationships that people have developed over time seem to correspond much 
more to things learnt by the force of experience rather than to conscious calcula-
tion”, and an attribution of rationality of the agents, when they are electing a strat-
egy, is that “they are more likely to do what has proved to be successful in the past” 
(2010, 92, 85).
The inspiring examples of the superiority of collective rationality over individual 
rationality are given by natural sciences, in particular by behavioural ecology. For 
example, according to the research of Susan Edwards and Stephen Pratt, ant colo-
nies can avoid irrational changes in preference that can be shown by individual 
animals and humans (Williams 2009). Edward and Pratt tested for irrationality in 
colonies of Temnothorax ants choosing between two nest sites that varied in attri-
butes, such that neither nest site was clearly superior. In similar situations, individ-
ual animals show irrational changes in preference when a third relatively unattractive 
option is introduced. These societies act as unitary decision-makers, able to jointly 
select a single travel direction, foraging location or nest site from many options. 
Detailed analysis of this species has shown how consensus depends on a minority of 
active ants that scout for potential homes and assess their quality. Problem solving 
by insect societies relies on highly decentralized information processing. This partly 
reflects cognitive and information-processing constraints: individual insects cannot 
handle these problems alone, and colonies lack the hierarchical structures that might 
foster centralized decision-making. The results of this study support another advan-
tage: the filtering out of systemic errors that would otherwise arise from the cogni-
tive limitations of individual animals.
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The example with ants echoes Hayek’s idea cited by a number of well-known 
economists4 according to whom the information in the economy remains dispersed 
and is never brought together into signals available to everyone:
The problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the 
knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or 
integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory 
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess”. “The whole acts as one market, not 
because any of its members survey the whole field, but because their limited individual 
fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that through many intermediaries the relevant infor-
mation is communicated to all (1945, 519; 526).
One of the main features of a complex system is diversity, which, in turn, is 
related with information capability of a system. So, first, according to the informa-
tion theory, the homogeneous structure is characterized by zero information. 
Second, according to W. Ross Ashby’s law of requisite variety, to be able to resist 
variable unpredictable impacts of the external environment and thus to be con-
served, the open system must have the requisite variety and complexity of its inter-
nal structure; only variety absorbs variety.
To sum up, on the one hand, if a social system consists primarily of “atoms” (i.e. 
selfish maximisers), its collective rationality is more reducible to atomistic rational-
ity and, at the same time, such a system is more mechanistic, very vulnerable to 
external factors (sources of energy), and less enduring. On the other hand, in the 
case of a weak reducibility (or irreducibility) of systemic rationality to individual 
one, the system under consideration is more complex, it is characterized by more 
information capacity and diversity, and is more enduring.
9.5  Complexity and Institutions: Institutions 
as the Embodiment of Collective Rationality
An example of the influence of collective rationality on individual rationality can be 
the role that is played by institutions and norms. After all, in socioeconomic sys-
tems, it is institutions and culture that fulfil the function of preservation and conser-
vation of information, i.e. they serve as the fundamental carriers and transmitters of 
information. Just as a human body “knows” how to function due to the information 
contained at the level of genes (genetic code), human beings often know what to do 
because they follow the norms and rules established in a society.
The link between institutions and information is emphasized by a number of 
prominent economists. For example, in the opinion of Douglass North (1991), insti-
tutions are formed to reduce uncertainty in human exchange with the help of struc-
turing everyday life; they serve as indicators for human interactions; under 
conditions of incomplete information and imperfect computing capabilities, 
4 See, for example, Hodgson (2015, 292), Kirman (2010, 12), Smith (2008).
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(institutional) constraints reduce costs of human interaction in comparison with the 
absence of institutions; in a world of instrumental rationality and complete informa-
tion institutions are unnecessary. Also Geoffrey Hodgson (1988) points to the infor-
mative role of institutions and routines, in particular, when he writes that institutions 
really create and broadly disseminate additional information already by the very 
fact of their existence.
To better understand how institutions and rules predetermine the individual ratio-
nality, let us consider the following thought experiment. Imagine a magical external 
observer who watches people crossing the road. Let us also assume that he does not 
see the traffic lights (and does not know about their existence). And assume that 
there are no violators of the traffic rules. Let us consider the two following scenar-
ios: first, when the traffic light works and, the second, when the traffic light does not 
work. So, in the first case, our observer can see the perfect order and think about 
perfect rationality of the both pedestrians and drivers: the pedestrians are rational, 
because they cross the road when the cars stand; the drivers are rational, because 
they stop when pedestrians cross the road. In the second case, however, the picture 
changes and becomes more chaotic: people can cross the street even when vehicles 
are moving; the cars can continue to drive even when people are crossing the road. 
Therefore, our magical observer can conclude that pedestrians as well as drivers 
became less rational. Is it really the case? In their own eyes, the pedestrians con-
served both: a goal (end) – to cross a road, and a means – a wish to conserve their 
lives avoiding cars. The drivers conserved their goal to continue their way and the 
movement, avoiding pedestrians. In other words, their individual rationality did not 
change (or changed slightly). But something happened with the general system of 
rules, and the participants of the process under consideration were disoriented.
This thought experiment demonstrates, first, that individual rationality is not 
identical with collective rationality, and, second, that rationality of individual 
behaviour depends on the system of rules in a society. In other words, we can take 
pedestrians and drivers to represent economic actors, and a traffic light can be 
thought a representative of institutions, rules and routines dominating in the system 
under consideration. But, as Richard Langlois (1998) remarks, “economic choice as 
we normally think of it can happen only in a stable and predictable world in which 
most of the cognitive load is being carried by rules and routines”. So the change or 
the damage of old institutions and rules influence the character of individual choice, 
which under conditions of growing uncertainty seems to become less rational.
It is a commonplace fact that culture, norms and institutions influence, for exam-
ple, the tastes and, thus, decisions of consumers. Similarly, the institutional environ-
ment influences investment decisions. It is noteworthy that Akerlof and Shiller, 
pointing out the weak sides of the conventional theories of saving (which are con-
structed around the assumption about individual rationality), remark that “saving is 
largely cued by different institutional and mental frames” (2009, 123) and, in par-
ticular, give examples of the big differences in savings between China and United 
States, which are connected to institutional and cultural differences.
Actually, the phenomenon of individual rationality under the influence of the 
institutional environment is described by the concept of ecological rationality. The 
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term of ecological rationality was coined by Gerd Gigerenzer (2008) and it is also 
used by Vernon Smith, the main creator of experimental economics, who considers 
that there are two types of rationality – constructivist and ecological, which coexist 
and complement each other. The concept of constructivist rationality is associated 
with the conscious deductive process of human reason, and the use of reason to 
deliberately create rules of action, and to create human socioeconomic institutions. 
Exactly this type of rationality is close to the understanding of rationality by neo-
classical economics. The ecological rationality, in turn, is associated with intelli-
gence embodied in the rules, norms and institutions of our cultural and biological 
heritage that are created from human interactions, but not by deliberate human 
design. In particular, one of the principal findings of experimental economics is that, 
with repeated experience in a variety of market institutions, impersonal exchange in 
markets converges to the equilibrium states implied by economic theory, even under 
information conditions far weaker than specified in theory (Smith 2008).
Thus, based on the foregoing, the question arises about conceptualizing institu-
tions as the embodiment of collective rationality (or irrationality), which, in turn, 
affects individual rationality. With that we arrive at a hypothesis identical with Alan 
Kirman’s assumption, namely that “it is the type of organization rather than the 
individual behaviour that is central to achieving coordination. Once in place, the 
organizational structure, itself, coordinates individual activities and makes them 
consistent” (2010, 6). In other words, in the interrelationship between individual 
and collective rationality, we have to start not from individual rationality in its neo-
classical meaning, but vice versa.
9.6  Institutions and Human Emotions
Institutions are not only the product of constructivist rationality. As a form of human 
interactions, alongside with other factors, they can either build on certain human 
emotions or exploit those emotions, which, in turn, provide (or promote) human 
interactions. In other words, suppose that one of the most important components, 
which is built into collective rationality, but is excluded by individual rationality in 
its neoclassical understanding, is the emotional part of human nature.
In contrast to the selfish utility-maximizing model of an individual in mainstream 
economics, representatives of economic heterodoxy (such as e.g. evolutionary and 
anthropological economics) point to the altruistic and cooperative features of human 
nature, which are due both to genetic and cultural human evolution, and which are 
important for survival of the individual and the social groups (Hodgson 2015, 
68–69). They emphasise the role of emotions for our social existence and note that 
“in a complex culture, emotionally empowered rules can help enhance notions of 
justice and morality”. In particular, Geoffrey Hodgson notes that these features of 
human nature such as emotional capacities evolved by natural selection are “par-
ticularly important for the functioning of law and the state” (Hodgson 2015, 72–73).
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Unlike representatives of economic imperialism who expand the principle of 
individual economic rationality on other, non-market, human relationships and 
attempt to present the altruistic and cooperative behaviour of human beings in the 
light of the logic of homo economicus,5 i.e. treatise altruism as another form of self- 
interest,6 the supporters of the complexity approach argue that both motivations for 
self-interest and generosity coexist, as obligation coexists with freedom (Cedrini 
and Novarese 2014).
Indeed, the fundamental socioeconomic and political institutions, such as, for 
example, institutions of democracy and market, rely both on the constructivist indi-
vidual rationality and the emotional component of human nature related with non- 
selfish behaviour. For example, the capability of human beings to trust in others is 
one of the fundamentals of market transactions. According to different researches, 
this capability played a significant role in the human evolution, as it helped human 
beings to coexist together and to use advantages of cooperation and labour division. 
Thus, although markets are traditionally associated with competition and the search 
for personal gain, the characteristics of human nature such as adherence to moral 
principles and capability to trust also play an important role in securing the func-
tioning of markets. In particular, Vernon Smith (2008), referring to the ideas of 
Adam Smith and his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), points to the fact of depen-
dency of markets on human virtues and notes that otherwise the costs of monitoring 
and enforcement would become unbearable.
In their discussion of “animal spirits”, alongside with confidence Robert Shiller 
and George Akerlof, among others, pay much attention to such human feelings as 
fairness and faith in stories. In particular, they note with irony that though some 
textbooks “do mention fairness as a motive, they still demote it to end-of-chapter, 
back-of-the-book status”, and “it is reserved for those sections that student know 
they can skip when studying for the exam” (2009, 20). Such little attention to fair-
ness seems paradoxical if we are to take into account, for example, what place 
Adam Smith devoted to considering “the sense of justice” in his The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments and that, in particular, he concluded:
Beneficence is an ornament that makes the building more beautiful, not the foundation that 
holds it up; so it’s good that it should be recommended, but it doesn’t have to be imposed. 
In contrast with that, justice is the main pillar that holds up the entire building. If it is 
removed, the whole of human society must in a moment crumble into atoms (Smith 1759).7
To sum up, not only a human capacity of rational reasoning but a variety (com-
plexity) of human nature in general, including its emotional part, has the impact on 
collective rationality since it influences the formation and functioning of socioeco-
nomic institutions, whereas the latter, as it was demonstrated above, should be con-
sidered as a specific embodiment (or accumulators) of collective rationality. Thus, it 
makes sense to think of some key concepts and institutions of a market economy, 
5 See, for example, Becker (1974).
6 The critique of this approach see, for example, in Cedrini and Novarese (2014).
7 See Part II, Section 2, Chap. 3.
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which are traditionally connected with neoclassical rationality, from the point of 
view of emotions embedded in these institutions.
9.7  The Institution of Innovative Entrepreneurship
Without taking into account the complexity of human nature, it is impossible, in 
particular, to explain adequately the phenomenon of innovative entrepreneurship as 
a driving force of economic development (in the understanding of Josef Schumpeter 
(2017)). For example, according to William Baumol,“the efforts of entrepreneurs 
are reallocated by shifts in the sectors of the economy and the lines of activity where 
profit seems most easily to be earned” (1993, 13). In our opinion, this is an impor-
tant thesis that explains the intersectoral capital flows, and it is a financial investor 
who is highly sensible to profits (if to compare him with economic actors in the 
so-called real sector of economy). So, it is one of the basic motives for the financial 
capitalist (we use this controversial term here for convenience). As his task is 
“money making”, he is (at least theoretically) indifferent about what to invest money 
as long as it is profitable. In other words, he is indifferent whether to invest money 
in the production of computers or in the production of slippers, or in financial specu-
lations. Here we do not deny the importance of the financial investor in entrepre-
neurial activity, mindful of Schumpeter’s thesis about the connection between the 
capital market and the development of the economy. But is Baumol’s thesis true for 
the Schumpeterian entrepreneur-innovator who drives technological progress?
We dare suppose that the motivation of the great entrepreneur-innovators is much 
more complex, and the phenomenon of entrepreneurship cannot be explained exclu-
sively by “easiness of the profit earning” and (or) profit maximization principle. For 
many of these personages we must acknowledge the combinative role of rationality 
and emotions (as e.g. a propensity to risk in the part not connected with mathemati-
cal calculations of probabilistic outcomes). For example, Henry Ford who undoubt-
edly was one of the greatest entrepreneurs in the industrial age said that “the highest 
use of capital is not to make more money, but to make money to do more for the 
betterment of life”, and that “a business that makes nothing but money is a poor 
business”. Steve Jobs, whose name is associated with the computer revolution, said: 
“Being the richest man in the cemetery doesn’t matter to me. Going to bed at night 
saying we’ve done something wonderful, that’s what matters to me”; “Your work is 
going to fill a large part of your life, and the only way to be truly satisfied is to do 
what you believe is great work. And the only way to do great work is to love what 
you do”. He also acknowledged: “I have a great respect for incremental improve-
ment, and I’ve done that sort of thing in my life, but I’ve always been attracted to the 
more revolutionary changes. I don’t know why. Because they’re harder. They’re 
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much more stressful emotionally. And you usually go through a period where every-
body tells you that you’ve completely failed”.8
It is noteworthy that Richard Langlois, when considering the question of ratio-
nality in relation to the entrepreneur-innovator who is dealing with novel situations 
(i.e. makes decisions in conditions of uncertainty), quotes Schumpeter’s words: 
“Here the success of everything depends on intuition, the capacity of seeing things 
in a way which afterwards proves to be true, even though it cannot be established at 
the moment, and of grasping the essential fact, discarding the unessential, even 
though one can give no account of the principles by which this is done”.9
In their Animal Spirits, George Akerlof and Robert Shiller also note that “the 
future of any country is in the hands of the business-people who decide on invest-
ments, and it is in large measure dependent on their psychology”; “business – at 
least successful business  – thrives on excitement of creating the future” (2009, 
143–144).
9.8  The Prisoner’s Dilemma, the “Shadow of the Future” 
and Institutionalization of Emotions
The important question concerns the issue about the neoclassical type of individual 
rationality in its relation with socioeconomic institutions. If we start moving from 
micro rationality in the neoclassical sense, we risk concluding with the impossibil-
ity of cooperation and the viability of social institutions. One of the best known 
examples is the prisoner’s dilemma, since it illustrates that individually rational 
behaviour does not necessarily lead to a socially optimal outcome.
The prisoner’s dilemma, the originators of which are Merrill Flood, Melvin 
Dresher and Albert William Tucker,10 is a standard example of a game analysed in 
game theory. It shows why two completely rational individuals might not cooperate, 
even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so. Imagine that two members 
of a criminal gang – A (I) and B (II) – are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is 
in solitary confinement with no means of communicating with the other. Each pris-
oner is given the opportunity either to betray the other by testifying that the other 
committed the crime (‘defecting strategy’), or to cooperate with the other by remain-
ing silent. The offer is: if A and B each betray the other, each of them serves 2 years 
in prison; if A betrays B but B remains silent, A will be set free and B will serve 
3 years in prison (and vice versa); if A and B both remain silent, both of them will 
only serve 1 year in prison (on the lesser charge):
8 https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes
9 Schumpeter (1934/2017); Langlois (1998).
10 See, for example, Tucker (1983).




I Cooperation (1, 1) (3, 0)
Defection (0, 3) (2, 2)
This hypothetical scenario demonstrates that a choice to betray is a dominant 
strategy because defection always results in a better payoff than cooperation regard-
less of the other player’s choice. Mutual defection is the only strong Nash equilib-
rium in the game (i.e. the only outcome from which each player could only do worse 
by unilaterally changing strategy). The dilemma, then, is that mutual cooperation 
yields a better outcome than mutual defection but is not the rational outcome 
because the choice to cooperate, from a self-interested perspective, is irrational.
In fact, the prisoner’s dilemma deals with the perfectly atomistic approach to 
rationality as it ignores institutional environment and regards two prisoners who 
are members of the same criminal gang in a way that the fact of existence of this 
criminal gang does not influence the choice of the prisoners, and they do not have 
a fear of punishment from other members of this gang. Such rationality resembles 
rather the reflexive reaction of an animal on a piece of food in front of its muzzle, 
but not a work of human mind and reasoning. Is it not the case that the almighty 
mind of individual rationality, implying unlimited knowledge and possession of 
information, turns out to be only a primitive reflex of the animality greedy to the 
pleasures?
Moreover, in a such a type of interaction (a game), the assumption that each 
player is self-interested and always chooses the largest of two immediate payoffs for 
himself, strangely resembles the principle of entropy increase: if we consider the 
evolution of an isolated system, this unstable system left on its own will be destroyed, 
gradually converting into more probable and stable states; at the same time both 
probability and entropy are growing (Brillouin 1964). Since entropy is associated 
with a disorder in a system, the above-mentioned analogy inspires us to doubt the 
rationality as it is presented by neoclassical economics, and to think about rational-
ity in a wider context, namely in the terms of the process of ordering and system 
complexity.
Also, the prisoner’s dilemma does not presume emotional affection and trust 
(which can counteract the defective strategy) between persons because it does not 
take into account their past interaction, and also assumes that two individuals are 
destined never to meet again. In this situation, “no matter what the other does, the 
selfish choice of defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation” (Axelrod and 
Hamilton 1981, 1391). In their seminal article The Evolution of Cooperation, Robert 
Axelrod and William Hamilton (1981) note that, in many biological settings, the 
same two individuals may meet more than once. According to their model, probabil-
ity of cooperation (correspondingly, probability of a defection strategy, but in oppo-
site direction) depends on “the history of interaction so far” and the probability of 
the event, that after current interaction the same two individuals (players) will meet 
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again. The latter is also expressed as “the shadow of the future” that must be long; 
no player should know when the game will end (Axelrod 1984).
For evolution of cooperation it is very important that “an individual must not be 
able to get away with defecting without the other individual being able to retaliate 
effectively”; for this it is necessary that “the defecting individual must not be lost in 
an anonymous sea of others”. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) note that higher organ-
isms avoid this problem by their well-developed ability to recognize many different 
individuals of other species (they have a more complex memory, more complex 
processing of information; in humans, a better ability to distinguish between differ-
ent individuals is largely based on the recognition of faces).
Based on game theory and the ideas of Robert Axelrod, it could be interesting to 
conceive of some institutions from the point of view of their role in the formation 
and support of “the shadow of the future” and, thus, promoting cooperative (non- 
defective) behaviour. For example, it can be the institution of church, i.e. the insti-
tutionalization of those human emotions and feelings, which are connected with the 
fear of death, faith in God (gods), faith in the afterlife, fear of punishment for sins 
(e.g. faith in karma). In other words, the church-supported faith in the afterlife and 
punishments from God, prolonging the “the shadow of the future”, could facilitate 
the evolution of social cooperation; and this is one of the most obvious examples of 
how emotions are built into institutions, forming collective rationality (or 
irrationality).
9.9  Concluding Remarks
Rationality relates to information (knowledge), its accumulation and use. Thus, 
rationality is a characteristic of the complex, primary living systems. A feature of 
complex (living) systems is an accumulation of (free) energy and information, so 
the fundamental characteristic of rationality is to prevent the process of disordering 
and to the growth of entropy in a system. In this sense, rationality is an action (phe-
nomenon or feature) that is intended to counteract the entropy processes and the 
growth of chaos in the system, and, thus, has similar functions to institutions, as the 
goal of both should be organization in a relevant system. In turn, neoclassical ratio-
nality in its connection with the idea of optimality and efficiency must be regarded 
as a particular case of this general anti-entropic foundation of rationality.
In the process of production of collective information, not only the human capac-
ity to reason but also other human abilities such as risk appetite and the search for 
the new are involved, since they increment collective experience. Not only self- 
interested calculations of the future outcomes, but also human emotions such as 
feelings of affection, confidence, and fairness play an important role in collective 
coexistence and thus, influence social interactions which adopt the form of different 
institutions, and influence the formation and character of collective rationality. 
Collective rationality is embodied in social institutions and cannot be reduced to 
individual rationality in its narrow neoclassical meaning.
9 Between Individual and Collective Rationality
156
According to modern social psychology and neuropsychology, decisions based 
on emotions differ from decisions based on reason, but they help to support macro- 
rationality as they allow us to consider the interests of others in our decisions. 
So-called economic imperialism which extends the principle of individual eco-
nomic rationality to other human relationships, not connected directly with eco-
nomic activity, ignores the complexity of human nature, the role of human emotions 
and altruism, and overvalues the calculating capacities of the human brain. The 
emergence and functioning of many important socioeconomic institutions cannot be 
explained by narrowly selfish understanding of individual rationality.
A person is able to act both selfishly and altruistically and the way in which he/
she will eventually act depends on the environment. A society which has much more 
information than an individual provides specific values that then become criteria for 
the future decisions of individuals. Political processes, like democracy sustained by 
free media, help the society to distinguish crucial values and to find and define the 
problems that the given society wants to solve. In its turn, the realized and expressed 
‘will’ of a society takes a form of relevant institutions which then not only provide 
the criteria of ‘be rational’ and efficient but also have instruments to prevent or 
enforce that society to act according to these criteria.
In this sense, if the existing institutions favour altruism and not only egoism, 
there will be much more space and opportunities for individuals to develop their 
altruistic traits, especially if altruistic behaviour is considered by a society as ratio-
nal. The neoliberal ideology, through its formal and non-formal institutions, expands 
the conviction that altruistic behaviour is not rational. At the same time, behavioural 
studies and social psychology open the new view, namely that altruism can pay off 
and in the end be a rational strategy. Societies with developed democracies seemed 
to have learned that diversity allows them to act more rationally as the whole and 
instil the values of the whole in individuals through relevant institutions. Diversity 
allows the society to minimize risks in an insecure environment and combat the 
challenges with which we have to deal.
Human greed and human generosity, egoism and altruism, reason and emotional-
ity are embedded in different activities that can equally be important for the exis-
tence of human society as a whole. However, the prevalence of the sole characteristic, 
pushing out all the others, leads, in Ortega y Gasset’s words, to pernicious homoge-
neity. So, starting from a narrow self-interest individualism, positivism and short- 
termism, we risk getting the “one-dimensional man” (the term used by Herbert 
Marcuse) who similarly to José Ortega y Gasset’s “mass man” (Ortega y Gasset 
1930), is capable of destroying the human civilization, including the intelligence 
that is the basis of human rationality.
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Abstract It is almost taken for granted among economists that the ultimate goal of 
public policy is to provide society with more “welfare”, and the concept of welfare 
as well as the general strategy how to improve it is roughly the subject of studies of 
normative economics.
The naturalisation of normative economics is an attempt to analyse the “ultimate 
goal of public policy” from the perspective of human cultural evolution. The “ulti-
mate goal” is one of the “cultural variants” which may be subject to Darwinian 
analysis and may or may not be adaptive in given circumstances. The most impor-
tant problem which is posed here is whether such analysis could be helpful in estab-
lishing that “ultimate goal” and thus to contribute to normative economics and 
resolve the “normative problem” (as it is rephrased in the philosophy of law).
Three fundamental issues which seem to constitute the strong limits of the natu-
ralization of the normative problem are highlighted:
 1. Naturalistic ontology does not overcome the “naturalistic fallacy” indicated by 
Hume and Moore.
 2. The epistemological perspectives in the naturalistic accounts are confused. 
Different normative postulates may be formulated from the individual perspec-
tive and from the perspective of the respective group, while the Darwinian analy-
sis seems to privilege the population.
 3. The genetic algorithm with endogenous fitness function seems to be non- 
susceptible to “mathematical close-up”. Even if we know the initial normative 
order, there are limits to finding a shortcut in order to predict the future value of 
the fitness function. In other words, the predictability of the future social order is 
fundamentally restricted.
M. Gorazda (*) 




Daniel Hausman (Hausman et al. 2017) in his recently published interview gave the 
following answer to the question about the ultimate goal of public policy:
What is often said, which I think perhaps is justifiable, but not very helpful, is that a central 
goal of a government should be to promote the general welfare or general wellbeing. The 
reason I don’t think that it is very helpful is that I don’t think we have a good grip on what 
general wellbeing is.
This response perfectly reflects economists’ first and spontaneous intuition of 
what is going on in normative economics. It is about the general wellbeing, and the 
main problem to be resolved is what it means.
Alfred Pigou, the indisputable father of welfare economics, was of a similar 
opinion. Although he did not see economics as a normative science, he claimed that 
it is “knowledge for the healing that knowledge may help to bring” and the most 
important task for economists is “to make more easy practical measures to promote 
welfare” (Pigou 1920, 30). He also provided us with the important insight of what 
welfare could be, looking for its foundations in the states of consciousness and their 
relations. However since policymakers have no access to the states of conscious-
ness, and can hardly influence them, they need a convenient proxy which is money 
and economic welfare. The relation between money and welfare is not direct but is 
mediated through desires and aversions. Money does not measure the satisfaction 
received from the things it buys, but rather, the strength of our desires for those 
things (Hausman et al. 2017, 38).
Therefore Philippe Mongine (2002, 145) proposes the following definition of 
normative economics:
The task of normative economics is to investigate methods and criteria for evaluating the 
relative desirability of economic states of affairs.
It sounds neutral (especially the phrase “relative desirability”) but soon evoking 
Pigou, he instantly and directly refers to welfare economics, presenting four con-
secutive stages of its development (new welfare economics, social choice theory, 
modern welfarism). He also quotes eight basic assumptions of welfare economics:
 I. Normative economics is an exclusive teleological theory which attempts at 
answering question about social good.
 II. Social good is social welfare.
 III. Social welfare is determined by the data of individual welfare.
 IV. It exploits a particular notion of the social state which is determined by eco-
nomic variables, primarily quantities of commodities consumed.
 V. Individual welfare can be measured by an index of preference satisfaction.
 VI. The index summarises individual choice behaviour (revealed preference 
theory).
 VII. The index has standard properties of an ordinal utility function.




The assumptions are not indisputable, and in the course of the normative eco-
nomics development some of them were undermined. Nonetheless, they provide us 
with a general concept of welfare as it is understood by economists. The concept 
reveals a strongly individualistic approach (with many reservations). The value of 
the social welfare function is supposed to determine the social good, while the ulti-
mate social good revealed thereby determines the direction of public policy.
The idea that a somewhat ambiguous concept of general welfare should be the 
central goal of public policy is quite recent. It goes back directly to utilitarian ethics 
and partially to enlightenment ideology. Partially, because when we study the text 
of the three oldest constitutions (the American, the French and the Polish), defi-
nitely inspired by the European enlightenment, we will indeed find references to 
wellbeing, but this is not their central goal. In the American constitution, before 
welfare is mentioned, it reads: “more perfect union, justice, domestic tranquillity 
and common defence”. In the French Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen: 
“natural and imprescriptible rights of man” are put forward and “these rights are 
liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression”. And in the Polish constitu-
tion, we even find a passage which sounds very counter-welfaristic: “…holding 
dearer than life, than personal happiness the political existence, external indepen-
dence and internal liberty of the people …”. The deeper we go into the human his-
tory and further from the European culture, the fewer references we find. Societies 
have a variety of concepts of their destiny and their ultimate goals. Throughout 
history and the world, welfarism is probably the least popular, while what seems to 
dominate are various theological concepts where the ultimate goal is subordinated 
to certain transcendental values (sacred natural rights, God’s will etc.) or “tribal” 
concepts where it is defined in terms of a nation, state, tribe or tribal culture. We 
may reasonably conclude that:
 1. Wellbeing understood roughly as described above by Mongine is far from an 
obvious answer about the ultimate social goal, regardless even of its ambiguity;
 2. There might be some “natural” determinants of our concept of the ultimate social 
goal, and investigating them could be an interesting approach.
This paper attempts to investigate these possible, natural determinants of the 
concept of the ultimate social goal, primarily on the basis of the naturalistic, evolu-
tionary approach. Assuming a certain mechanism of biological and cultural evolu-
tion, it tries to establish whether that mechanism might be instructive in the search 
for the social goal. In the first two sections, the problem is rephrased in terms of 
legal philosophy (the so-called “normative problem”), and the naturalistic jurispru-
dential approach is discussed. In the following section various evolutionary theories 
are presented, and then used to reconstruct the mechanism of the emergence of a 
normative order. In the closing sections two types of conclusions derived from the 
mechanism are drawn: Firstly, that in the light of the evolutionary mechanism, the 
present concept – the pursuit of wellbeing – may be maladaptive. Secondly, that the 
normative problem itself may be undecidable.
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10.2  The Normative Problem in Naturalised Jurisprudence
Economics is not the only science which asks about the ultimate social goal. Similar 
question is asked by legal philosophers and the history of this question in this part 
of humanities is much longer than the history of normative economics. In jurispru-
dence, the question of the ultimate social goal, or in other words, the question of 
what law should govern the society, is often called “the normative problem” (Załuski 
2014).1 Since this phrase uses the same adjective as “normative economics”, it will 
be applied further in the paper.
There are several currents in legal philosophy which have worked out their dis-
tinctive solutions to the normative problem. The most prominent among them are 
various sorts of natural law theories (some of them directly gave rise to the values 
evoked in the constitutions mentioned above), legal positivism and normativism, 
and legal realism. Since we will be looking for the “natural determinants”, which 
roughly means scientific, and has nothing in common with natural law theories, we 
will focus on the last current. To naturalise the normative problem means to search 
for a solution within the science which describes human behaviour most accurately 
and comprehensively. Legal realism which was especially vivid in the USA in the 
first decades of the twentieth century developed an instrumental approach to law. 
Law was considered to be exclusively a means to an end.2 Early legal realists, under 
the great influence of Benthamite utilitarianism, either did not notice that the con-
cept of an end is not granted forever, or they thought that it could be established on 
the basis of scientific, natural studies of the regularities in human behaviour. Thus, 
they wanted to naturalise it. Both assumptions failed. The instrumental view of law 
found its disastrous culmination in the twentieth-century totalitarian regimes while 
the development of social sciences was too poor to draw sound conclusions. But the 
idea came back unsurprisingly with the progress in normative economics in the 
form of the Economic Analysis of Law, and with the progress in behavioural sci-
ences in the form of experimental and evolutionary jurisprudence.3 Those trends are 
the contemporary successors of the American realists, and they have also attempted 
to solve the normative problem.4
Before we elaborate further on the evolutionary approach, which seems to repre-
sent the most comprehensive theory of human behaviour and therefore is most 
promising, one additional remark on normative philosophy is in order. The sen-
tences which are applied in ethics and law are not logical predicates, which means 
that they cannot be attributed truth value. They express duties and rights. They are 
the so-called “ought-sentences”, and they require a different kind of logic than 
1 The normative problem should not be confused with the problem of normativity, which is also 
commonly discussed in the theory of law. The latter refers to the justificatory power of rules which 
makes us follow them and has nothing in common with the ultimate end problem.
2 See Dewey (2008, 251) and Tamanaha (2006).
3 See Beutel (1957).
4 More on this in Gorazda (2017a, b).
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classical predicate calculus. Whether such logic can be effectively constructed to 
conduct sound reasoning is an entirely different story. Lawyers are taught that to the 
certain extent it can, and they habitually perform such reasonings on the basis of a 
few inferential rules. A possible answer to the normative problem by its nature must 
also be the ought-sentence. Naturalisation of the normative problem means that its 
solution is sought in the natural facts (facts established in the natural sciences). 
From the logical point of view, it requires a special kind of reasoning: from predi-
cates (factual sentences) to ought-sentences, in other words, from facts to duties. It 
is the so-called Hume/Moore problem as both philosophers agreed that such reason-
ing is not possible.5 There are several proposals on how to solve this presumed 
impossibility, beginning from its denial,6 through the extended kind of logic and 
inferential rules (Brożek 2013) and finally to the “modest naturalistic programme”. 
The last one was advocated among others by Quine and is currently supported by 
Churchland. Briefly, it does not deny the genuineness of the Hume/Moore problem, 
but it states that even if at least one ought-sentence is irreducible to facts and must 
be necessarily accepted as a temporary axiom to conduct any sound deontological 
inferences, there is still enough room to reason on the specific duties. On the other 
hand, those specific duties are not inferred top-down (i.e. first general ultimate rule 
and then its derivatives) but, on the contrary, the usual way of constructing the nor-
mative order is bottom-up, i.e. first we resolve the specific cases, and then the 
applied, repetitive pattern of that resolving becomes the upper-level-rule.7
10.3  Evolutionary Philosophy of Law
Załuski specifies a few methods of naturalisation which are based on or at least refer 
to the Darwinian theory of evolution. Historically, the first to be mentioned is social 
Darwinism. The term is often used in a pejorative sense, and the concept which lies 
behind it is attributed (disputably) among others to H. Spencer. If the main ‘goal’ of 
evolution is ‘the survival of the fittest’ (a phrase coined by Spencer [1864, 444]), the 
ultimate goal of the order designed by humans should be the same. Otherwise, nei-
ther the order nor humans who designed it will survive. Social Darwinism was 
strongly and commonly criticised, mainly due to the dubious objectives of its sup-
porters. But the most obvious weakness is the necessary pre-assumed and previous 
knowledge on the features which make someone the fittest. Another proposal listed 
by Załuski is “functionalism”. If we could, in accordance with the evolutionary 
principles, decode the functions of the given psychological or behavioural mecha-
nism, we could also design a normative order compliant to those functions. The 
similar logic can be reversed. Normative order should not require from humans that 
5 See Hume (2000), Moore (2004), Brożek (2013), and Hohol (2015).
6 Cf. Searle (1964) and Pigden (1991).
7 Cf. Quine (1979) and Churchland (1986).
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they do what in light of the theory of evolution proves to be impossible or prohibi-
tively costly. Those costs come from our predilections which are hardwired into 
human nature, which we can decode and thus conclude that any attempt at altering 
them will most probably fail. We owe this negative reasoning to legal theorist Owen 
D. Jones (Załuski 2018, 102). A conceptual tool inspired by evolutionary psychol-
ogy has been worked out on the basis of this concept to assess the comparative 
effectiveness of legal regulations: the so-called “law of law’s leverage”. The possi-
bility to determine certain ‘function’ of human behavioural traits or predilections 
opens the room for the determination of human nature in general or the direction of 
human evolution. Both can also be instructive for public policy and may give rise to 
“evolutionary ethics”. Such reasoning led one of the most famous contemporary 
legal philosophers, H.L.A.  Hart to propose the minimum content of natural law 
which is based on the assumption that certain rules are necessary for the realization 
of the ‘minimum purpose of survival which men have in associating with each 
other’ (1994, 193). Hart reconstructed certain features which may undermine our 
survival and then set against them rules, which, when obeyed, may neutralise those 
features. He listed five such features and their respective counteracting rules (Hart 
1994, 195–196)8:
 1. Human vulnerability to bodily attack, which is counteracted by the normative 
restriction of violence.
 2. Human approximate equality in ‘physical strength, agility, and intellectual 
capacities’, so that in longer term nobody could effectively subordinate other 
members of the tribe, which entails rules constituting a ‘system of mutual for-
bearance and compromise’.
 3. Human limited altruism makes rules of mutual forbearance necessary and 
possible.
 4. Limited resources for humans – are counteracted by ‘some minimal form of the 
institution of property (though not necessarily individual property), and the dis-
tinctive kind of rule which requires respect for it’.
 5. Human weakness of will and limited understanding of its long-term interest, 
which is counteracted by the system of sanctions which applies when certain 
rules are not observed.
But the most comprehensive, evolutionary theory of law we owe to Załuski 
(2009). In his account, knowledge of our biological and cultural evolution serves the 
determination of the most important features of human nature. Nature decoded 
thereby is compared to the concept of nature described in the most popular 
philosophical- political theories. As those theories usually include some factual 
assumptions (e.g. on the deemed human nature) and some normative judgments 
(e.g. on the most demanded content of social order) which are usually compliant 
with one another, the most accurate normative judgements are those made by the 
theory that is most consistent with the evolutionarily shaped human nature.
8 Cit. after Załuski (2018, 63).
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It is indeed true, that various philosophical-political theories imply a certain sys-
tem of values which are promoted within such a theory. It is also true that we can 
learn a lot about our nature (defined after Załuski as the dominant moral motive and 
the way of conduct) by studying human evolution and prevailing daily practices. 
What may raise doubts is whether nature defined in this way exists and if it is stable 
enough to let us derive any conclusive views as to how would it look like in the 
foreseeable future, and if it is possible to derive any normative implications from 
such knowledge of that nature. Załuski claims that both questions should be 
answered positively. In reference to the former, there are accounts, rejected by the 
author, e.g., the so-called standard model of social science which claims that no 
such thing as stable human nature exists. Humans are more accurately modelled, as 
born tabula rasa, which is later shaped during an agent’s path of life under environ-
mental and cultural impact. This account, however, contradicts our evolutionary 
knowledge as well as contemporary empirical studies which broadly confirm that 
humans indeed reveal very repeatable patterns of behaviour. In Załuski’s terms, they 
are narrowly altruistic (kin and reciprocal altruism is commonly observed) and 
imperfectly prudent. If we agree on the existence of human nature, to combine this 
notion with normative judgments, theoretically there are three stances possible. The 
weak version agrees that the correct recognition of human nature is necessary for an 
effective introduction of any social policy, but it gives up searching for any ultimate 
goals of the law. The weaker and more general version also agrees that the ultimate 
goal cannot be derived from human nature, but its recognition has an impact on 
social practices. The strongest version (supported by the author) goes furthest and 
claims that stable human nature determines the goals of the law by the philosophical- 
political theory consistent with it and supported by it. Such a theory usually has two 
components which should be compatible with one another. These are the concept of 
human nature and the set of value judgements. If the concept of human nature 
embedded in the theory coincides with the knowledge constructed on the basis of 
the evolutionary approach and empirical studies, we have strong reasons to believe 
that the embedded value judgments are also sound. In the conclusions, Załuski notes 
that the narrowly altruistic and imperfectly prudent human nature can hardly be 
compliant with communism, anarchism, conservatism, and libertarianism but does 
not contradict liberalism and (to a lesser degree) socialism.
Do we really have reasons to assume that human nature does resemble the one 
pictured above by Załuski? Although his remarks are supported by some empirical 
studies, especially those investigating the contemporary patterns of human behav-
iour, there are also significant grounds to question them. Those patterns are not 
stable enough, and they seem to evolve even in the historical period. This observa-
tion was raised by several authors studying the evolution of human culture and its 
impact on our behavioural patterns (Richerson and Boyd 2005). Particularly inter-
esting are the studies on the declining propensity towards violence in societies 
which coincide with the studies on cooperation in larger societies. This somehow 
counterintuitive and surprising conclusion was among others expounded by social 
and evolutionary psychologist, Steven Pinker (2011). Pinker’s starting point is that 
our neurobiological mechanisms make us far from being gentle or friendly towards 
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each other. On the contrary, our “hardware” is rather programmed to various forms 
of violence. Paradoxically, even those cooperative dispositions, which are recog-
nised by Załuski as features supporting collaboration in society and the creation of 
legal order, may be responsible for ideological subordination and violent intergroup 
rivalry. Kin and reciprocal altruism do strengthen social ties but within ideological 
groups, thus making them more inclined to aggression towards other groups.9 Pinker 
also notes that we are equipped with some mechanisms (both biological and social) 
which let us tame our natural tendency towards aggression. These are empathy 
(bound with our narrow altruism), self-control, moral sense (in Załuski’s terms: 
personal and moral autonomy) and intelligence. It is worth noting that some of these 
features may be responsible both for aggression and its curbing as it is in the case of 
the above-mentioned cooperative dispositions fuelled by empathy, or moral sense 
which may steer our behaviour to “justified” but violent revenge. Given such a com-
plex picture of several counteractive mechanisms, the real question is not about the 
stable features of human nature but rather why the latter, responsible for curbing 
violence, has prevailed since the fact that they prevail is broadly confirmed by thor-
ough and numerous empirical studies. After analysing some candidates for the 
explanation and rejecting the implausible ones (like genotype evolution in recent 
years), he proposes five causes, all of them of cultural character. In the first place, 
he puts Leviathan, i.e. the organised state and its institutions. This state’s priority 
strongly resembles the account of Hobbes, rejected by Załuski. The second factor is 
the development of commerce which forces merchants to take the position of their 
customers if they want to cut any deal with them and thus it strengthens cooperative 
behaviour. In giving primacy to commerce, Pinker is not alone. He subscribes him-
self to the Austrian school of economics and its successors. Many of the contempo-
rary studies on human evolution which aim at explaining our dominance over other 
humanoids also point to human propensity to exchange goods, even among very 
distant tribes. The third factor is feminisation which curbs the harmful impact of 
testosterone and male rivalry. The fourth is the extending circle of sympathy. In 
order to break through the narrow, family or tribal empathy, we need to frequently 
meet strangers in peaceful circumstances, talk to them and get more familiar with 
their perspective and emotions. This process accelerated with the growing geo-
graphical and social mobility, and with widening literacy and the custom of reading 
books and stories coming from various parts of the world and cultures. This is 
directly connected to the last factor, “the escalator of reason.” Although analytical, 
cognitive systems are used for many forms of violence, in the end, the reason is 
more likely to tame it. Reason means more self-control and higher intelligence, both 
interdependent. Since psychologists have started to measure intelligence, they 
noticed the so-called Flynn effect – an observed increase of IQ in each generation. 
This strengthens the pacifying impact of reason. More intelligent people are inclined 




to offer collaboration instead of instrumental violence; they are more liberal, agree-
able for group decision-making and constructive, gentle discourse.
Pinker’s particular theses have been criticised by many academics from a differ-
ent perspective. However, at least two of them seem to be somewhat untouched: the 
complex picture of human nature, rather biologically predisposed to violence than 
to friendly co-operation; and the changing patterns of human behaviours over the 
centuries. Both theses undermine Załuski’s optimistic view. Clearly, it is the other 
way around. The moral and legal order is not a simple extension of our biological 
predispositions but rather helps us to curb them. And our nature observed statisti-
cally in repeatable patterns of behaviour is an effect of a subtle game between sev-
eral counteractive biological mechanisms and social environment while both factors 
act interdependently. The same picture is drawn by several, evolutionary oriented 
cultural anthropologists like Richerson, Boyd and Henrich. They discovered, among 
others, the particular mechanism of co-evolution of genes and culture which was 
responsible for shaping the human social instinct, which further gave rise to large, 
modern cooperative societies. Through the so-called “moralistic punishment” this 
evolutionary dance may gradually eliminate non-cooperative agents and thus mod-
ify our, statistically defined human nature. In the end, it seems that Załuski’s con-
cept does not provide us with a plausible solution to the normative problem.
10.4  Neglected Cultural Evolution and the Emergence 
of the Normative Order
Załuski’s attempt to construct a unified philosophy of law based on our evolutionary 
shaped propensities is not the only one. If we initially agree that the normative 
order, within which the normative problem is posed and answered is per se an evo-
lutionary phenomenon, which is somehow shaped by an agent’s propensities, but 
even more by the influence of the prevailing culture, it still seems promising to track 
down the mechanism of its emergence. The comprehensive knowledge of this past 
mechanism may give us a hint about the future normative problem solution. Several 
theories were proposed to that effect. The most prominent were offered by Hayek, 
Quine and nowadays by Churchland, Boyd and Richerson. There are some differ-
ences among them but what they have in common is the bottom-up approach, spon-
taneity of the behavioural patterns emergence (driven by random forces like cultural 
mutation and cultural drift10), group selection mechanism (especially in Hayekian 
theory11) and thus the strong influence of culture and evolutionary pressure in the 
form of natural and sexual selection. In contemporary social sciences, the most 
comprehensive picture is drawn by Richerson and Boyd (2005) and in the philoso-
phy of law by Brożek (2016), who widely exploits Tomasello’s (1999) account. The 
10 Richerson and Boyd (2005, loc. 977).
11 Hayek (1983).
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common element in those accounts is an emphasis placed on culture, as the main 
normative-order-creating factor and the use of mathematical modelling which 
strengthens the presented arguments. Culture is understood as:
…information capable of affecting individuals’ behaviour that they acquire from other 
members of their species through teaching, imitation and other forms of social transmis-
sion. (Richerson and Boyd 2005, loc.105)
Culture includes instructions or imperatives, which are cultural variants trans-
mittable between agents, societies and generations. Those variants are subject to 
three categories of cultural evolutionary forces.
 1. Random forces, which are on the agent’s level, cultural mutations, and on the 
group level, a cultural drift.
 2. Decision making forces, which by their nature are more consciously chosen by 
an agent, and consist of the guided variation (emulation) and biased transmission 
(cultural variants imitated from others due to their deemed effectiveness).
 3. Natural selection, which is based on an unbiased transmission (cultural variants 
imitated naturally from parents and close relatives) and changes in the composi-
tion of a population, due to sexual selection and elimination of unfit agents.
Culture in general is a powerful evolutionary adaptation and cultural variants and 
genes co-evolve. However it may be, and sometimes indeed is maladaptive. Cultural 
evolution and the spread of cultural variants within a population can be tracked 
down and modelled by the Darwinian analysis, which means the extensive use of 
genetic algorithm and agent-based modelling.
A genetic algorithm was initially developed in informatics and mathematics to 
improve problem-solving tools. It resembles an algorithm which steers biological 
evolution and it assumes that if evolution is so good at solving an adaptation prob-
lem, similar instructions to solve less sophisticated technological problems should 
be used. However, besides solving problems, the genetic algorithms disclosed one 
more side-effect. It enhanced our understanding of the actual evolutionary process 
by creating an opportunity to simulate them and observe results depending on dif-
ferent values of variables applied.
How does a genetic algorithm work then? Like its evolutionary model, it makes 
use of similar terminology, namely population, chromosome, mutation, crossing 
over and offspring, and consists of several consecutive steps (Mitchell 1999, 308).
 1. We start with a randomly generated population of n l-bit chromosomes (candi-
date solution to a problem), then
 2. Calculate the fitness f(x) of each chromosome x in the population.
 3. Repeat the following steps until n offspring have been created:
 (a) Select a pair of parent chromosomes  – probability of selection being an 
increasing function of fitness.
 (b) Cross over the pair at a randomly chosen point to form two offspring.
 (c) Mutate the two offspring at each locus with probability pm and place the 
resulting chromosomes in the population.
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 (d) Replace the current population with the new one.
 (e) Go to step a.
In the search for an ultimate goal, the second step seems to be most interesting. It 
assumes that in each task we have a predetermined fitness function which enables 
us to calculate the results which we intend to achieve and which we value as the 
most desirable. The functioning of the algorithm and the direction in which chromo-
somes evolve are subordinated to the value of the fitness function. If by analogy, we 
apply the same mechanism to human evolution, the search for an ultimate goal turns 
into a search for a proper fitness function and its optimum value. However, is it pos-
sible to predetermine it in a natural environment? In the simplified model above, the 
function is exogenous. In models imitating natural evolution, it must be endoge-
nous, and it evolves depending on the initially embedded genome, the changing 
environment, and an increase in the population, and the last element is crucial. The 
more numerous are the carriers of a particular chromosome; the more likely this 
chromosome is to spread within the population. And vice versa, the more likely the 
chromosome is to contribute to the expansion of the population, the more likely it is 
to survive, spread, and represent the searched value of the fitness function. The 
changing environment complicates the whole story. The optimum value should 
remain optimum both in short and in the longer term. So, the sought chromosome is 
required not only to be stable but also flexible enough so that in the long term, the 
survival of the population is not threatened. If we anchor our reasoning in the fact 
that they were cultural changes which shaped our behavioural patterns to form a 
full-blooded legal order rather than our genome and, that it is a population as a 
whole which may determine the value of a fitness function rather than a particular 
agent’s predispositions, it will lead us to the concept of cultural evolution through 
group selection.
The Hayekian theory was one of the first accounts based on the group selection 
mechanism, also referred to by Załuski. According to Hayek, controversial group 
selection is responsible for cultural evolution. Certain traits/patterns of behaviour 
could have evolved because they increased the fitness of the group, even if they 
decreased the fitness of an agent. The group is more fit if its chances of survival rise 
in a confrontation with other groups. However, there is no unique, distinguishable 
carrier of a cultural trait (memes). Traits can spread within the group (and be trans-
mitted to other groups) in two ways. The first is an imitation. It makes cultural 
evolution Lamarckian by its nature, and not Darwinian. The second is sexual selec-
tion – the desired traits are more often chosen by sexual partners, which makes them 
more likely to be spread within the population. This would work if we accepted the 
concept of genetic group selection so that certain genetically encoded traits, which 
are not adaptive for an agent but adaptive for the whole group, may nevertheless 
spread in the way described above and dominate other traits. Excluding the very 
exceptional example of human lactose tolerance, no other case of genetic group 
selection has been recorded so far. That is why the account is controversial.12 
12 See for example Price (2011).
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However, it is commonly accepted that learned skills may indeed be under evolu-
tionary pressure connected with the group selection mechanism.13 If so, the account 
is not complete. Darwinian evolution, which is the only one admitted as a scientific 
theory, does not allow the skills learned by phenotype over its lifetime to be passed 
on to the next generation. How is it possible then?
The first person to suggest a plausible answer was James Mark Baldwin, who in 
1896 published a paper on the possible passing on of specific learned skills to the 
next generation. It is not the particular skills that are passed on but rather the cogni-
tive flexibility of an agent (the trait which is genetically determined), which 
enhanced strongly an agent’s ability to learn those skills during its lifetime. Those 
who are more gifted and learn quicker, live longer and are more likely to have more 
offspring, which explains the rapid spread of this cognitive ability in the population. 
Those abilities according to Brożek (2016) (and Tomasello, whose works he refers 
to) are imitation and emulation. Imitation means an elementary form of copying the 
behaviour of others, according to the rule “do what I do” without reflecting on the 
purpose of conduct. Emulation is more like the process of learning. It cannot be 
reduced to imitating other agents, but it requires awareness of the ultimate end of 
the process. I learn not to know but to achieve a certain, predetermined, ultimate 
goal. It means that with the use of my intelligence, I do not restrict myself to imitate 
others, but I am consciously able to decline in some points from the observed pat-
terns and steer my behaviour towards the previously identified goal. The significant 
contribution of Tomasello is that he found out that whereas imitation is broadly 
observed among mammals, especially primates, emulation is specific for humans. 
But imitation also has some specifically human peculiarities. Although primates can 
imitate others like humans, it seems that their propensity to imitate is significantly 
weaker. As Brożek puts it, “(…) their tendency to imitate is limited in comparison 
to human eagerness to copy others. We do indeed ‘out-ape’ the apes, but not because 
they have no skill for aping – they lack the tendency” (Brożek 2016, 670). From this 
point on, Brożek’s account significantly supplements the Baldwin effect. Referring 
to one of the simulation models of Boyd and Richerson, he claims that these two 
uniquely human features are the foundation for any, even very primitive, form of 
culture, a part of which is a normative order. “It transpires that in such a setting there 
exists ‘the evolutionary equilibrium amount of imitation’, from which both learning- 
prone and imitation-prone individuals benefit, so that the population as a whole has 
a higher average fitness than a population consisting solely of learners, or a popula-
tion in which there are only “pure” learners and imitators. They further observe that 
“imitation may increase the average fitness of learners by allowing learned improve-
ments to accumulate from one generation to the next” (Brożek 2016, 705). Most 
importantly, imitation is a culture-creating mechanism – it enables the transmission 
of behavioural patterns from generation to generation, thus allowing the accumula-
tion of knowledge, smooth adaptation of existing cultural tools, the recombination 
13 See Richerson et  al. (2016), where authors presented the set of arguments for cultural group 
selection being an essential mechanism in human evolution contributing among others to emer-
gence and development of cooperation among humans.
M. Gorazda
171
of means and ends, as well as the emergence of fine-grained ways of conduct 
(Brożek 2016, 740). The essential element in this picture that should be added is 
that both learned skills inheritance paths (i.e., imitation and emulation) do not act 
evenly within the population. Some of the agents are more likely to be imitated or 
to be learned from. First and foremost, they are parents and close relatives.14 
Secondly, the outstanding individuals perceived as successful according to the com-
monly accepted standards15 and, thirdly, others, while our propensity to imitate 
them declines with the increasing cultural distance, language being one of its most 
important indicators.16 The author further draws before the reader the possible path 
from imitation and emulation through the emergence of rudimentary rules and their 
consecutive transformation into fully-grained abstract rules, expressed in a lan-
guage; complex, modal and endowed with the justificatory power. From the subject 
issue of this paper, it is worth noting that the searched ultimate goal, the solution for 
the normative problem is always embedded in the abstract rules and thus, in the 
extended social order. To ponder over humans’ desired destination, we need a lan-
guage, modality and justification. Rudimentary rules do not need any predetermined 
ultimate end, or at least an agent does not need to be aware of it.
As we have some plausible hypothesis on the learned skills transmission mecha-
nism, we may go back to the Baldwin effect and its possible simulation in models 
based on a genetic algorithm. Evolutionary Reinforcement Learning (ERL) model 
designed by Ackley and Littman (1992) is a simple one, but it includes all the essen-
tial components of cultural evolution. Agents in the model move through a two- 
dimensional space. As in the natural environment, they forage food, may encounter 
a predator and hide from it. They dispose of a certain amount of energy, which is 
consumed and partially recovered during their lifetime. Exhaustion of energy means 
an agent’s termination. Their key equipment is two neuronal networks: one is 
responsible for the evaluation of the given state, whether it is good or harmful for an 
agent (evaluation network), and the other one is responsible for the undertaken 
action (action network). The first network may be interpreted as a surrogate of sim-
ple normative judgment. The architecture of the network is identical for each agent, 
but it differs in weights. As a consequence, they value their states differently. The 
genetically encoded chromosome determines the evaluation network and thus is 
subject to the consecutive steps of the genetic algorithm (mutation, cross-over, mul-
tiplication, selection, and replacement) and invariant during the lifetime. In contrast, 
the action network is subject to a learning process and thus could be modified dur-
ing the lifetime. An agent learns to act in ways that lead to “better” states. “Better” 
means the initially inborn evaluation, then modified according to the survival rate. 
14 This effect is very well recognised and confirmed by several experimental studies. It is referred 
to by Longman (2004). See also Palmer and Steadman (1997). In Poland, research was among 
others conducted by Brzozowski (1988), Wołosiuk (2010) and Elżanowska (2012).
15 See Henrich (2004), Henrich and Boyd (1998), Henrich and Gil-White (2001).
16 Boyd calls this unbiased and biased transmission and they both, together with natural selection, 
constitute the three model factors responsible for spread and prevalence of cultural traits. Richerson 
and Boyd (2005, loc. 935).
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What is most important, no exogenous fitness function is given for evaluating the 
genome. Fitness is endogenous; it emerges from many actions and interactions (and 
evolves). It means that no ultimate end is given from the outside. The measured 
parameter is the time of survival of the given population before it becomes extinct. 
It depends on the following initial settings: evolution plus learning (ERL), evolution 
alone (E), learning alone (L), (so that the evolutionary mechanisms of mutation, 
cross-over, multiplication, selection, and replacement are excluded), fixed weights 
chosen randomly (F) and random walk through the matrix, (i.e., ignoring the infor-
mation from the environment) (B). The extension of the population and its survival 
time gives us some basic information on which setting is the most effective one and 
what combination of the value judgements (evaluation network) and learnt skills 
(action network) is the most adaptive and stable, and thus whether we may draw any 
conclusions on the possible ultimate goal, the ultimate system of value judgements 
for the initial population. After several iterations, Ackley and Littman were able to 
summarise their results. ERL did much better than evolution alone (E) and slightly 
better than learning alone (L). Fixed weights worked worst, even worse than ran-
dom walk (B). “It is easier to generate a good evaluation function than a good action 
function” (Richerson and Boyd 2005, loc. 427). It is easier to specify useful goals 
(encoded in the evaluation network) than useful ways of accomplishing them or, in 
other words, the evolutionary mechanism works well at choosing the best value 
judgments but cannot cope effectively with selecting the appropriate means to 
accomplish these values. Working out an effective modus operandi requires the 
engagement of a learning process. The second part of the simulation additionally 
supported this interpretation. Both scientists decided to search for the so-called 
functionally constrained parts of a chromosome. The underlying concept is that in 
nature those parts of the genome which are subject to the least changes through 
generations are supposed to be the most functionally constrained ones, which means 
that they are most likely to be strongly adaptive. To check which parts could those 
be in the model, they extended the lifespan of the population to almost 9 million 
generations. It occurred that genes responsible for encoding the evaluation network 
reveals a low level of variation during the first 600,000 generations until the chro-
mosome reaches the optimum pattern for the action network. Then this setting 
becomes more functionally constrained, loosening the constraints on the evaluation 
network. So it seems to be more important for shaping the proper ability for an 
agent’s current state evaluation in the early stages of the population’s evolution, 
which is necessary to strengthen the learning ability. Stable goals are crucial for 
survival. However, later on, when proper modes of action begin to be genetically 
encoded, value judgments play a less critical role.
If this simulation correctly imitates the milestones of natural biological and cul-
tural human evolution, we may suspect that patterns of our behaviours are more 
important for our survival than value judgments including judgments on ultimate 
end, assuming the early stages of our evolution are behind us. It somehow coincides 
with the observation that the very foundational principles of human behaviours 
indeed remain invariant throughout the very distant cultures while the system of 
abstract rules (moral and legal), often involving deeper value judgments, 
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presupposed ultimate human goals and its justification, differs significantly even 
within the same cultures and geographical areas.
Let us now consider the following conclusions which may be derived from the 
preceding passages. I have summed them up below being fully aware that they are 
intuitions or plausible guesses rather than a proven thesis. However, if they were 
correct, we might draw up the following picture:
 1. Human nature, defined as a dominated moral motive and typical way of conduct, 
is hardly definable independently of time and place. Contrary to Lock and 
Załuski, it seems to be relatively unstable and variable throughout generations, 
and its underlying biological mechanism inclines us rather towards violence and 
aggression than to co-operation (which unfortunately supports the dismal picture 
drawn up by Hobbes).
 2. The evolutionary mechanism has no fitness function. The spread of particular 
traits within the population is subordinated to its expansion and the strength of 
imitation and emulation or biased and unbiased transmission. In case of behav-
ioural patterns transmitted through imitation and emulation, the expansion of the 
particular population (symbolically marked groups17) seems to be a stronger fac-
tor as we are more inclined to imitate our close relatives (unbiased transmission), 
and the spread of group-beneficial beliefs is twice as quick within the group as 
from one group to another (Richerson and Boyd 2005, loc. 2865).
 3. Rudimentary rules and abstract rules may correspond to the action network and 
evaluation network in the Ackley and Littman model. The former is crucial for 
survival, the latter is less functionally constrained, at least after the adaptive pat-
terns of behaviour are preserved enough.
 4. Both create social orders at different levels. Abstract rules with their justificatory 
power include value judgments, and among them the desired postulates regard-
ing ultimate goals.
 5. Both social orders of different levels may interact with one another. Rudimentary 
rules give rise to abstract rules, but it goes the other way around, too. An extended 
order (system of abstract rules) may act in our way of conduct (rudimentary 
rules), thus causing, for example, the observed decline of violence.
The outlined picture gives us a relatively comprehensive (although necessarily 
simplified) image of the possible evolutionary origin of human normative order. It 
provides us also with suppositions for where to look for the ultimate end value judg-
ments and the main factors shaping them. At the first stage, they must be genetically 
encoded and functionally constrained, but in the pace of a species’ further develop-
ment, they become less constrained, and their impact on our behaviour weakens, 
being reduced to interactions on the social order levels. In other words, we may have 
very different ideas on what is and what is not good for us, or where we should head 
(namely, very different value judgements), but the essential patterns of our behav-
iour remain relatively unchanged. It does not exclude possible changes, even 
17 See Richerson and Boyd (2005, loc. 2865).
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commonly spread, but as they are caused mainly by the system of abstract rules and 
corresponding extended order, their causal power is more vague and subtle, yet it 
may also create certain observable trends such as the decline in violence.
10.5  The Pursuit of Wellbeing May Be Maladaptive
There are two significant consequences of the models presented above. Firstly, the 
value judgement and especially the determination of the ultimate end may be of less 
relevance to the evolutionary success of human species than we might have thought. 
What counts are our behavioural patterns, which at a certain stage of the species’ 
development are weakly dependent on value judgements. The significant part of 
them may be of no relevance to our behavioural patterns. They may play a role of 
necessary chromosome mutations, while most of them have no significant impact 
on the phenotype or, even if they have, they may be maladaptive, and they may 
terminate. Secondly, the solution to the normative problem is not reducible to the 
search for the proper fitness function. In other words, evolution (both biological and 
cultural) is directionless. Any sort of ‘social Darwinism’, ‘functionalism’, ‘evolu-
tionary ethics’ or ‘minimum content of law’ is bound to fail, especially if it is pri-
marily dictated by the survival and wellbeing of an individual agent. The spread of 
behavioural patterns seems to be more strongly subordinated to the expansion of the 
population. Patterns which are more likely to contribute to that expansion are more 
probable to spread. If at the end some of them reveal any causal power, the “survival 
rate” is stronger among those contributing to the population’s increase than those 
that contribute to the agent’s wellbeing. This is one of the most important discover-
ies in evolutionary biology and the unexpected consequence of the population’s 
thinking. Early evolutionary biologists thought that it was the survival and fitness of 
an individual that counts the most, but further research reveals that selection favours 
traits that increase the reproductive success of individuals and not their fitness. The 
same refers to cultural evolution and the emergence and diffusion of a particular 
normative order.
Biased transmission depends on what is going on in the brains of imitators, but in most 
forms of natural selection, the fitness of different genes depends on their effect on survival 
and reproduction independent of human desires, choices and preferences. (Richerson and 
Boyd 2005, loc.1106)
This slightly counter-intuitive effect of evolution may, for example, explain the sur-
prising spread of Christianity in the Roman Empire, despite the tough and puritan 
ethic which clashed with Roman promiscuity (Załuski 2012). It may also occur that 
subordination of women, which is still the case in some Islamic states, will have a 
higher survival rate only if it implies higher birth rates (which is plausible), despite 
strongly negative ethical connotations. It may at the end occur that the pursuit of 
wellbeing or individual happiness, which has been commonly preached recently, is 
counter expansive (maladaptive) if the pursuit of wellbeing or happiness merely 
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means pursuit of comfort and avoidance of unpleasant and disturbing circumstances 
like childcare. This is precisely the kind of explanation offered by Richerson and 
Boyd of the surprisingly low fertility rate in western civilisation. However, for them, 
the reason does not lie primarily in the pursuit of comfort but rather in the maladap-
tive patterns (or as they name it, cultural variants). Biologists know that evolution is 
not a perfect process which always leads the species to maximise their fitness, but 
on the contrary, it is full of errors and maladaptive traits. A genetic algorithm is not 
able to eliminate those traits, especially when the same trait carries both adaptive 
and maladaptive functions. The often-invoked example is the peacock’s tail. Its size 
is at the same time a visible sign of strength and health of its carrier, which makes it 
an attractive mate, and an obstacle when it comes to escaping predators, which puts 
its carrier at risk of premature termination. However, sexual selection seems to be a 
stronger factor so far, as males with a bigger tail have more offspring before they fall 
prey to the predator. Boyd and Richerson constructed a similar argument in refer-
ence to the so-called prestige bias. In principle, culture and specifically biased trans-
mission of the cultural variants is very adaptive, as it helps us to work out and 
sustain the skills which are crucial for our survival, and it does it in a much shorter 
term than genes evolution would have done it otherwise. As it has already been 
demonstrated in the model mentioned above, a certain level of imitation of other 
people, especially our parents and prestigious members of society, is required to 
sustain the culture and to spread the cultural variants which contributed to the suc-
cess of the prestigious ones. On the other hand, those who are commonly perceived 
as prestigious in a modern western culture very often reveals the “selfish cultural 
variant”. It is quite obvious when we consider who the people are whom we per-
ceive as successful. At least from the beginning of the industrial revolution, they are 
rich merchants and entrepreneurs, highly paid professionals, popular artists and sci-
entists. To reach their social position they needed to sacrifice much of their time and 
resources for education and professional training. Those who follow them, but are 
not equally talented or endowed, need to sacrifice even more. High status also needs 
to be socially marked. In modern societies, those markers are often expensive toys 
and hobbies. On the other hand, childcare is costly and extremely time-consuming. 
Prestige bias forces drive us away from those costs. It is especially true for women. 
The deepest fall in the fertility rate is strongly correlated with their access to educa-
tion.18 The “runaway” cultural evolution is thus accelerated by the universal educa-
tion and development of mass-media which “suddenly exposed people to much 
more non-parental culture influence than had been experienced in more traditional 
societies”.19 It is worth noting that this non-parental culture is at the same time the 
culture promoting individual wellbeing, understood as preference satisfaction and 
the pursuit of individual happiness, which happens to be the necessary components 
of rapidly spreading “selfish cultural variant”, apparently maladaptive.
18 See Richerson and Boyd (2005, loc. 2467) and Newson and Richerson (2009).
19 Richerson and Boyd (2005, loc. 2365).
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10.6  Concluding Remarks: Threefold Undecidability 
of the Normative Problem
Does it mean that humans will become extinct? Does it mean that the concept of 
wellbeing is nothing but a dangerous maladaptation which at a certain stage of our 
cultural evolution brought us some individual comfort but in the longer term may 
drive us to extinction? The truth is that no one knows. But we cannot exclude such 
a hypothesis. It seems that the normative problem is undecidable regarding the natu-
ralistic approach for at least three independent reasons.
 1. Naturalistic ontology does not overcome the “naturalistic fallacy” indicated by 
Hume and Moore. Even if we adopt the modest naturalistic programme and con-
sequently assume certain indisputable norms as axioms (like the discussed con-
cept of wellbeing), we instantly encounter three unsolvable problems:
 (a) According to the modest naturalistic programme, axioms are not created in 
the value-judgement vacuum and do not reflect our, indisputable human or 
divine intuition. They are constructed bottom-up, by numerous, previously 
resolved normative problems, solutions of which were subsequently evolu-
tionarily tested. Axioms are generalisations reflecting our multigenerational 
knowledge and seem to be a more useful tool for solving daily normative 
problems than somehow privileged, higher-level rules.
 (b) The causal power of those axioms is doubtful. As Litman and Ackley’s 
model shows, the higher-level value judgements, which are crucial at the 
early stages of species’ evolution as they determine the behavioural patterns, 
soon after those patterns are genetically encoded, become less functionally 
constrained. At least some of them may serve as useful rationalisations of 
our behaviour, without having any real impact on them.
 (c) If some of those axioms reveal some causal power, the development of the 
social order according to them and according to the principles determined by 
the genetic algorithm may occur to be evolutionarily counterproductive, as 
Boyd and Richerson’s model on fertility rate decline shows.
 2. The epistemological perspectives in the naturalistic account are confused. 
Different normative postulates can be formulated from the individual’s perspec-
tive and the perspective of the referential group. What seems to benefit an agent, 
needs not to be beneficial for the population, and the other way around, what is 
beneficial for the population, needs not to benefit an agent. As the endogenous 
fitness function seems to privilege the population, traits which are beneficial 
exclusively for agents and do not contribute to the genetical success may be 
condemned to extinction. The concept of wellbeing may represent such a trait.
 3. The genetic algorithm with an endogenous fitness function seems not to be sus-
ceptible to “mathematical close-up”. Even if we know the initial normative order, 
there are limits to finding a shortcut in order to predict the future value of the 
fitness function. In other words, the predictability of the future social order is 
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fundamentally restricted. Models based on the genetic algorithm are by their 
nature very complicated, but at the same time, they are an enormous simplifica-
tion of the actual environment and forces acting behind it. They help us to under-
stand certain mechanisms and trends but will not reveal to us the future state of 
society and especially the future evolutionary solution to the normative problem.
The third point is especially the direct reason for the undecidability of the norma-
tive problem, the reason why we cannot determine if the concept of wellbeing is an 
example of the maladaptive trait condemned to extinction. There are many scenar-
ios possible. Extinction is one of them. Richerson and Boyd point to particular 
orthodox groups like Methodists and Amish in the USA, who have been able to cut 
themselves off from the access to the modern mass-media and thus weaken the 
biased transmission and cultivate their traditional family and religious values, which 
implies high fertility rate. Wellbeing, especially one that is understood in monetary 
terms, is definitely not their ultimate end. They are slowly growing in numbers. On 
the other side of the social structure, we have the growing model of lonely parent-
ing. The fertility rate among those who apply this model is not very high but at least 
close to the natural replacement rate. It may be that a certain equilibrium between 
the counter-acting processes like the spread of selfish cultural variant, fertility rate 
and natural selection will be reached in the longer term. Finally, there is the problem 
of “estimating the strength of various effects on the trajectory of evolution”.20 There 
seem to be natural and robust reasons to reject moral Darwinism. As the fitness 
function does not exist, and the interdependence between the different social orders 
is multi-causal, any possible value of adaptiveness is untractable.
Taking into account the above-outlined picture of the possible origin of the nor-
mative social order and the remarks on its potential consequences, it seems that in 
our search of the ultimate end, we are within a vicious circle with no way out. It 
appears that we are condemned to accept the fact that the ultimate end problem is 
undecidable, at least within the evolutionary knowledge.
Not everything is lost, however. At least, following the “modest naturalistic pro-
gram” we may form a couple of reasonable postulates:
 1. In social sciences (including normative economics) “nothing makes sense except 
in the light of evolution”. Darwinian analysis and populational thinking should 
be an integral part of those sciences. Commonsensical truths, which are taken for 
granted are nothing more than cultural variants which may and should be anal-
ysed in terms of their adaptiveness (welfare, happiness, success, pleasure 
and like).
 2. Predictability of the possible consequences followed by the adoption of certain 
cultural variants is limited but not entirely excluded. Big data collection and 
agent-based models combined with the Darwinian analysis may help draw pos-
sible scenarios and be informative for societies and policymakers.
20 Richerson and Boyd (2005, loc. 3486).
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 3. If moral axioms have a weaker impact on our behavioural patterns (which can be 
the subject of possible, future empirical studies), than we have suspected, their 
relaxation may not constitute a real danger for social cohesion. And if they play 
a role of necessary cultural mutations, wherefrom both adaptive and maladaptive 
patterns may emerge, which will be naturally tested and observed, their diversity 
may be desirable, but only from the particular point of view, namely the survival 
and further expansion of the human population. This could be interpreted as an 
argument for a liberal and open society and value pluralism, as it used to be pro-
moted by K.R. Popper (2013) and I. Berlin (2002).
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Chapter 11
Beyond Mere Utility-Maximisation. 
Towards an Axiologically Enriched 
Account of Well-being
Tomasz Kwarciński and Wojciech Załuski
Abstract The aim of the article is to reconstruct the way the concept of well-being 
is most commonly understood in economics, to identify deficiencies of this under-
standing, and to find a remedy to them. The paper defends two basic claims: (1) that 
the dominant understanding of well-being in economics is non-normative and boils 
down to the concept to utility maximisation, i.e., satisfaction of one’s preferences, 
whatever they are (subject, at best, to some formal constraints); (2) and that, given 
the shortcomings of the non-normative concept of well-being, e.g., its tautological 
character (at least in the case of certain formulations of this concept), it is indispens-
able to build an axiologically richer (that is: normative) concept of well-being, 
thereby going beyond the mere notion of utility-maximisation. As for the claim (2), 
two versions of the normative concept are distinguished in the article, viz. an exclu-
sive one (well-being as causally dependent on prudential values but not moral ones) 
and an inclusive one (well-being as causally dependent on prudential values con-
strained in some way by moral ones), and it is argued that the latter is more plausi-
ble, since, in contrast to the former, it does not rely on a dubious assumption about 
the absolute priority of prudence over morality.
11.1  Introduction
Somewhat schematically, one can say that there are three assumptions economics 
makes about well-being. The first one is that the economic agent is focused on what 
is “good for herself” (is self-interested). The second – which adds content to the first 
one – is that well-being is the primary criterion of evaluation of the state of affairs 
in normative economics: what is good for an agent equals her well-being. The 
third – a natural consequence of the second one – states that the economic progress 
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of societies is evaluated in terms of social well-being usually measured by GDP per 
capita. As we can see, well-being is a central concept of economics. However, there 
are controversies as to how it should be understood. Our goal here will be to recon-
struct the way the concept of well-being is most commonly understood in econom-
ics and to identify deficiencies of this understanding. More specifically, we shall 
argue that it is necessary to build an axiologically richer concept of well-being and 
that in order to do this, one has to go beyond the mere notion of utility- maximisation 
(which is usually assumed by economics to be definiens of well- being). If such 
understanding of well-being is accepted, the dichotomy of self-interested and axi-
ological motivation of economic agents can be overcome.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 11.2 argues against a non- 
normative account of well-being which reduces this concept to utility maximisation, 
i.e., satisfaction of one’s preferences, whatever they are (subject, at best, to some 
formal constraints). Section 11.3 discusses two versions of a normative account of 
well-being: (1) well-being as causally dependent on prudential values but not moral 
values (an exclusive approach); (2) well-being as causally dependent on prudential 
values constrained in some way by moral ones (an inclusive approach). The final 
section concludes.
11.2  Against the Non-normative Account of Well-being
The prevalent view of well-being in mainstream economics can be dubbed non- 
normative, as it refers merely to utility maximisation, where utility is defined either 
in terms of revealed or stated preferences. Before we discuss these two versions in 
some detail, let us notice that both of them constitute a significant departure from 
the classical understanding of utility. In his popular textbook “Intermediate 
Microeconomics”, Hal Varian asserts that back in the Victorian days classical utili-
tarians and economists understood ‘utility’ as an equivalent of a person’s overall 
well-being identified with happiness (Varian 2010). However, this claim is not 
entirely correct. In fact, Jeremy Bentham (1907) says that what is meant by ‘utility’ 
is “that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, plea-
sure, good, or happiness (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or 
(what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, 
evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered.” Thus, it would be 
more precise to say that, for him, ‘utility’ was a synonym of ‘usefulness’ (Broom 
1999, 19), which can give rise to certain positive consequences (including happi-
ness). But this is only a starting point in a complicated history of the meaning of 
‘utility’ in economics. The meaning evolved from signifying a useful property of 
things (Bentham), through mental states of a person (pleasure, happiness), the 
intensity of his desires and their satisfaction (Pigou 1932, 38), to its contemporary 
understanding  – as preference satisfaction among specified alternatives. What is 
more, even the relationship between utility and preference satisfaction changed. As 
Varian (2010, 55) states: “Originally, preferences were defined in terms of utility: to 
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say a bundle (x1,x2) was preferred to a bundle (y1,y2) meant that the x-bundle had 
a higher utility than the y-bundle. But now we tend to think of things the other way 
around. The preferences of the consumer are the fundamental description useful for 
analysing choice, and utility is simply a way of describing preferences. A utility 
function is a way of assigning a number to every possible consumption bundle such 
that more-preferred bundles get assigned larger numbers than less-preferred bun-
dles.” The question of which consumption bundle is preferable to someone is 
answered upon the choice he or she makes. For instance, if someone consistently 
chooses apples when bananas are also available, an economist can infer that she 
prefers apples over bananas. Thus we have come to the first version of the non- 
normative account of well-being (in terms of revealed preferences) mentioned at the 
beginning of this section. In our critical analysis of this concept we shall follow, to 
a large extent, Amartya Sen (and we shall also use the term ‘well-being’ inter-
changeably with ‘welfare’ – the term Sen prefers).
The lack of a choice-independent way of understanding a person’s attitudes 
towards alternatives provides a rationale for what is called definitional egoism 
which means that “(…) all agent’s choices can be explained as the choosing of 
‘most preferred’ alternatives with respect to a postulated preference relation” (Sen 
1977, 323). Following Amartya Sen, we can identify three dimensions of self- 
interested behaviour. Firstly, this view assumes that a person’s welfare depends only 
on his or her consumption bundle (self-centred welfare). Secondly, the only goal of 
a person is to maximise his or her welfare (self-welfare goal). Thirdly, people always 
act purposively, that is, whatever they are choosing it is directed to reach their goals 
according to their order of preferences (self-goal choice) (Sen 1986, 7; 1988, 80). 
The self-centred welfare precludes the possibility that an agent’s welfare depends 
on the consumption bundles of some other persons. For instance, it rules out the 
possibility that someone feels worried because of another person’s extreme poverty 
and that this feeling negatively impacts his own well-being. The self-welfare goal 
excludes any attachment of any positive or negative weights to other people’s wel-
fare from the agent’s goals. The agent cannot aim to increase or diminish other 
people’s welfare. Finally, the self-goal choice states that the only motive behind a 
person’s actions is his or her desire to further their goals. All other motives, such as 
complying with social conventions or acting according to one’s religious and moral 
commitments have to be excluded.
The combination of self-welfare goal and self-goal choice allows one to infer 
that an agent makes his or her choice exclusively to further his or her welfare, which 
means that she always prefers and chooses things which enhance her own welfare 
(self-welfare choice). The self-welfare choice establishes choice – welfare inference 
by ruling out choices unrelated to the agent’s welfare, and not allowing the possibil-
ity of counter-preferential choices. The self-welfare choice, together with the self- 
centred welfare, completes the task of defining personal welfare on the basis of her 
choices. On this view, whatever one chooses, the choice will mean that it is her most 
preferred option and that it maximises her well-being. In other words, what is cho-
sen by an agent is always good for her or him. Thus, definitional egoism, implied by 
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the theory of revealed preferences, leads to the following tautological account of 
well-being:
The life of an agent S goes well if and only if S succeeds to choose, in the overwhelming 
majority of decisional situations he is faced with, the options that are the most preferred for 
him; and the statement that an option p is most preferred to S in a given decisional situation 
means that S chooses p in this situation.
The arguments against this view can be divided into two groups. The first one 
consists in a criticism of the assumption that the self-goal choice is true. The second 
group contains arguments rejecting this assumption. According to Daniel Hausman, 
the choice – welfare inference is doubtful even if people always make purposive 
choices. He points out that in order to infer welfare from an agent’s choices through 
her preferences, economists have to assume not only that the agent is goal-oriented 
and self-interested but also that she is aware of different available options, and can 
correctly judge what is better for her. Hausman gives the following example. 
“Suppose there are only two alternatives, x and y, and that x is in fact better for Jill 
than y. If Jill judges correctly, then Jill will rank the expected benefit of x above that 
of y. If Jill is self-interested, then Jill prefers x to y. If Jill knows that she can choose 
x or y, she will then choose x. The economist can then work backward. From Jill’s 
choice, the economist can infer Jill’s preference – but only on the assumption that 
Jill knows that she could have chosen y. From Jill’s preference for x over y, the 
economist can infer that Jill thinks that x is better for her than y is – but only on the 
assumption that Jill is self-interested. From Jill’s judgment that x is better for her 
than y is, the economist can conclude that x is, in fact, better for her – but only on 
the assumption that Jill’s judgment is correct (Hausman 2011, 89).” Hausman’s 
analysis shows that definitional egoism, in fact, excludes the possibility that the 
agent’s choice could be mistaken. Given how often people are wrong about their 
knowledge regarding available options or correct judgements, this is a rather uncon-
vincing assumption. Thus, Hausman concludes that a person’s choices do not deter-
mine what is good for her but can only be treated as evidence of her well-being. 
Even more fundamental objections against definitional egoism are raised by 
Amartya Sen. According to him, choice cannot be a part of the definition of an 
agent’s welfare because sometimes other people make choices for her. For instance, 
if the government decides how much money to spend on defence so that its citizens 
do not feel insecure, we cannot infer citizen’s well-being levels merely by looking 
at their choices. What is more, going beyond self-goal choice, an agent can be moti-
vated by other reasons than her welfare (even broadly understood). Someone can 
follow social rules or moral norms which are against his or her preference ordering. 
In such a case his or her choices cannot be seen as enhancing their welfare (Sen 
1980, 206).
The above definition of well-being forms a kind of non-normative view because 
it does not contain any reference to values (prudential or moral). However, we 
should be aware that the rejection of definitional egoism does not necessarily lead 
to the normative interpretation of well-being. There is a second version of non- 
normative account, according to which:
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The life of an agent S goes well if and only if, in the overwhelming majority of decisional 
situations S is faced with, S succeeds to choose the options that are the most preferred for 
him; and the statement that an option p is most preferred to S in a given decisional situation 
means that it occupies the highest place in his ranking of preferences which is constructed 
or given prior to the choice.
Unlike the previous one, this account (in terms of stated preferences) avoids the 
objection of being tautological, because it assumes that preferences are known prior 
to making a choice. But it is still non-normative, as it implies that only formal 
requirements are imposed on an agent’s ranking of preference. In particular, a set of 
preferences should be complete and transitive. Preference completeness means that 
an agent can either prefer x over y or y over x or is indifferent between them. It is 
essential to distinguish between indifference and inability to rank options. If an 
agent is indifferent between two options, it means that each of them is equally good 
for him, while if he is unable to rank them, not only does he not know whether one 
of them is better than the other but also whether they are equally good for him. The 
requirement of transitivity implies that if an agent prefers x over y, and y over z he 
also has to prefer x over z. This requirement protects the agent from being exploited, 
since, as the so-called “money pump argument” shows, a person with intransitive 
(cyclic) preferences will be eager to engage in a series of transactions where he 
“(…) will have paid a positive price for a zero benefit” (Schick 1986, 116). For 
instance, someone who prefers x over y, and y over z, and at the same time z over x 
will be ready to sell x to buy y, paying an extra money, then sell y to buy z, paying 
an extra money, then sell z to once again buy x, of course paying extra money. The 
series of transactions ends up at the point when an agent is left with the same good 
which he had at the beginning, but with less money. Although these formal require-
ments are important for an agent to ensure that his life will go well, this account of 
well-being, as we have seen, does not make any reference to prudential or moral 
values. So even though it is not a tautological concept of well-being, it is still non- 
normative: it does not rely on any substantive (axiological) assumptions. All of this 
leads us to the conclusion that in order to create a richer, normative account of well- 
being, we have to reject definitional egoism and move beyond purely formal con-
straints of preference ordering.
11.3  The Normative Account of Well-being
One can distinguish two ways to account for the normative conception of well- 
being: one in which well-being refers exclusively to prudential values, and the sec-
ond in which besides prudential values well-being includes some reference to moral 
ones. Let us investigate them in turn.
11 Beyond Mere Utility-Maximisation. Towards an Axiologically Enriched Account…
186
11.3.1  The Exclusive Approach: Well-being as Unconstrained 
Pursuit of Prudential Values
The exclusive approach to normative well-being assumes that there is only one kind 
of value which contributes to a person’s well-being, namely: prudential value. If 
something is prudentially valuable for someone, it means that it is good for him. The 
general theory of what it means that x is good for y was presented by Richard Kraut 
(2009). He claims that to say that x is good for y, we have to know the nature of both 
elements of this relationship as well as whether there is a certain fit or match between 
them. For instance, watering is good for potted flowers or changing the oil in a car 
is good for the engine or having a couple of devoted friends is good for a person. To 
say something about what is good for a person, that is what contributes to his or her 
well-being, we have to gain some knowledge about him or her.
As economists usually assume, the basic facts about human beings are a reflec-
tion of the basic tenet of folk psychology  – that people have some beliefs and 
desires. Roughly speaking, these mental entities are what enables them to form 
goals and make decisions which are supposed to lead them to the attainment of 
these goals. More technically, persons are capable of forming preferences and want 
them to be fulfilled. According to this view, p is good for S if and only if p satisfies 
S’s preference. For instance, if Eve would like to have a child and she, in fact, gives 
birth, then the baby is good for her. However, if she prefers not to have a child, and 
the reality matches her preferences, then not having the baby will be good for her. 
Because a person is an agent with a set of beliefs and desires, whatever is good for 
a person depends solely on her or his preferences. The match between a person’s 
preference and her preferable state of affairs depends on the occurrence of that state 
which guarantees satisfaction of the preference.
This somewhat formalistic view of prudential values, however, is an object of 
wide criticism. First of all, since a person exists in particular circumstances, her 
preferences can be influenced by many factors, which leads to the well-known prob-
lem of preference adaptation. What is more, preferences can be formed via indoctri-
nation; if they are formed in this way, they cannot be regarded as a genuine reflection 
of wants and beliefs of that particular person. One possible answer to these objec-
tions is to move into the direction of the theory of true preferences. On this theory, 
only preferences created by agents who are in the proper state of mind, that is, who 
always reason with the greatest possible care, and have all relevant information 
about the states of affairs should be taken into account (Harsanyi 1977, 646).
Finally, the view that something is good for a person – is prudentially valuable – 
just because she prefers it, may work well in some popular examples from economic 
textbooks but not necessarily in real-life situations. For instance, if someone has to 
choose between ice-cream and chocolate (a common dilemma in many economic 
textbooks), it is undoubtedly true that that dessert is good for him, which he prefers 
most. However, in real life, people often prefer something because they are con-
vinced that it is good for them. Following James Griffin (1993), we indicate that 
prudential values require going beyond the so-called taste model (that is, the view 
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that value of things is based only on personal tastes or preferences) towards the 
perception model which states that in order to prefer something, a person has to 
recognise its value first. In other words, people should prefer something because it 
is valuable, not the other way around. This way of conceptualising the relations 
between values and preferences is assumed in Griffin’s account of prudential val-
ues. He lists these values under the following categories: “(1) accomplishment (the 
sort of achievement that gives life point and weight), (2) the components of a char-
acteristically human existence (autonomy, liberty, and minimum material provi-
sion), (3) understanding, (4) enjoyment, and (5) deep personal relations” (Qizilbash 
1996, 155; Griffin 1993, 52). Usually, people share these values, though not all of 
them are equally important for all persons. It may be the case that something good 
for one person can be bad for someone else. The important thing is that if something 
is suitable for a particular person, according to Kraut (2009) it fosters a flourishing 
of the person. It is worth noticing that even this richer view of prudential values (as 
compared with the previous one which defines values in terms of preferences) can 
conflict with moral obligations. It may be the case that taking care of other people’s 
welfare, that is being altruistic, will require a sacrifice of some part of the agent’s 
well-being (e.g. if I devote some of my time to help other people at the cost of not 
realizing the prudential value of enjoyment, I sacrifice some of my prudential well-
being for the sake of moral values). Now, on the exclusive account of the normative 
well-being, such sacrifice always amounts to the diminution of well-being. This 
approach can be more precisely stated in the following way:
The life of an agent S goes well if and only if (a) S’s preference set contains a sufficiently 
large number of prudential preferences (i.e. preferences expressive of his attachment to 
prudential goods/values); (b) S chooses prudential goods in many decisional situations; (c) 
in the case of conflict between prudential values and moral values the agent always gives 
priority to the former.
As we have already mentioned, the normative force of this account of well-being 
rests on its reference to prudential values which are not purely subjective but depend 
on the perception of what is good for a human being. It is debatable whether this is 
an agent-neutral or agent-relative normativity; if the former, every person has a 
reason to promote or at least to not undermine other people’s welfare; if the latter, a 
person has a reason to support only her own well-being. But we shall analyse this 
problem further. We shall focus instead on a different question, namely: whether (as 
it is assumed in the exclusive approach) well-being can indeed be achieved by 
unconstrained (by moral values/obligations) pursuit of prudential values. We shall 
argue that it cannot.
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11.3.2  The Inclusive Approach: Well-being as Constrained 
Pursuit of Prudential Values
Let us recall that the exclusive approach to the normative account of well-being 
resolves the two main problems of the non-normative account. First, it is non- 
tautological, which means that the agent’s action cannot always be (ex-post) inter-
preted as contributing to her own well-being. It is true that this problem has also 
been resolved within the second version of the non-normative account – but in an 
essentially different way: by imposing certain formal requirements on the agent’s 
preferences and assuming that they are known prior to making a choice, and not (as 
in the exclusive approach) by introducing certain substantive requirements with 
regard to the content of the agent’s preferences. Resolving this problem by recourse 
to the exclusive approach is much more effective: it is by far easier to state that an 
agent failed to reach the state of well-being if the notion of well-being is defined in 
a more restrictive manner – by allowing not only formal but also substantive require-
ments. But this methodological advantage, as one may call it, is less important than 
the second one. The basic problem of the non-normative account is that it seems to 
be an incorrect explication of the concept of well-being, for the concept, on its ordi-
nary usage (though not on its usage that is dominant in economics!), has a norma-
tive dimension. Moreover, this dimension cannot be reduced to purely formal 
constraints imposed on the agent’s preferences. The exclusive approach to the nor-
mative account undoubtedly does some justice to this dimension. It, therefore, also 
resolves (at least to some extent) the second problem. But the question arises 
whether it does it full justice, i.e., whether it does not present well-being in an overly 
reductionist manner. Let us deal with this question at somewhat greater length. It 
will lead us to a richer account of well-being, one that makes some reference to 
moral values.
The exclusive account assumes (correctly, in our view), that the essential (in a 
causal or constitutive sense) components of well-being are prudential values. If the 
agent does not pursue them, or if she pursues them unsuccessfully, she cannot be 
said to have achieved the state of well-being. This claim seems to be true in the 
empirical sense (prudential values do seem to be the basic source of the positive 
subjective state, which we tend to call ‘well-being’). But in addition to this plausible 
claim, the exclusive account also includes a highly controversial one: that an agent 
who wants to achieve well-being should always give priority to prudential values in 
the case of their conflict with the moral ones. It is important to understand this (con-
troversial) claim properly: it does not say that a prudential agent can never act mor-
ally. If it did, it would be evidently false because the demands of prudence are often 
convergent with those of morality (that “honesty is always the best policy” is, 
regrettably, false, but it is for sure true that “honesty is often the best policy”). What 
it does say is that prudence and morality may give rise to mutually inconsistent 
claims and that, if we want to achieve well-being, we should always sacrifice the 
demands of morality. This claim is very difficult to evaluate. It is not even clear what 
method of evaluation one would need to assume. Whether the method should be 
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conceptual (one would then have to examine perhaps by ‘questionnaire’ methods of 
experimental philosophy, whether the concept of well-being, as it is commonly 
used, implies that absolute priority of prudential values over moral ones), or empiri-
cal (psychological research examining which of the two types of agents  – those 
never sacrificing prudential values for the sake of the moral ones or those sacrificing 
them at least occasionally – achieve a higher level of well-being would be needed). 
Even if the proper method were chosen, it would be naïve to expect that its results 
would be unequivocal. Their interpretation would, therefore, be difficult. But there 
seems to be a way out of this quandary. Instead of investigating into how people 
understand the concept of well-being or examining what psychological research 
says about the relations between various axiological rankings and the level of well- 
being, we can make recourse to purely normative considerations and ask whether a 
conception of well-being which implies the absolute priority of prudence over 
morality is normatively attractive. It might seem that the resolution of this problem 
is a matter of taste but, arguably, this is not so; there appears to be a simple and 
plausible test of a normative attractiveness of a (normative) conception of well- 
being, namely: whether we would be ready to defend it publicly, to present it openly 
to other people, or, more pertinently, to treat it as a central – legitimate and attrac-
tive – economic concept. One can safely assume that most of ‘us’ (including econo-
mists) would be rather embarrassed to admit publicly that their conception of 
well-being allows for pursuit of moral values only if it does not amount to the sac-
rifice of the prudential ones. In other words, if economics is not a ‘dismal science’, 
it cannot assume an exclusive approach to the normative account of well-being. It 
must go (and, arguably, it does go) beyond it.
But what an inclusive approach to the normative account might look like? It 
seems that one can distinguish its two main varieties. The first one assumes that:
The life of an agent S goes well if and only if (a) S’s preference set contains a sufficiently 
large number of prudential preferences (i.e., preferences expressive of his attachment to 
prudential goods/values); (b) S chooses prudential goods in many decisional situations; (c1) 
in the case of conflict between prudential preferences and moral values, the agent makes a 
reasoned choice between them on a case by case basis (i.e., prior to the decisional situation, 
he does not give priority to any of them).
The second one, in turn, assumes that:
The life of an agent S goes well if and only if (a) S’s preference set contains a sufficiently 
large number of prudential preferences (i.e. preferences expressive of his attachment to 
prudential goods/values); (b) S chooses prudential goods in many decisional situations; (c2) 
in the case of conflict between prudential preferences and moral values, the agent always 
give priority to moral preferences.
Accordingly, the first one treats moral values as important considerations which 
cannot be discounted while pursuing prudential values, but not as absolute con-
straints (only as prima facie constraints), whereas the second one treats them as 
‘trumps’ which always win over prudential values, that is as absolute constraints 
which set impassable limits to pursuing prudential values. We do not intend to 
decide which of these two varieties of the inclusive approach is the open one; we 
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leave it as an open question. But it is our conviction that any of them is more plau-
sible than either the non-normative ones or the exclusive approach to the normative 
account of well-being.
11.4  Concluding Thoughts
We have presented several accounts of well-being, starting from its two non- 
normative forms (which we criticised above all for their lack of normative dimen-
sion), and then passing to its normative accounts: unconstrained prudential and 
constrained prudential. We have argued that the constrained prudential account is 
most plausible. One may ask, however, why we have stopped here, that is, why we 
have not proposed another account, which would locate moral values (rather than 
prudential ones) in the centre and treat prudential values only as prima facie con-
straints and/or as playing only a subsidiary role in the achievement of well-being. 
The answer is twofold. First, the general concept of well-being which we endeav-
oured to explicate or build is subjective making no recourse – unlike the objective 
one (e.g. Aristotle’s) – to any strong metaphysical assumptions about what it means 
to be a full/perfect human being.1 Though, clearly, the conception which we 
defended – the constrained prudential one – contains also two (modest) objective 
components: (a) it assumes that the overwhelming majority of human beings cannot 
achieve subjective well-being, that is, feel satisfied with their life, if they do not 
realize prudential values, but (b) constrained in some way by moral values. The 
objective component (b) is all the more prominent since our argumentation for its 
introduction was primarily normative; we did not assume, though we find it plausi-
ble, that unjust people cannot be truly happy/satisfied with their life. Second, we 
have intended to compare only those conceptions of well-being which can be 
accommodated within economics – with its focus on the individual pursuit of vari-
ous goals, including ‘worldly’/‘material’ ones (social position, economic success, 
etc.), the subjective satisfaction with their attainment, and with its rejection of any 
stronger metaphysical assumptions. By contrast, it is characteristic for the classical 
(objective) conceptions of well-being (e.g., Aristotle’s, and especially that of the 
Stoics) that they assert that human beings can achieve well-being even in the abject 
economic conditions. The sublime detachment of this kind of well-being is admi-
rable but is not what economists understand by this term.
1 See, e.g., Sumner (1998).
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Chapter 12
Identity Theories in Economics: 
A Phenomenological Approach
Ivana Anton Mlinar and Ricardo F. Crespo
Abstract After the seminal 2001 paper written by George Akerlof and Rachel 
Kranton, the field of identity economics has increasingly developed. This paper 
presents a new approach to the definition of economic agents’ identity, sketching 
first the conditions required for an appropriate notion regarding the identity of eco-
nomic agents. Next, it summarizes earlier views outlined by Akerlof and Kranton, 
Amartya Sen, Miriam Teschl and Alan Kirman, and John B. Davis. Finally, it intro-
duces a phenomenological approach – following E. Husserl’s and K. Wojtyla’s con-
tributions  – combining ‘intentionality’, ‘position-takings’ and ‘habitualities’ as 
constitutive features of the experience of the acting personal self, to provide a satis-
factory identity concept for economic agents.
12.1  Introduction
The ‘anomalies’ of standard economic theory – the rational choice theory and the 
expected utility theory – that emerged in experiments conducted over the last 30 years 
have forced economics to consider imports from non-economic sciences to explain 
them. Thus, some new research programs, such as behavioural economics, evolution-
ary economics, neuroeconomics or the capability approach that take elements from 
other sciences, have been increasingly developed. Identity economics represents an 
important new approach. John Davis believes that behind the crisis of standard eco-
nomics’ concept of rationality lies its notion of individual identity (Davis 2011, 3). 
Identity economics captures the idea that personal identity of an individual  – an 
economic agent  – is important for explaining individual economic behaviour. 
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Personal identity greatly influences people’s decisions, including their economic 
decisions. As Davis states, ‘Economics and social science – […] – must make use of 
some conception of the individual to explain economic life’ (Davis 2003a, 22). The 
notion of identity is important to economics in that it provides a necessary theoretical 
or philosophical framework underlying our descriptions of individual economic 
agents. We need such a framework because without it the description of the individ-
ual economic agent may fail. The agent might still be modelled mathematically, as in 
standard optimization analysis, but, unless the underlying description can reasonably 
be said to identify the agent, there is no reason to believe that such an analysis refers 
to any particular individual. Indeed, we must be able to justifiably say to ‘whom’ a 
description applies if we are going to claim a realistic description.
In addition, the literature on identity and economics upholds that agents’ descrip-
tions fail to identify real people. Identifying the economic individual poses an issue. 
Standard economics endorses an atomistic conception of individuals, as Davis (2003a) 
argues. However, an individual’s multiple social commitments shape his/her sense of 
identity. Therefore, the atomistic individual conception proves inadequate for eco-
nomics. Moreover, behavioural economics has shown that individuals often make 
choices that are influenced by context. Yet, while contexts change, individuals remain 
the same, and individual identity is forged from choices, experiences and circum-
stances. Thus, it is relevant to know a person’s identity to knowing how he/she will 
act. In fact, Google, Facebook, Amazon use algorithms to detect users’ characteristics, 
identity, concerns, and tastes in order to offer them goods and services accordingly.
Consideration of an individual’s social links provides George Akerlof and 
Elizabeth Kranton the kick-off for identity economics. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, in its August 2001 issue, published an article entitled “Economics and 
Identity” by Akerlof and Kranton. They drew the definition of identity as ‘a person’s 
sense of self’ (2000, 715) from social psychology.1 These authors asked how per-
sonal identity affects economic facts (2000, 716) and believe that ‘[i]dentity can 
account for many phenomena that current economics cannot explain’ (2000, 715). 
They consider identity as ‘a new type of externality’ (2000, 717).
The notion of identity is also present in Nobel laureate Amartya Sen’s ‘capability 
approach’. In addition to his philosophical training, Sen draws from authors like 
Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum and Sen 1993) and Michael Sandel (Sen 1999) on 
identity. Economists-philosophers Alan Kirman and Miriam Teschl have also 
reflected on identity in economics. Davis, a leading figure in the field of philosophy 
of economics, has extensively worked on the concepts of identity and economics.
In this paper we will first question what conditions economics requires for a 
concept of identity. In the second section, we will review some literature on identity 
and economics, describing the positions adopted by Akerlof & Kranton, Sen, 
Kirman & Teschl, and Davis. Then, in the third section, we will present an approach 
that we believe meets the requirements of a notion of identity for economics: a 
phenomenological perspective on identity. In fact, we will argue that economic 
1 On the largely psychological roots of this notion, see Davis (2011, 72–75; 78).
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reality does not call for a specific notion of human agency and identity, but it needs 
a notion of them in their completeness and unity. Economic agents are not economic 
agents but ‘simply’ human agents, with their whole identity; these agents perform – 
among other human actions – economic actions, as construed as explained in Sect. 
12.1. Finally, a short conclusion will follow.
12.2  A Notion of Economics and Requirements 
for a Corresponding Concept of Identity
Kirman and Teschl (2004, 62) assert that ‘[t]he economic agent creates, builds, 
changes, and learns, is self-reflexive and evaluates her actions’. Crespo (2013, chap-
ter 2) discusses the deep meaning of economic matters – or ‘the economy’ – from a 
philosophical standpoint, characterizing economic reality as free, uncertain, and 
embedded in time. Crespo also notes its subjective character and its social entangle-
ment, exploring three meanings of ‘the economic’: (1) a metaphoric or improper 
meaning: human beings are ‘economic’ insofar as they have needs that they can 
satisfy using material means; (2) a proper, broad meaning: all decisions and actions 
geared to the acquisition and use of the goods that satisfy human needs are eco-
nomic: economic affairs, as they are commonly understood, regardless of their 
motivations, and (3) a proper, precise meaning: the maximizing character of the use 
of means in order to achieve ends with those decisions and actions is specifically 
economic. This last meaning matches the notion adopted by standard economics. 
Nonetheless, it lacks the richness implied in Kirman and Teschl’s description of the 
actions performed by economic agents and Crespo’s characterization of economic 
reality. We need a theory of agent and identity fitting with descriptions of ‘the eco-
nomic’ according to its second meaning – a proper broad meaning. Crespo (2013, 
chapter 2) also argues that the ‘focal’ meaning of ‘the economic’ is economic action.
Specifically speaking about political economy, John Stuart Mill implicitly con-
siders the second and third meanings mentioned above. He first defines political 
economy as follows:
What is now commonly understood by the term ‘Political Economy’ is not the science of 
speculative politics, but a branch of that science. It does not treat of the whole of man’s 
nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is con-
cerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of 
judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end. (1844/2006, 321)
The last part of the last sentence anticipates the currently prevailing definition of 
economics – namely, the third meaning of the economic mentioned above: the opti-
mum allocation of scarce means in order to satisfy given ends. However, Mill is 
aware that this description of political economy involves a simplifying abstraction:
All these operations, though many of them are really the result of a plurality of motives, are 
considered by Political Economy as flowing solely from the desire of wealth […] Not that 
any political economist was ever so absurd as to suppose that mankind are really thus con-
stituted. (1844/2006, 322)
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Therefore, he finally emphasizes the need to consider additional motives for 
these ‘operations’ in order to come to a correct explanation and prediction:
So far as it is known, or may be presumed, that the conduct of mankind in the pursuit of 
wealth is under the collateral influence of any other of the properties of our nature than the 
desire of obtaining the greatest quantity of wealth with the least labor and self-denial, the 
conclusions of Political Economy will so far fail of being applicable to the explanation or 
prediction of real events, until they are modified by a correct allowance for the degree of 
influence exercised by the other causes. (1844/2006, 323, see also 326–327)
We provide Mill as an example because, although he propounded the expression 
‘homo economicus’, he recognizes that it is an unreal abstract concept and that real 
agents’ economic decisions can be greatly influenced not only by economic factors 
but by a plethora of motivations.2 Adam Smith shares this conception. As Milonakis 
and Fine (2009, 19) assert, Smith’s theoretical edifice is ‘rich and multifaceted, 
encompassing philosophical, psychological, social, historical and economic ele-
ments’. Consideration of a plurality of motives for economic actions constitutes a 
central characteristic of the German Historical School of Economics. Schumpeter 
(1954, 177–78) remarks that a key feature of this school is that it recognizes that 
human actions, including economic actions, are not motivated by economic rewards 
only but are mostly guided by a ‘multiplicity of motives’, and that it stresses the 
need to concentrate more on individual correlations than on the general nature 
of events.
Max Weber (1949, 65–66) distinguished ‘specifically economic motives’ (almost 
corresponding to Lionel Robbins’ definition of economics) from ‘economically 
conditioned’ events and ‘economically relevant’ activities and situations which are 
not specifically economic. According to him, we find specifically economic actions 
only in ‘unusual cases’ (1978, 15). He considers that there are at least four types of 
social actions: ‘instrumentally rational’ (for example specifically economic actions), 
‘value-rational’, ‘affectual’ and ‘traditional’, and that it would be ‘very unusual’ to 
find actions ‘oriented only in one or another of these ways’ (1978, 32).
That is, as conceived by classical economic thinkers, the real ‘economic action’ 
involves not only the motivations considered by standard economics, but also ‘a 
plurality of motives’, ‘other causes’. These other motives or causes lie at the root of 
the characteristics of economic actions as described by Kirman and Teschl and by 
Crespo: they are rational, psychological, sociological, historical, and ethical – con-
sistent with the second meaning noted above.
Let us use an example to illustrate this point. Buying a new car is an economic 
action. When buying a car, you make calculations and economic comparisons 
among car models, taking into account their specific features. However, you may 
also feel loyalty to a brand, sympathy for the seller, or you may be used to buying 
cars from a single dealership; you listen to and take into account your wife’s tastes 
and opinions; you might be influenced by the beauty of a specific car, and so on. In 
short, there are plenty of motivations involved in the transaction.
2 On the origin of the expression ‘economic man’ and its meaning according to Mill, see 
Persky (1995).
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Thus, we need a concept of agency and identity that supports all the abilities and 
characteristics implied in the second meaning above. In fact, these traits do not call 
for an ‘economic’ specificity in agents and their identity. Agents performing eco-
nomic actions are entirely involved in these actions. A notion of ‘economic agent’ 
only makes sense for the third meaning the economic; consequently, as the third 
meaning is an ‘idealization’, we can only speak about an ‘economic agent’ as an 
unrealistic simplification. In the second meaning, there is no economic agent, but 
‘simply’ a human agent, that has to be considered in her completeness. Similarly, 
we do not need a specific notion of identity for economic actions but ‘simply’ a 
human identity – in all its richness. The example of buying a car shows how all 
kinds of motivations influencing human agency are involved.
Hence, it seems clear that an identity theory becomes necessary to grasp eco-
nomic affairs because the economic agency is essentially a human agency. Indeed, 
the agent, the acting-who must be considered in all her wholeness. In the last sec-
tion, we will introduce an identity theory that supports the characteristics of human 
agents when dealing with economic affairs, explaining the link between identity 
and agency.
The standard economist can be sceptical about the usefulness of considering 
identity in economics. This is understandable in the context of economics as cur-
rently conceived. However, within the conception of economics as a social science, 
with a methodology that leaves room for prudential reason assessing decisions 
stemming from an incommensurable plurality of motives, identity happens to be a 
central motive. This concept differs greatly from today’s economics but draws 
closer to classical political economy. The authors of this paper believe that the 
‘spirit’ of this ancient original thought about economic life should be re-established 
and that personal and social identity constitute a critical factor for consideration.
12.3  Identity Theories in Economics
Identity theories supported by the following authors vary based on distinct philo-
sophical notions. We will concentrate on Akerlof and Kranton’s ‘foundational’ the-
ory and we will then present other theories as well as some criticisms raised against 
them by different authors.
12.3.1  Akerlof and Kranton
Using standard economic reasoning tools, such as utility functions and game theory, 
Akerlof and Kranton show that some presumed anomalies in the standard model 
(rational choice theory and expected utility theory) can be explained by agents’ 
identity. They state (2002, 1168):
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An individual gains utility when her actions and those of others enhance her self-image. 
Furthermore, self-image, or identity, is associated with the social environment: People think 
of themselves and others in terms of different social categories. Examples of social 
 categories include racial and ethnic designations, and in the school context include, for 
example, “jock” and “nerd.” Prescriptions give the ideal, or stereotypical physical attributes 
and behavior, of people in each category. Individuals then gain or lose utility insofar as they 
belong to social categories with high or low social status and their attributes and behavior 
match the ideal of their category.
These authors think that ‘[w]ithout a model that mirrors this sociology, economic 
analysis produces only partial answers to key questions’ (2002, 1168), arguing that 
‘identity and norms bring something new to the representation of tastes’ (2010, 6). 
Consequently, they incorporate these new elements to the utility function, viewing 
the latter as two-fold: the traditional ‘standard utility’ and ‘Identity-utility’ (2005, 
14; 2010, chapter 3, 17ff). They assert, ‘[w]e suppose a person chooses actions to 
maximize her utility, given her identity, the norms and the social categories. She 
balances her Part 1 standard utility and her Part 2 identity utility’ (2010, 18).
This proposal proves positive because it considers new motivations for economic 
actions, which is a very realistic notion. However, the introduction of these motiva-
tions fails because the sociological new inputs lose their meaning in the logic of 
utility maximizing, which is not their ‘natural’ logic. The unity of the ‘instrumental 
self’ as Elizabeth Anderson (1993, 39) calls the ‘self’ involved in this economic 
kind of logic, hinges on the unity of its preferences. It cannot account, she explains, 
‘for the rational unity of our emotions, attitudes, internalized norms, intentions, and 
ways of deliberating. In unifying a person’s preferences and choices around the 
achievement of particular consequences, the instrumental view creates discord 
among other aspects of the self’ (1993, 40). The instrumental view only includes 
other motivations – as Akerlof and Kranton posit – for an instrumental reason – in 
order to maximize utility – and, thus, ‘denaturalizes’ these motivations, which do 
not focus on utility maximization. Instead of subsuming or understanding the instru-
mental motivation in terms of identity, it subsumes or understands identity in terms 
of instrumentality. Paraphrasing Anderson (1993, 79), identity ‘has global author-
ity’ over all possible motivations of actions, while instrumental calculations ‘play 
various local roles within it’. Or, as Martha Nussbaum (1999, 183) puts it, cost 
benefit analysis only serves as an ‘acolyte’.
A consequence of the flip side implicit in Akerlof and Kranton’s theory is, as 
Teschl (2010, 447) remarks, that ‘as with all non-market goods, the question is how 
to evaluate benefits and costs and in the Akerlof and Kranton case, how to evaluate 
identity gains and losses’ (see also Kirman and Teschl 2004, 76–77). Herein lies an 
incommensurability issue that requires a decision-making process other than a cost- 
benefit analysis: using practical reason.3
3 See Nussbaum (1999, 182–185), Henry Richardson (1994, 69–86; 209–227). Davis criticizes the 
inclusion of identity in the utility function, arguing that this is a ‘circular explanation’: ‘the prefer-
ences-utility conception of the individual says that if one has one’s own (well-ordered) prefer-
ences, one can be represented with a utility function and then identified as an independent 
individual. This, however, only assumes what needs to be shown’ (2016a, 24).
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We think that the case of Akerlof & Kranton provides a good example of a pro-
cess described by John Davis (2008b, 365):
economics, as other sciences, has regularly imported other science contents in the past, and 
having subsequently ‘domesticated’ them, remade itself still as economics. In the current 
situation, for example, behavioral economics — a research program in economics, not in 
psychology – employs imports from psychology but frames them in terms of economic 
concerns.
Indeed, Akerlof and Kranton consider psycho-social motivations for economic 
behaviour, but they ‘domesticate’ them with the logic of instrumental rationality. 
Viktor Vanberg (2008, 605–610) reasonably notes that seeking to account for non- 
economic motives by including them as preferences misses the point. Instrumental 
motives are outcome oriented. There are non-instrumental motives that are not 
guided by outcomes but by actions that are valuable by themselves; an instance of 
‘preferences over actions per se’ (Vanberg 2008, 609). This is the case, among oth-
ers, of actions motivated by people’s identities.
In addition, Akerlof and Kranton correctly note that there are inconsistencies 
between different times in people’s lives (2010, 126). Yet, ‘what then is the overall 
identity of the person? It seems that Akerlof and Kranton’s approach to introduce 
identity as motivation for choice leads to the paradox that it dissolves a person’s 
overall identity’ (Teschl 2010, 447).
Davis (2011, 81–84) also stresses that Akerlof and Kranton avoid the ‘multiple 
selves’ problem by adopting a partial equilibrium analysis: there is no specific cri-
terion to unite people’s multiple social identifications. Also, Jason Potts (2008, 4) 
points out that Akerlof and Kranton offer an ‘equilibrium identity’ analysis, while 
he believes that identity is ‘by definition a dynamic disequilibrium, in which identity 
is developed and maintained in an entropic open-system context’.4 Potts argues for 
a ‘generic evolutionary model of identity’ in which, ‘rather than conceptualizing 
identity in terms of departures from rationality, identity instead enters economic 
analysis in terms of the drive to continually recreate and re-invest in individual 
coherence’ (2008, 10).
In short, while Akerlof and Kranton introduce the idea of taking into account 
identity as a motivation for economic behaviour, they do it in an ‘economic-like’ 
way that does not lead to the very identity of economic agents. This is why Davis 
(2006, 374–377) refers to this position as ‘the neoclassical strategy’.5 Our pro-
posal for a phenomenological approach includes a non-consequentialist notion 
of identity, i.e., not depending on the outcomes of actions. We will introduce it 
in Sect. 12.3.
4 Italics in the original text.
5 See also Ben Fine’s critical article, with similar arguments (2009).
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12.3.2  Amartya Sen
In Reason before Identity (1999), Sen devotes a whole section to the question 
‘Discovery or Choice?’ (1999, 15–19). Sen’s view of identity derives from his 
answer to this question asked by communitarian Michael Sandel. Sandel states that 
we discover our identities, while Sen believes that we choose them. He softens this 
view by saying that our choices are not unrestricted (1999, 17) and that sometimes 
we also make discoveries, but he adds: ‘choices have to be made even when discov-
eries occur’ (1999, 19). Davis (2008a) argues that Sen regards having an identity as 
the most important capability. Given that, for Sen, identity is built by the choices an 
individual makes, it must be central to the development of individuals’ all other 
capabilities.
Some authors referring to Sen speak about a metaphysical deficit in his view, 
which hinges on an insufficient conception of human nature. Crocker (1992, 588) 
asserts that neither Sen nor Nussbaum is trying to ground their ethical proposals on 
a metaphysics of nature or an account of a trans-historical human essence. Des 
Gasper (1997, 288ff; 2002, 442, 447, 449–450) complains about Sen’s ‘thin’ con-
ception of the person, adding that Sen’s theory also lacks an elaborated theory of the 
good (2002, 441). Sabina Alkire and Rufus Black (1997) propose to complete Sen’s 
‘deliberately incomplete approach’ with John Finnis’ practical reason principles. 
With a more positive approach, Séverine Deneulin (2002) argues that the policies 
undertaken according to the capability approach (CA) need to be guided by a per-
fectionist view of the human good. Ananta Giri (2000) regrets the lack of a creative 
and reflective self in Sen’s notions.6 Benedetta Giovanola (2005) argues for the 
expansion of Sen’s notion on the human person in Marxian terms. The very diverse 
orientations of these suggestions to overcome Sen’s incomplete definitions points to 
the difficulties of establishing a conception of human beings. However, a minimum 
notion would help to provide the grounds for a basic guide for social and economic 
policymaking and would consequently improve CA’s operating nature.
12.3.3  Kirman and Teschl
Alan Kirman and Miriam Teschl assert that standard economics has answered the 
question what economic agents are by describing them as maximizing beings who 
follow their preferences and constraints represented by a utility function. More 
recently, economics has answered where people are locating them in a specific net-
work and society. Akerlof and Kranton’s model considers what and where a person 
is, but not who she is (2004, 73). They propose an answer – new in economics – 
about who she is: ‘a self-reflexive human being who has the capacity of actively 
6 Sen’s concept of commitment (1977, 2002) seems, however, to entail a reflective self, see Davis 
(2008a, b).
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discovering and consciously creating her identity within a given social context’ 
(2004, 63). These authors believe that this answer is philosophical and goes beyond 
psychology or social identity. They rely on Derek Parfit’s (1984) ‘complex view of 
identity’ and on Pierre Livet’s (2004, 2006) account of personal identity when pre-
senting their ‘who-identity model of identity’ (2004; 2006, 303). From Parfit, they 
draw the idea of the key role of continuity in personal identity (2006, 316). Livet 
views personal identity as the interplay between two identity functions: personal-
ity – more stable – and social status. These ideas inspired Kirman and Teschl (2006, 
316–317) notion on who-identity. They describe it as follows:
In our view, the identity of the economic agent is not characterized by a given and unchang-
ing preference ordering or orderings, but reflects rather a process of continuity and change, 
i.e. an interplay of three different aspects of a persona that evolve over time: what she cur-
rently is and does, who she wants to be and where she chooses to participate, that is, to 
which social group she chooses to belong. Each of these aspects will correspond to a vector 
in the characteristics space, a list, undoubtedly very long, of all relevant features of that 
aspect. The three chosen vectors can be thought of as forming the ‘corners’ of a triangle of 
identity that moves and changes in a space of characteristics.
Who a person wants to be is her desired self-image, and, to become who she 
wants to be, the person will choose to identify with the corresponding social groups. 
However, both the desired self-image and the social groups can change and influ-
ence each other.
This proposal accounts for what the person wants to be and, consequently, what 
she wants to choose and what social group she wants to join, as well as subsequent 
possible changes. Yet, the question remains as to who the ‘who’ that underlies all 
these desires, choices and changes is. In fact, Davis (2011, 197) believes that Kirman 
and Teschl reproduce Akerlof and Kranton’s ‘multiple selves’ problem  – albeit 
more dynamically. Davis argues, ‘How can someone be said to have a personal 
identity if what that involves continually changes?’ Indeed, this is essentially the 
conclusion of Horst, Teschl, and Kirman (2007, 23), who say that ‘personal identity 
of individuals is relatively weak’.
12.3.4  John Davis
For the past few years, John B. Davis has focused on the analysis of the concept of 
identity underlying different economic currents and his own concept of identity. 
Beginning with a book chapter in 2001 and spanning two books (2003b, 2011) and 
a great number of articles, this topic remains the main focus of his intellectual work 
to this day. This section will not deal with Davis’ appraisal of identity notions in 
economic theories but with his own concept, especially centring on the ideas 
expressed in his 2011 book Individuals and Identity in Economics.
Davis (2011, 4) calls his approach to identity ‘an ontological-criterial approach 
to identity’. He wonders ‘what the concept of an individual requires, or what funda-
mental criteria are involved in referring to things as individuals’ (2011, 4). He 
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establishes two criteria: first, the individuation criterion, representing individuals as 
‘distinct and independent beings’ (2011, 5). He adds that ‘for individuals to be dis-
tinct and independent, they must hold together as single whole beings and cannot 
fragment or break up into multiple selves’ (2011, 9). Second, he refers to the re- 
identification criterion, by which those individuals can be re-identified as distinct 
and independent, despite changes in many individual’s characteristics (2011, 5).
Inspired by Sen and Pierre Livet (2006), Davis holds that the individual has a 
special personal identity capability, ‘interpreted as a capability for maintaining and 
developing an account of oneself in changing interactions with others’ (2011, 188). 
He labels this position ‘the capabilities conception of the individual’ (2011, 170). 
Individuals have several changing capabilities. The danger to be avoided is the pos-
sibility of transforming the individual in a set of multiple selves, not a unified sin-
gle being.
He believes this problem can be overcome with ‘self-narratives’ – ‘discursive 
accounts people keep of themselves’ (2011, 183) – that allow people to ‘construct 
personal identities for themselves in the form of autobiographies’ (2011, 171).7 The 
identity capability is people’s ability to organize themselves through a self-narrative 
(2011, 190). Self-organizing allows people to have enduring personal identities 
(2011, 209). Self-narratives are ‘evolutionary, open-ended, and generally do not get 
resolved, because people are continually engaged in developing their capabilities 
and this continually creates new possibilities for how their narratives will proceed’ 
(2011, 209).
Rather than an individual task, this implies a mutual influence of personal and 
social identities: ‘who they [individuals] are is socially influenced, while at the same 
time they are a part of the social world because they influence it as well’ (2011, 
213). Thus, self-narratives are both individual and social.
Miriam Teschl (2011, 79)8 describes Davis’ position on identity:
This evolution and development of capabilities occurs through social interaction in society. 
Conflict is important here: different capabilities arise out of different social identities, but it 
is the conflicts between identities that generate the need to engage in self-organizing pro-
cesses. Social identity has two aspects for individuals. One is relational and concerns an 
individual’s engagement with others from a particular position or role that they occupy 
using first-person, i.e., self-reflexive, representations. The other is categorical and concerns 
the collective aspect of their identity, assessed from a third-person perspective. Over their 
lifetimes, individuals keep narrative accounts of themselves, which is a way to reflect on 
conflicts that their social identities may create, and this engagement and self-examination is 
what constitutes their personal identities. Indeed, personal identity is an evolving narrative, 
but it does not necessarily have to be a single, continuous story. It is rather a succession of 
ongoing conflict-solving discursive accounts, which also help the individual reflect upon 
the past and project themselves into the future. It is a way of being influenced by and influ-
encing the social structure in which the individual evolves. The individual is thus socially 
embedded, and yet each self-narrative is highly individualized.
7 Italics added. From a philosophical point of view the idea of constructing identities has Kantian 
reminiscences and the idea of constructing them through self-narratives has links with contempo-
rary conceptions of language.
8 Italics added.
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For Davis (2011, 204), the relational social identity proves pivotal for other 
social identities and unifies them.
More recently, Davis (2016b, 23) has stressed the idea of reflexivity linked with 
identity: ‘individual behavior and identity need to be understood in terms of some 
sort of capacity to reflexively orient on that behavior and identity, a type of idea 
which has had little place in the theory of decision-making in economics, with a few 
exceptions’. He uses Sen’s notion on identity and self-scrutiny as an example, asso-
ciating it with John Searle’s idea of preferences as ‘the product of practical reason-
ing’ (2001, 253). However, the question remains, who is the individual that 
self-narrates or reflects? Which is her identity?
In the next section we present an alternative theory which, in our opinion, is 
consistent with the concept of economic theory described in Sect. 12.1.
12.4  An Alternative Proposal for the Definition 
of Personal Identity
Kirman and Teschl have insightfully noticed that considering what and where a 
person is does not meet all the requirements for an identity-model, but who she is 
actually does (2004, 73). However, we find that a who-identity is not explained 
either by merely recognizing a continuity factor or by admitting an individuation 
criterion, as Davis suggests (2011, 4–5); then, both individuation and re- identification 
criteria fail to characterize personal identity: they may apply to any thing or being 
but only as thing or being – that is, just different from other individuals belonging 
to the same species. The essentially personal condition of identity is missing, and so 
is identity itself. As shown by the who-formula itself, identity starts with a first- 
person demand, which, of course, may have and indeed does have third-person cor-
relates, as indicated below.
Most contemporary philosophical discussions on personal identity9 still factor in 
John Locke’s core account of personal identity, in terms of recollection of past expe-
riences or psychological conscious experience of oneself as a means to ensure that 
continuity factor needed among multiple possible changes over time: ‘and as far as 
this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far 
reaches the Identity of that Person’ (Locke 1975, 27). The fact that a person persists 
over time does not weigh more heavily than some other facts generally spelled out 
in either biological or psychological terms, or both. These kinds of interpretation, 
usually known as complex view, analyse personal identity in terms of simpler rela-
tions. This theory not only leads to inconsistences but also fails to explain personal 
identity.10 Biological and psychological continuity (in all its possible  realizations: 
9 See Shoemaker and Swinburne 1984, Parfit 1984, Williams 1970 and Lewis 1986, among others.
10 Thomas Reid formulated one such inconsistency by considering the example of a person who 
can now remember her first day in high school but cannot remember her first day in primary 
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memory, personality, projects, preferences…) may be regarded as epistemic criteria 
for an individual diachronic identity, but it provides neither the necessary nor suf-
ficient conditions for personal identity.11 The question of what it takes for a person 
to persist over time is different from the question of how to find out whether a per-
son at one time is identical to a person at another time. Epistemic criteria for recog-
nizing personal identity over time must not be confused with criteria for identity itself.
Here we present another conception, a phenomenological approach to personal 
identity, as a contribution to getting a grasp of the acting personal self from a first- 
person perspective. Husserl’s critique of Locke’s understanding of conscious expe-
rience narrows down to remarking that Locke, like many others in the history of 
philosophy, did not understand intentionality (1956, 76; 92; 110; 112; 114). Husserl 
states, ‘If one has no insight into what is essential to intentionality and into the spe-
cific method that belongs to it, one can also not acquire an insight into what is 
essential to personality and personal accomplishments’ (1968, 221).
The phenomenological understanding of the intentionality of consciousness 
allows us to formulate a theory of personal identity that (1) can account for the con-
tinuity of consciousness over time, (2) provides an account of an aspect of what it 
means to be a person – namely to be able to appropriate one’s past actions and 
thoughts as one’s own (not merely to remember them or not) – and (3) gives an 
original answer to the question of personal identity, establishing what the identity of 
a person over time involves.
In phenomenological terms, intentionality is the basic feature of consciousness – 
that is, to be always conscious of something, to be always geared towards some-
thing, to transcend oneself (Husserl 1984, §§ 9–21; 1977, § 36). In other words, 
intentionality is a relational capacity. However, where a person is concerned, inten-
tionality is not just any relational capacity. Merely experiencing the world and 
school, although, on her first day in high school, she could remember her first day in primary 
school (Reid 2002, 262). Another inconsistency appears when considering identity during sleep: 
the insistence of Locke himself about the necessarily self-aware nature of our thoughts challenges 
the possibility that there could be self-aware thought during sleep of which we have no recollection 
(Locke 1975, II, 1, §10). He even argues that my inability to recollect the thoughts I presumably 
entertained during sleep leaves open the possibility that they could belong to another person (1975, 
II, 1, §11).
11 Knowing everything about bodily and psychological properties and their relations would still 
leave the question of personal identity unanswered. Consequently, personal identity is conceivable 
in the absence of psychological and bodily relations. An argument points, for example, to changes 
of body and psychology (see e.g. Swinburne 1984, 22–3). I can conceive myself as having your 
body and psychology and you as having mine (more than a thought experiment, it is, by the way, 
the experience of thought insertion and delusion of control, very common in schizophrenic 
patients). I could also imagine that I might not have existed, but that instead someone else exists 
with the same life and body that I actually have. If these scenarios really are metaphysical possi-
bilities, then psychological or bodily relations are neither necessary nor sufficient for personal 
identity: there is a possible world where I exist without the bodily and psychological properties 
that I actually have, and another one where the bodily and psychological properties I actually have 
belong to another person.
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others does not, according to Husserl, make us persons yet (animals also do it, 
which may be viewed as a rudimentary first-person perspective, in contrast to a 
robust one12).
For Husserl (1973, 196), us being persons originates in us performing a specific 
kind of intentional act, which he calls ‘position-taking’ (Stellungnahme). In the 
same sense, Wojtyla asserts that “knowledge about man and his world has been 
identified with the cognitive function […] And yet, in reality, does man reveal him-
self in thinking or rather in the actual enacting of his existence? – in observing, 
interpreting, speculating, or reasoning […] or in the confrontation itself when he 
has to take an active stance upon issues requiring vital decisions and having vital 
consequences and repercussions?” (Wojtyla 1979, vii–viii).
To be a self – namely, to be a person – means, first, not to be a natural object – 
that is, an ‘I’ does not appear as a dependent part of causal connections, as a mere 
individual with its specific essential features, but it emerges in motivational connec-
tions of intentional subjects. This can be understood considering that causality is the 
fixed and empirical legality of physical nature, characterized by certainties in expec-
tations, whereas motivation serves as the basic principle of consciousness – in other 
words, of the subjective condition. Husserl (2004, 299) asserts, ‘It should be taken 
into account that this causality of nature, […], is radically different from the causal-
ity of motivation that purely reigns inside the sphere of the mental, of the sphere of 
the immanent subjectivity. In the case of causality of motivation, the necessity of the 
connection is comprehensible’. For him, ‘causality in the physical nature is nothing 
else than a fixed empirical regulation of coexistence and succession, always given 
in the experience in form of certainties in expectation’ (1960, 134).
The intentional character of an ‘I’ entails taking a stance towards things, towards 
the world and others, not merely relating in a fixed, predictable way but in a com-
prehensible manner. It consists of more than perceptual, wakeful awareness, but it 
does not involve other higher-order activities in its original core sense. Taking a 
stance does not include making explicative or comparative judgments  – higher- 
order activities. It is simply the defining feature of the personal subjective condition 
of the self; then, it is the “quality” of the subjective way to view or connect with 
objects (facts, etc.), revealing their traits but not as imposed features. Subjective 
receptivity adopts this form: specific availability directions are in the person, influ-
encing the (theoretical, axiological or practical) way she handles an object 
(facts, etc.).
All position-taking occurs as a specific form of intentional directedness towards 
being, values, or goals. By means of a progressive position-taking exercise, a stable, 
“sedimented” character is shaped – that is, the person becomes determined, more 
receptive to specific dimensions or directions of the availability of things or facts. 
That is why, as persons, we become characterized by a habituality originated in our 
activity (Husserl 1966, 360). Our past position-takings remain alive to the extent 
that they shape our future active life. Thus, the person correlates with a horizon of 
12 Cf. Baker (2015, 156).
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sense. To relive the past is to remember, but ‘habituality’ does not mean remember-
ing a past position-taking. Position-takings have their own way of shaping the pres-
ent, enduring as characteristics of the self, who is the agent responsible for all the 
positions she has taken.
As the bearer of such enduring position-takings, the ego is always more than the 
source of its positing, since it is, as a personal ego, also the product of this positing. 
Through the concept of action, Wojtyla also aims to show not only the person’s 
fundamental experience of being the cause of her own actions, but to be self- 
determining, that is, − as Buttiglione interprets – the person not only moves beyond 
the body and the psyche by transcending them but also integrates them in action 
(1997, 144). The person reveals and realizes herself in action.
As a self with a personal history in the form of enduring interests, choices, and 
convictions, I am not just aware of a perceptually appearing surrounding; rather, I 
am aware of this surrounding as displaying my interests, goals, and projects. More 
precisely, the enduring convictions, projects, and beliefs are expressed in the inter-
est the subject takes in certain cultural, social, scientific, and political practices, 
which are revealed by the way one experiences the world. What one stands for, 
moreover, is not some private affair; rather, it shows in the inter-subjective situation 
via the way we act, think, and talk.
Even if we take the same decisions as others, or if we change our minds con-
stantly, our personal history would, from a phenomenological perspective, still be 
characterized by an identity: as one always asked to take a position – that is, to relate 
with a horizon of sense – and as the agent solely responsible for taking that position. 
“In this experience man manifests himself as the person, that is to say, as the highly 
specific structure of self-governance and self-possession” (Wojtyla 1979, 179). 
Thus, being a specific person does not mean having a specific corresponding set of 
features that only belongs to me; then I can indeed share decisions, convictions and 
traits with others. In fact, there can be one or more individuals with precisely the 
same set of features as me.
My positions individualize me because they are mine; they originated in me, and, 
as such, they correlate with an environment. I do not endure like any worldly object, 
nor do I persist in the way that my habitualities do. The mere ability to recollect a 
past experience or action does not yet imply the ability to personally appropriate it 
–that is, to take a position, to be intentionally – not causally – related. There is an 
essential sense of self-governance that denotes the person both as the one who gov-
erns herself and as the one who is in a way subjected and subordinate to herself 
(Wojtyla 1979, 190 ff).
Thus, it may be said that recollection most often reveals continuity, even though 
the possibility of recollecting is not enough to establish such personal continuity. 
When I recollect a certain point in my life and still think that I have made the right 
decision in favour of, for example, a certain profession, the explicit appropriation of 
my past decision shows that this decision still holds today, both in the sense that I 
would make the same decision again and that this decision was mine all along, as a 
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habitual and ‘sedimented’ decision. As such, this decision, even without being re- 
enacted constantly, has implicitly structured and influenced my other decisions and 
even prevented me from making other decisions. Indeed, I am still the same person 
that I was before. Thus, personal identity relies on the capacity to be intentionally 
related – whether in perception, memory, future or fiction… –, which entails a cor-
relation between myself and a horizon of sense.
As a result, an individual’s formal identity appears as the recollecting and recol-
lected subject from a third person perspective: a bundle of characteristics, experi-
ences, features and actions… A genuine personal identity consists of more than the 
continuity of our conscious awareness and the relative continuity of ourselves over 
time, changing continuously as we continuously take new stances and revise old 
ones. A person is hence a whole recognizable by certain habitualities in correlation 
with an environment. These habitualities provide actual volitional direction, in com-
bination with the motives given in present; then, a person is the subject of free 
motivations.
Summing up, to be regarded as the only one responsible for taking a stance and 
not merely as a being that endures over time makes me an ego, separating me from 
natural objects. Yet, this does not say anything about my personal identity, my 
uniqueness. My position-taking characterizes me, not only setting up my present 
way of connecting with the world and others but also establishing my correlation 
with a horizon of sense. The positions that I take become habitualities, sedimented 
stances. Even though they can be and actually are revised, some of them (individual 
and universal) remain unchanged. This fixed relational condition makes up my per-
sonal acting self.
Thus, the phenomenological approach to personal identity may fill the gap 
between hitherto considered formal identity and agency. Formal perspectives of 
identity fail to grasp that ultimate sense of what is personal and, therefore, fall short 
of explaining personal agency. That intuited “new type of externality” (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2000, 717) may be found as the expression of the intentional as the moti-
vated way of connecting with the world through habitualities. Davis’ individuation 
and re-identification criteria were considered as grounded on the capability for 
developing accounts of oneself that give coherence to changes and different stories, 
emerging like different ‘selves’ (Davis 2011, 188). However, how could first- 
personal givenness be brought about by narrative structures? An account of self that 
disregards the basic structures and features of our intentional-experiential life is not 
fundamental, and this is the first-person perspective with the primitive form of self- 
reference that it entails. In order to tell stories about one’s own experiences and 
actions, one must already hold a first-person perspective. Personal identity can be 
found here, and it may, in turn, correlate with narratives.
Moreover, a certain dimension of inaccessibility and transcendence that charac-
terizes others – the reason why the other is an other – comes precisely from the fact 
that they are also selves, with their own irreplaceable, unique first-person 
perspectives.
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12.5  Conclusion
In the introductory section we have discussed the importance of identifying the 
agent in economics. This depends on a particular vision of economics that has been 
sketchily developed in Sect. 12.1. In Sect. 12.2 we have introduced the concepts of 
identity in economics proposed by Akerlof and Kranton, Sen, Kirman and Teschl, 
and John Davis. Finally, in Sect. 12.3, we have looked for another theoretical frame-
work, presenting a phenomenological position about personal identity.
It seems that neither memory nor mere continuity or recollection embody the who, 
the personal self. The mere formal identity of myself as the self that is both recollect-
ing and recollected, or as the individual capable of being represented as a distinct and 
independent being and that can also be re-identified despite changes – according to 
Davis – is not a personal identity but an individual diachronic identity akin to that of 
any other object or being. These traits could prove valid epistemic criteria to recognize 
identity and its continuity over time, but they must not be confused with criteria for 
identity itself. The key notion is intentionality – actually, intentionality as the essential 
and structural feature of a personal self: as position- taking. To take a position or stance 
means to enter into a motivational (not mere causal) level of relationship with the 
world and others and, therefore, to generate ‘habitualities’ over time – a ‘sedimented’ 
structure informing my actual volitional life in correlation with a horizon of sense. 
‘Habitualities’ are individualized not because of their specific content (that can be 
revised, changed and even shared with others), but because of their mineness – their 
first person perspective. The notion of a true self as the persistent core of personal 
identity lies, however, on the ultimate definitiveness of my position-takings: those 
personal convictions that I experience as an individual calling and values that claim 
for universality. Thus, decisions, projects and preferences supporting my true self are 
of a capital importance, and following them leads to habitual attitudes – a sedimented 
structure that informs my present and future experience of the environment.
If an ‘economic action’ is a typical human action, all of human agents’ motiva-
tions and characteristics participate in it. The specificity of economic action  – 
broadly understood – does not call for human agent and human identity specificity; 
quite the contrary, it requires the consideration of them in their full wholeness 
and unity.
A phenomenological account considers the person as a whole, and, therefore, the 
above-mentioned human characteristics of people’s actions in relation to economic 
matters are also involved. People are particularly understood as free, facing uncer-
tainty, but having a specific style when connecting to the world, gained through their 
position-takings. Hence, they build their own identity in relation to the environment 
and to others. All the former qualify as characteristics of economic affairs and 
agents, as described previously. Economic agents are not different from human 
agents. Every one of them is a singular person who takes positions that make her 
who she is, becoming habitualities, sedimented stances. She decides and acts based 
on this personal identity, which is obviously richer than any economic maxi-
miser agent.
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Chapter 13
Temporal Structures of Justification 
in the Economic Analysis of Law: Legal 
Philosophy and Free Will
Kevin Jackson
Abstract In an appropriation of jurisprudence away from moral philosophy in the 
name of advancing positive science, the economic analysis of law repudiates judi-
cial responsibility in regard to human freedom and rights. I argue that the moral 
freedom and responsibility presupposed by a system of legal rights should not be 
eclipsed by narrow causal determinism but instead upheld by proper judicial dis-
cernment of wider temporally balanced structures of legal rights within such a sys-
tem. Indeed, this is part of a wider claim that moral philosophy at large proceeds at 
its best by means of a temporally holistic reasoning process. I am interested in 
exposing and challenging theoretical bias and unacknowledged assumptions about 
time-value – in particular the privileging of future outcomes – lurking behind the 
economic analysis of law philosophy.
13.1  Economic Analysis of Law
Economic analysis of law uses concepts from micro-economic theory to analyse 
legal rules and institutions. Such an approach adopts the idea of rational action that 
is at the heart of micro-economic theory.
The notion of rational action in economic theory holds that each agent will act to 
maximize her or his preferences no matter what environment is being considered. 
Preferences are rankings of various elements in one’s domain of preference. An 
agent’s domain of preference is made up of the things that fundamentally matter to 
him or her. For typical consumer behaviour models, an agent has fundamental pref-
erences over consumption bundles. The consumer’s decision problem consists of 
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choosing a consumption bundle from the set of feasible consumption bundles (fea-
sibility being defined by prices of goods and the income of the agent).
Normally the scenario for an economic analysis of law is slightly more compli-
cated. An agent will have preferences concerning a set of consequences, like income, 
health or wealth. And the agent chooses an action that partly determines which con-
sequence is realized. Ordinarily the domain of preference differs from the domain of 
choice. That is usually because an agent chooses a strategy that, coupled with the 
strategy choices of other agents, together determines the consequence at hand.
Richard Posner advances two theses that are characteristic of the economic anal-
ysis of law (Posner 2014). What is termed the “positive” thesis says that, as a factual 
matter, the legal rules of common law are efficient. His second thesis, usually 
referred to as the “normative” thesis, says that the legal rules of common law ought 
to be efficient.1 The concept of efficiency in this context means maximization of 
social willingness- to- pay. Other law-and-economics scholars sometimes employ 
“efficiency” in the Pareto sense.
Under the guise of the economic analysis of law approach, judges become 
emboldened to exercise activist inclinations, using legal rhetoric about rights instru-
mentally to advance various social agendas. For the law and economics movement, 
such agendas are grounded in a peculiar ideology of rational choice, efficiency, 
pareto optimality, and wealth maximization. Propositions about rights are taken 
merely on an as-if basis – it is as if we had rights, but they don’t really exist. All that 
exists are competing preferences to be understood and arranged according to caus-
ally determined scientific laws.
13.2  Theoretical Time-Privileging
This paper posits that the economic analysis of law fails to give any satisfactory 
normative justification for its peculiar theoretical privileging of the future over the 
past. Judicial decision making, according to the economic analysis of law mindset, 
is portrayed as giving justifications exclusively in terms of future outcomes.2 The 
1 Throughout Posner’s work stress is placed on the expected efficient results normally accom-
plished through free trade and voluntary exchange. In Posner’s law-and-economics world the good 
is prior to the right. Yet it seems that the normative appeal of voluntary exchange and the legal 
rights that uphold this institution should not rest upon the resultant wealth maximization and effi-
ciency that are anticipated to ensue. Rather, what ought to be treasured most is moral respect for 
free will and chosen allegiance to rule of law – the system of legal rights and responsibilities as 
such – rather than the economic outcomes they enable. If market solutions are deemed superior it 
is because they are the intended outcome of free exchanges (O’Driscoll 1980).
2 In this respect, the economic analysis of law falls within the criticism Ronald Dworkin levelled 
against what he termed ‘legal pragmatism.’ “The pragmatist takes a skeptical attitude toward the 
assumption we are assuming is embodied in the concept of law: he denies that past political deci-
sions in themselves provide any justification for either using or withholding the state’s coercive 
power. He finds the necessary justification for coercion in the justice or efficiency or some other 
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economic analysis of law proceeds squarely in line with the dictates of modern 
economic theory’s obsession with calculations of preferences. By contrast, coming 
from the opposite direction, the judicial philosophy of ‘originalism’ harbours its 
own theoretical bias of time-value, which proceeds from a privileging of the past 
concerning questions of constitutional intent.3
Economic theory regards preferences as a type of empirical data, and it seeks to 
bypass any regard for the moral content of preferences or for the propensities of 
preferences to change in the face of moral considerations. However, what econo-
mists term ‘preferences,’ sometimes include peoples’ judgments on moral issues. 
Such judgments are made as a result of moral reflection and argumentation. As 
such, economic theory also ignores the various temporal value structures that are 
constitutive of preferences. Such temporal value structures implicate the free will of 
people making choices in time that are not causally determined nor predicable in 
advance of the time they are made. The moral decisions made engage further choices 
about alternative time-values – whether consequentialist (future oriented consider-
ations) or nonconsequentialist (blending past and future considerations) – which 
together is what enables them to be responsible moral agents. In their reductive 
treatments of these choices, economists are ignoring the fact that sometimes they 
are determined by moral judgments arrived at through antecedent moral arguments. 
So a more complete treatment would take into account the soundness of the moral 
argumentation that is presupposed by preferences. Accordingly, the best foundation 
for philosophy of law is not economic analysis and economic theory but rather 
moral philosophy.
13.3  Temporal Structures of Moral Decision Making
Temporal structures are implicated in moral decision making and in the acts of free- 
will that follow from those decisions. Consider that at time t, moral agent M, faces 
choices x or y (x: give money to a homeless person on the street, or y: walk on by). 
M can freely decide to do x or y. At time t1, after considering various arguments for 
and against, M decides to do y.
One significant point is that M’s decision to do y is not causally determined in 
advance of t1. On the contrary, the choice is free, it cannot be predicted in advance, 
either by M or by an external observer. Like M, our conscious moral decisions are 
contemporary virtue of the coercive decision itself, as and when it is made by judges, and he adds 
that consistency with any past legislative or judicial decision does not in principle contribute to the 
justice or virtue of any present one. If judges are guided by this advice, he believes, then unless 
they make great mistakes, the coercion they direct will make the community’s future brighter, 
liberated from the dead hand of the past and the fetish of consistency for its own sake. Of course 
judges will disagree about which rule, laid down in which circumstance, would in fact be best for 
the future without concern for the past.” Dworkin (1986, 151)
3 For an account of originalism, see Whittington (2013).
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independently significant in their own right. The logic of ethical justification is dif-
ferent from the logic of scientific explanation. The importance of making a moral 
case supporting a decision, and the weight that such a justification carries, is not 
contingent on, nor even particularly relevant to, any remote causal explanation that 
scientific study may offer.
A second important point is that M’s moral reasoning involves free (non-causally 
determined) choices about time orientation, horizon, and so on that express and 
depend upon a variety of M’s values. These engagements in time-value factors are 
not quantitatively measurable clock-time events but rather qualitative touchpoints 
that figure into moral reflection. M considers, say, the significance of the recently- 
past fact that he already has given money to charities just this week; M thinks ahead 
about whether, if he gives the beggar some money he will still have enough cash to 
cover the subway ride M’s about to take; M reflects that often in the past when he 
has given handouts to people they’ve used the money for drugs or booze; he recalls 
a time long ago when he himself was down and out; he wonders what if this was his 
son or daughter. Further, M makes a rough assessment of whether the beggar seems 
to be sincere and desperate, based on a complex mix of other past, present and 
future factors. M thinks about how these kinds of choices and judgments connect to 
the kind of person M has been, is, and will become; and perhaps M extends a similar 
process of thinking to the perceived character of the beggar as well. Or M may not 
give a thought to any of it at all – who knows? At any rate, even M’s deciding not to 
think about it is itself a moral choice.
A third point is that it is meaningful, and in line with what ordinary people do, to 
either blame or praise M (for his ungenerousness or sound judgment, respectively) 
if, say, he decides to do y. But ascribing blame or praise is only meaningful on the 
assumption that M’s decision comes from his free will. Determinism holds that your 
sense that you decided to walk on by comes from exercising your “free will” is 
delusional – your decision was caused by forces or events from the past. But deter-
minism does not show why any of this is true, nor give convincing reasons why we 
should suppose that we are living under a grand illusion about our free will. 
Determinism depicts the decision-making process the way we understand our inter-
nal organs to function. You don’t will or choose to make your heart beat or intestines 
digest. In this way determinism misrepresents moral decision making as a cause- 
and- effect process with no room left for the temporal nuances attending the free 
moral choices we have identified as figuring into one’s ordinary decision-making 
process.4
A fourth point – moving from M’s scenario to the context of judicial reasoning – 
is that in a relevantly similar way to M’s moral decision-making, the structure of 
legal decision-making presupposes and engages a vast and intricate web of time- 
values, and as such is not necessarily or exclusively portrayable as a project of jus-
tifying results solely in terms of future outcomes (efficiency, pareto optimality, 
4 According to the research studies of Zimbardo and Boyd (2009), people are psychologically 
determined to dwell, in quantifiably measurable allocations, on past, present, or future orientations 
with negative or positive attitudes.
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wealth maximization). For instance, in civil cases, the well-entrenched legal time- 
value structure of stare decisis requires that judicial decisions respect relevantly 
similar case precedents laid down in the past by the same or a superior court. It is 
owing to the force of stare decisis that a party’s legal rights are, in an important 
sense, pre-existing and thus interpretations of those rights are not hostage to the sort 
of future-oriented consequentialist justifications advanced by the economic analy-
sis of law.
13.4  Time and Free Will
Henri Bergson sought to mount a challenge against arguments that deny the exis-
tence of free will. In Time and Free Will, he claims that such arguments stem from 
confused concepts about time. The concept of time enlisted by physics and mathe-
matics is that time is a measurable construct analogous to dimensions of space. Yet 
Bergson insists that from the standpoint of human experience, one’s life is compre-
hended as a non-measurable, continuous flow. As such it is different from a succes-
sion of distinct, quantitatively measurable states of consciousness. The perceived 
flow is essentially qualitative, and not subject to quantitative reduction. Insofar as 
the human personality is expressed and revealed in actions that are not completely 
predictable, Bergson asserts that human free will is an observable fact. So Time and 
Free Will posits the idea of duration – lived time – in contradistinction from Bergson 
claims is a spatial understanding of time whereby time is measured and quantified 
scientifically with the instrument of a clock.
For Bergson the awareness we have of an inner self shows that psychological 
facts remain qualitatively distinct from other kinds of facts. Indeed, Bergson alleges 
that, in their pursuit of quantifying and calculating relations within the phenomena 
of this inner dimension psychologists (‘psychophysicists’) are implicated in a prac-
tice of “an inaccurate psychology, misled by language,” (1910, 165) that will “fail 
to translate completely what our soul experiences” (1910, 164). He takes issue in 
particular with Fechner’s reductive quantitative portrayal of a purported logarithmic 
lawlike relationship between the intensity of stimuli and the magnitude of corre-







[B]y invading the series of our psychic states, by introducing space into our perception of 
duration [the confusion of quality with quantity] corrupts at its very source our feeling of 
outer and inner change, of movement, and of freedom. (1910, 74)
For Bergson the key is to clear away conceptual confusions in metaphysics and 
psychology that confound the problem of free will:
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What I attempt to prove is that all discussion between the determinists and their opponents 
implies a previous confusion of duration with extensity, of succession with simultaneity, of 
quality with quantity: this confusion once dispelled, we may perhaps witness the disappear-
ance of the objections raised against free will, of the definitions given of it, and, in a certain 
sense, of the problem of free will itself. (xxiii–xxiv)
More recently, Thomas Nagel posits a distinction between two realms of truth 
concerning ourselves and the place we occupy in the world. One realm concerns our 
subjective, personal point of view. The other realm concerns the objective, imper-
sonal perspective from which one seeks to understand oneself as belonging to the 
natural world. Nagel (1986, 115) thinks the free will problem stems from the shift 
from one realm to the other:
The objective view seems to wipe out such autonomy because it admits only one kind of 
explanation of why something happened – causal explanation – and equates its absence 
with the absence of any explanation at all… [T]he basic idea which it finds congenial is that 
the explanation of an occurrence must show how that occurrence, or a range of possibilities 
within which it falls, was necessitated by prior conditions and events.
But is the impersonal point of view Nagel characterizes suitable for handling 
moral issues concerning responsibility, where such issues surpass scientific ques-
tions about freedom? Some scholars have developed views that treat issues of moral 
freedom as reducible to matters of control that is uncaused. Yet if it is true, as deter-
minism holds it to be, that all our behaviour is determined by external forces, then 
one is never in control of one’s behaviour in the sense that one can be held respon-
sible for it. A scientifically reductive determinism links moral judgments about 
responsibility to scientific explanations that are rendered on the basis of causation. 
Free will, from such a standpoint, is an illusion. Common attitudes about praise and 
blame and punishment, according to views espoused by J.C.C. Smart in his 1961 
Mind article, need to be adjusted accordingly. The implications of scientific deter-
minism for the philosophy of law are as astounding as they are implausible. Some 
legal scholars say that because science shows there is no free will, it is always 
wrong to punish. Instead we should treat criminals medically or reprogram them to 
change their behaviour. A similar view is put forward by an SEC attorney who 
couples his advocacy of scientific determinism and denial of moral free will with a 
thesis about the unreality of time (Gulack 2012).
13.5  Free Will and Legal Rights
Having a right to something means that you have control over others’ free will in 
regard to it. Otherwise, they can do as they please.
Someone violates your right by acting contrary to your free will in regard to your 
right’s object.
The will theory of rights, also known as the “choice theory,” allows rights- holders 




Example 1: the right to ownership of my land includes the freedom to do with it as 
I wish (subject to a set of legal constraints). It is wrong (a rights violation) for 
someone to interfere with my freedom unless they have a right to so interfere. If 
someone uses my land without having a right to do so, then I am free to either 
allow it, or to choose to prevent it by claiming protection of my right from rele-
vant legal authorities (injunction, criminal arrest, tort action for trespass).
Example 2: you cannot be subjected to harvesting of your bodily organs simply 
because transplants in others could be shown to make society better off. A tort 
right protects your individual interest in bodily security from any such coerced 
social redistributions. To lend protection, the tort right prioritizes your right- 
holder’s security interest over conflicting liberty or economic interests of correla-
tive duty-bearer(s). Your tort-based right, in turn, is grounded in an even more 
fundamental moral right of dignity.
A legal right has a temporal justificatory structure that extends from the present 
both ahead towards the future and backward towards the past. Any theory of law 
that fails to recognize this complex, multi-temporal nature of rights will be descrip-
tively deficient and normatively implausible.
That is to say, a theory of law should be temporally holistic in the way it accounts 
for the interpretation of rights.
13.6  Holism of Time-Value
Legal rights refer (either in tacit or explicit fashion) retrospectively to values from 
the past that ought to be respected. Interpretations of rights must bear consistency 
with settled precedents and statutory authority laid down in the past. This idea is 
enshrined in the common law doctrine of stare decisis. Legal rights also refer pro-
spectively to justifications based on moral objectives. Interpretations of rights must 
make sense in terms of political morality. Of course, legal rights refer to and exist in 
the present as well, as political rights that may be enforced on demand via coercive 
legal structures and adjudicative institutions. The call for their present recognition 
and enforcement does not require future supplemental legislation or additional law- 
creating action.
One example (there are others) of a temporally holistic conception of law is 
found in the work of Ronald Dworkin. Within Dworkin’s philosophy of law, there 
are two fundamental temporal structures – I will call them “theoretical time-value 
orientations” – that figure into interpretations of law. The first component, which he 
terms ‘fit,’ is retrospective. The second component, called ‘appeal’ or ‘justification,’ 
is prospective. In judicial decision making, a challenge is to develop a theory of law 
that simultaneously fits with past legal decisions while making the law the best it 
can be. Judges are bound to seek out historical legal principles that are woven into 
previously established ‘institutional material’ and then look forward to improving 
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and further purifying law for the future by rendering the most coherent interpreta-
tion of it.
In opposition to the claim that pre-existing legal sources might be contradictory 
or irreconcilable, Dworkin gives an interpretation according to what he terms the 
‘unity of value’ thesis. The project of interpretation he envisions reconciles values. 
The reconciliation seeks to show why moral conflict may call for a deeper structure 
of collaboration to resolve apparent conflicts and sometimes to illuminate a new 
point of comparison or contrast.
Dworkin presents a version of the drowning swimmer scenario:
One person clings to a life preserver in a storm that has wrecked her boat; sharks circle her. 
Two other passengers cling to another life preserver a hundred yards away; sharks circle 
them as well. You have a boat on shore. You can reach one life preserver in time, but then 
not the other one. Assuming all three are strangers, do you have a duty to save the two 
swimmers and let the lone swimmer die? (2011, 280)
But if we approach the decision in another way – by concentrating not on consequences but 
on rights – it is far from plain that we should automatically save the greater number. We 
might think that each victim has an equal antecedent right to be saved, and we might there-
fore be tempted by a lottery in which each shipwreck victim has at least one-third chance to 
be saved. (The sharks agree to circle while the lottery is conducted.) (2011, 281)
Whereas most people may, owing to the fact that there are two swimmers holding 
on one of the life preservers, yet only one swimmer clinging to the other, be auto-
matically inclined to save the two. That response follows from a utilitarian (conse-
quentialist) calculation to advance the greatest good for the greatest number. It is not 
clear, however, that this is the right solution from a principles-and-rights concep-
tion. Yet it is not obvious that each of the swimmers that one can aid has an “equal 
antecedent right to be saved.” If it is too dangerous and you would unreasonably risk 
your own life, then a right to be saved cannot be invoked to force you to give aid. 
The swimmers can, nevertheless, claim a right to equal concern and respect.
That right to equal concern and respect, in turn, is interpreted in light of a broad 
moral value: that life has value. So one needs to interpret the available options – lot-
tery to decide among them, or whether the lone swimmer is your spouse, or a gifted 
violinist or outstanding surgeon – in line with respecting the value of human life 
(2011, 281).
I wish to drill down further and ask: what does it mean to speak, in such contexts, 
of having an “antecedent right” in temporal terms? Is it a non-temporal ante-
cedence – that is, only a logical sense of antecedent? (As in ‘If x, then y’ – x is the 
logical antecedent to y). The idea of antecedent legal rights does have a temporal 
sense, since the rights are pre-existing (they are not invented on-the-spot, but rather 
interpreted), in that they exist already (historically) in settled law. To be sure, in the 
swimmer case, we are not dealing with legal (institutional) rights but rather with a 
moral rescue (aid) context. But that context is nevertheless used to illustrate the 
structure of legal rights and duties. It easily could be a legal case in some places, 
considering that there is a legal duty to rescue in some countries.
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Consider some of the ways that various temporal factors – engaging a host of 
value judgments – might come into play, particularly in connection with interpret-
ing the “equal objective importance of all human lives”:
• One can justifiably choose to save the lone swimmer if, say, it is one’s spouse. In 
that case, there is a special justification that refers to the past (the historical act 
of marriage and resultant relationship). And the justification presumably draws 
support as well from one’s present and future commitment to the spouse.
• What if the lone swimmer, a convicted child molester, nevertheless came out to 
save you from drowning last week when you’d fallen overboard? Does his crimi-
nal past matter now and for the future (should you forgive and forget)? Is there a 
present duty to reciprocate in saving his life now in respect of his past saving of 
your life?
What I would like to draw attention to in such examples (and others) is this: 
neither the past nor the future dominates in this approach. There is instead a need for 
intricate temporal balancing that defies any rigid privileging in any one direction or 
for any given retrospective or prospective distance.
13.7  So What?
Why does this kind of critique of the distorted temporality deployed in the eco-
nomic analysis of law matter? There is a resurgence in interest in the economic 
analysis of law, fuelled in no small way by trends toward using digital technologies 
(including artificial intelligence) for resolving legal conflicts. The empirical- 
scientific conception of law, which sees legal conflicts as best resolvable through 
future-oriented assessments of quantifiable data according to objective scales of 
efficiency, Pareto optimality, welfare maximization of revealed preferences, and so 
on, lends apparent philosophical support to the agenda of such a research project. 
This kind of reductive scientism (not scientific method per se) should be opposed, 
not only because of the perils of the ideology of scientism as such, but also because 
of the theoretical shortcomings of the economic analysis of law exposed herein.
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